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ABSTRACT 
A MULTILEVEL CONCEPTION OF INTENTIONALITY: 
THE EFFECTS OF UNCONSCIOUS INFORMATION 
ON COUNSELOR’S CONCEPTUALIZATIONS, 
INTENTIONS AND RESPONSES 
September 1986 
OSCAR F. GONCALVES 
B.A., M.A., UNIVERSITY OF OPORTO, PORTUGAL 
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Allen E. Ivey 
The concept of intentionality has been used in the 
philosophical literature to describe the process of 
knowledge construction in the relationship between subject 
and object. This concept has also been object of increased 
popularity in the fields of counseling and psychotherapy. 
Rooted on the cognitive-constructivist epistemological 
movement, this thesis, uses the intentionality construct to 
conceptualize the process of knowledge transformation in 
counseling. The research on the behavioral, cognitive and 
unconscious dimensions of the counseling process was 
reviewed. From this review the absence of models and 
research linking these three dimensions was evident. Thus, 
this thesis presents a multilevel conception of 
vii 
intentionality where behavioral, cognitive, and unconscious 
dimensions are articulated. The main assumptions of this 
model were presented, and an empirical study intended to 
explore some of these assumptions was carried out. This 
study tested the effects of tachistoscope presentations of 
affective words on subjects' conceptualizations, intentions, 
and responses to a simulated client. The participants, 36 
counseling students, were randomly assigned to one of the 
following treatments: (1) subliminal presentation of 
negative emotional concepts; (2) subliminal presentation of 
positive emotional concepts; (3) supraliminal presentation 
of negative emotional concepts; and (4) supraliminal 
presentation of positive emotional concepts. After the 
tachistoscopic presentations, all subjects were exposed to a 
simulated client, which they were asked to evaluate, respond 
to, and report the cognitive intentions that guided their 
responses. Significant effects were found in the subliminal 
presentation of positive emotional concepts on subjects' 
conceptualizations, intentions, and responses. Some 
significant effects were also found for the supraliminal 
presentation, but only for.the client evaluation measure. 
The results are discussed in their relationship to the 
multilevel intentionality model presented. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The present thesis is part of a personal search for 
the understanding of the complexities in the counseling 
process. Since my initial courses in counseling skills and 
therapeutic techniques I have found myself both overwhelmed 
and fascinated by the enormous complexity of the therapeutic 
enterprise. At that time I was looking for specific 
techniques and skills to enable me to work with my clients. 
The behavioral conception of the counseling process in 
terras of verbal and non-verbal behaviors impressed me as a 
good way to translate all the therapeutic interactions into 
concrete and observable mechanisms. Besides, when I was 
charged with the teaching of some introductory counseling 
courses I found relief and security in some counseling 
skills training programs prescribing clearly what to do, how 
to do, and when to do. What Mahoney (in press a) once 
referred to as the " Underground Handbook of How to be 
Helpfull" was at that time to me the raicrocounseling 
metamodel (Ivey, 1971, 1983). While, in a process of 
horizontal decalage, my therapeutic approaches were slowly 
moving in the direction of the cognitive revolution 
(Mahoney, 1977), my training methodologies, as well as my 
conceptualizations of the counseling process, still fell 
within the apparently simplicity of the counseling skills 
1 
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model. 
It was not until I began some research on the effects 
of counseling skills training programs, that the paradigm 
shift began to emerge. After a short stay in Iowa with 
Gerald Stone and a seminar with Norman Sprinthall I felt 
encouraged by the stimulating ideas of the cognitive (e.g, 
Stone, 1980, 1982) and developmental approaches (e.g., 
Sprinthall & Thies-Sprinthall, 1981). Convinced that 
personal and cognitive developmental dimensions were 
important components of the role played by the counselor in 
the therapeutic interaction, I tried to look for the effects 
of counseling skills training programs on cognitive and 
developmental measures, such as moral and conceptual 
development. Basically, I found that the traditional 
counseling skills training programs were of limited effect 
in terms of alteration of variables other than the 
behavioral ones (Goncalves, 1985; Goncalves & Campos, 1985). 
Other researchers were at that time finding similar results 
(e.g., Hirsch & Stone, 1982; Stone & Kelly, 1983). 
At that time it began to be evident, in ray teaching, 
practice and research, that a great amount (probably the 
greater amount) of the therapeutic experience remained 
undefined after a counseling skills analysis (Ivey & 
Goncalves, in press). Like Mahoney (in press a) "I began to 
slowly appreciate that my expert clinical mentors were 
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themselves operating according to abstract and tacit 'rules' 
rather than concrete and explicit guidelines". 
The more I taught and practiced, the more aware I was 
of the complexity of the counseling process, and of the 
inability of traditional behavioral tools to capture the 
therapeutic phenomenon. Comments from other process 
researchers on the slipperiness and elusiveness of the 
counseling process (Hill, 1984) gave me however some 
strength and enthusiasm to pursue the task of process 
research. 
This thesis, can, though, be seen as another step in 
the way toward a fuller understanding of the counseling 
process, and is stimulated by the considerable press for 
change that counseling and psychotherapy have been 
experiencing during the past few years. 
Three main causes are contributing to the 
dissatisfaction with traditional models. First, despite the 
amount of research done, few definitive conclusions can be 
drawn regarding the effective ingredients of the counseling 
process. Secondly, there is not a single method or technique 
which can claim to be successful with all kinds of clients 
and problems. Third, after a almost one century of 
evolution, psychotherapy still lacks "a coherent, unitary 
and epistemological program" (Guidano & Liotti, 1985, 
p.101). This dissatisfaction has produced an epistemological 
search (Borgen, 1984a; Joyce-Moniz, 1985). The 
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epistemological search is characterized by three main 
trends. First, in methodological and theoretical terras, 
there appears to exist an openess to integrate traditionally 
disparate approaches in the movement that will be here 
referred to as epistemological eclecticism. Second, the 
cognitive-constructivist approach is more and more referred 
to as an useful epistemological paradigm to conceptualize 
the counseling process. Third, and as a consequence of the 
previous two, in looking for new paradigms, counselors and 
therapists have also begun to pay more attention to concepts 
which provide more comprehensive and integrative views. 
Intentionality is one of those concepts (Schmidt, 1984). 
This chapter will begin with the presentation of 
examples of the epistemological eclecticism, searching for 
new paradigms to counseling practice and research. Then, the 
core assumptions of the cognitive-construtivist movement 
will be summarized. Next, the concept of intentionality will 
be introduced as a useful construct for the integration of 
the counseling process research. Finally, an outline of the 
chapters will be presented. 
Epistemological Eclecticism 
Some writers are accusing counselors of using outdated 
research methodologies directly inhereted from the Newtonion 
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conceptions for the physical sciences (e.g., Howard, 1984, 
1985). As was recently stressed by Howard (1984), the 
traditional research model of physical sciences was found to 
have limitations for explaining phenomenon occuring at the 
micro and macrolevel. As an alternative, he suggests the 
need for an increased number of case studies and greater 
attention to plans and intentions of the subjects involved 
in the research study. 
Following Howard’s (1983) suggestion for more case 
studies and methodological pluralism, Hill, Carter, and 
O’Farrell (1983) presented for the first time in the history 
of Journal of Counseling Psychology, a systematic and 
well-done analysis of a single case. As the central 
motivation for this study, they refer to their ’’frustration 
with the inability of traditional designs to describe the 
effective ingredients of the counseling process” (p.3). 
Similarly, Polkinghorne (1984) called for a radical 
change in counseling research methods. Alternatively, he 
defends the idea of a multiple system of inquiry, intended 
to include: (1) systemic and structural designs; (2) 
phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches; and (3) human 
action inquiries able to intentions. 
Similar opinions are defended by Patton (1984), Strong 
(1984), and Ford (1984). Patton states that there is a need 
to use models provenient from phenomenological philosophy 
and sociology in counseling research. Strong stresses that 
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reality of human experience is phenomenological, 
subjective, and idiosyncratic” (p.470). Ford defends that 
our research tools should be able to take into account the 
full implications of the definition of humans as 
self-constructing organisms. 
In conclusion, there seems to be a strong agreement 
concerning the need for a new philosophy of science in 
counseling research. The researchers seem to agree on some 
basic points. First, there is no single methodology which 
can take into account the complexity of the counseling 
process. Second, the joining of traditional methodologies 
with new and innovative approaches is viewed as desirable. 
Third, humans should be viewed as active, cognitive, 
decision-making, and intentional individuals. Finally, a 
growing number of phenomenological, biographical, 
hermeneutic, structural, and systemic studies should be 
undertaken in the future. 
This methodological eclecticism experienced in 
counseling and psychotherapy is accompained by a theoretical 
eclecticism. The number of counseling and clinical 
psychologists identifying themselves as eclectic has 
increased during the past years (Smith, 1982). Borgen (1984 
b), in a recent review, has also referred to the growing 
tendency in counseling psychology toward eclecticism. As 
Highlen and Hill (1984) stressed, "perhaps practitioners 
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began to realize that our theoretical set of 'spectacles' 
was insufficient for dealing with the gamut of psychological 
problems" (p.340). Several eclectic models were introduced 
during the last few years. For example, Cooper and Lewis 
(1983) presented a developmental framework to explain 
counselors confrontation with the diversity of theoretical 
approaches. Based on Perry's developmental theory, they 
described a three stage sequence: dualistic orientation, 
crisis of relativism, and confrontation with the pluralistic 
world. More recently, Brabel and Welfel (1985) have also 
described the eclectic approach in terms of developmental 
constructs, this time based on reflective judgement theory. 
Still other eclectic approaches were recently introduced by 
Ivey and Matthews (1984) and Held (1984). Particularly 
interesting is the meta-model presented by Ivey and 
Matthews.' In this model, the clinical interview is divided 
into five stages, hypothesized as common to most theoretical 
perspectives. In his Three Approaches to Counseling, Ivey 
(1983) uses his single skills approach, integrated in the 
five stages of an interview to demonstrate the operation of 
psychodynamic dream analysis, logotherapy dereflection 
technique, and assertiveness training. This metamodel is a 
good illustration of how (in counseling practice and 
training) it is possible to begin the construction of 
bridges between apparently discrepant theoretical 
approaches. 
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The advantages derived from this movement towards the 
integration of several approaches is well captured in the 
following words of Mahoney (1980): 
...whiie the life of an intellectual gypsy may not 
a ^ord the comforts of a conceptual home, it does 
offer a richness of experience and an appreciation 
of movement that are at least partially 
compensatory (p.158). 
In sura, counseling and psychotherapy research are 
searching for new paradigms intended to identify more 
clearly the components of the counseling process and devise 
more effective ways of working with clients. This movement 
is characterized by a growing openess both in terms of 
methodological and theoretical issues. 
The Cognitive-Constructivist Approach 
The central idea of the cognitive-constructivist 
position is well summarized in Weimer’s (1975) statement 
that each organism is a theory of its environment. That is, 
human beings are not passive recipients of input, instead 
they are active participants in the construction of 
knowledge, co-authoring their own scripts as Mahoney (1981) 
accurately puts it. 
Most of the cognitive revolution in counseling and 
psychotherapy (Mahoney, 1977) was not effective in producing 
the shift from an associationist, reductionist, and 
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empiricist point of view. Recently however, there are some 
indication that cognitive tharapists are begining to see and 
analyze the therapeutic process within a more constructivist 
point of view (Guidano, 1984; Guidano & Liotti, 1985; Ivey, 
in press; Ivey & Goncalves, in press; Joyce-Moniz, 1985; 
Mahoney, 1981, in press b). 
According to the constructivist position, counseling 
and psychotherapy are seen as processes of knowledge 
construction, where knowledge appears to be not a simple 
copy from reality but a "progressive, hierarchic 
construction of models of reality where, step by step, the 
furniture of experience is molded into cognitive structures 
by the ordering activity carried out by the knowing subject" 
(Guidano, 1984, p.33). 
Joyce-Moniz (1985) defend that the goal of an 
epistemology of therapy should be to understand the 
relationship between client's knowledge and therapist's 
knowledge. Both participants are epistemic subjects, and the 
therapeutic interaction represents the interface and 
dialectic relationship between these two epistemologies. 
Thus, each element constructs knowledge in his/her 
interaction with the environment, and the construction of 
knowledge about the world is seen in a certain way as 
construction of knowledge about the self (Guidano & Liotti, 
1985). The objective of therapy according to this approach 
should be not to prepare clients to know that or know how, 
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but to enable them to construct knowledge from the 
knower-known relationship of the therapeutic interaction 
(Ivey & Goncalves, in press). 
Even though this epistemological movement is still in 
its beginning stages, important implications can be drawn to 
the analysis and understanding of the counseling process. 
Three central ideas seem to be important to retain. First, 
participants in the counseling situation are seen as 
epistemic subjects active in the construction of their own 
knowledge. Second, the therapeutic relationship is seen as 
the one of knowledge construction, where both participants 
are simultaneous subject and object in this process. Third, 
the process of knowledge construction is seen as dialectic 
in nature. 
The next section will introduce the concept of 
intentionality as an useful one to help in the 
operationalization of some of the conclusion of the 
epistemological and constructivist movement. 
The Concept of Intentionality 
The concept of intentionality, as it is presented 
should be understood within the movement of attempting to 
find alternative and, hopefully more useful, research and 
The concept of intentionality is not a theoretical concepts 
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new one, and comes from a long philosophical tradition. 
However, this thesis will attempt to integrate some of the 
disparate meanings that this concept has had in the past. 
Intentiona1ity will be used here in reference to the 
fact that counselor and client are continuosly, 
intentionally involved - by their behaviors, cognitions, and 
unconscious processes- in a process of mutual influence. 
Several advantages could be found in the 
conceptualization of the counseling process in terms of the 
present intentionality dimensions. First, the term 
intentionality is a good one to convey the idea of subjects 
as active information processors. That is, in the present 
view, counselor and client are viewed as actively and 
intentionally affecting one another. Second, as it will be 
seen later on, intentionality has been a central concept in 
the philosophical thought. Within the philosophical 
tradition that concept has been used in an attempt to 
understand the relationship between the knower and the 
known. In other words, it reflects an attempt to understand 
the ways by which we relate to the external world. The 
search for the understanding of this relationship between 
knower and known can also be seen as the central theme of 
counseling process research. Third, the present 
conceptualization refers to three important dimensions of 
the counseling process: (1) the dimension of reality or of 
concrete behaviors; (2) the dimension of thought processes 
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or ideas; (3) and finally, the "hidden" dimemenslon of 
unconscious processes. Most of the past research has been 
restricted to exploring only one among these three aspects. 
Finally, by refering to the behavioral, cognitive, and 
unconscious dimensions of the counseling process, the 
present conception attempts to gap the distance between 
apparently discrepant approaches such as psychodynamic and 
behavioral theories. 
The following section will present a historical 
overview of the intentionality concept, along with its 
meaning in the context of the present thesis. 
Historical Overview 
In a recent and brief review of the concept of 
intentionality in counseling, Schmidt (1984) presents it as 
"an emerging construct that is important to counseling 
research" (p.383). The importance given to the concept of 
intentionality reflects increased attention that counseling 
and psychotherapy are addressing to epistemological issues. 
Sullivan (1968), refers to the epistemological approach as 
an attempt to understand the relationship between the knower 
and the known. "The idealists stress the existence of the 
knower; the realists, the existence of the known" (Sullivan, 
1968, p.250). The concept of intentionality has wavered 
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between these two positions throughout the history of 
philosophy and psychology. 
In this brief historical overview, the concept of 
intentionality will be presented in its movements between 
the realist and idealist positions, i.e. from the focus on 
the known to the focus on the knower. I will begin with an 
analysis of the concept within the philosophical tradition. 
This analysis will be brief and mainly restricted to the 
contributions of Franz Brentano. Following, the evolution of 
the concept in counseling and psychotherapy will be 
described. The existential model of Rollo May and the 
developmental approach of Allen Ivey will be stressed. 
Finally, the relationship between the conception presented 
in this thesis, as an attempt to integrate the idealist and 
realist positions, and the formulations of May and Ivey will 
be addressed. 
Intentionality in the Philosophical Tradition. As was 
defended by May (1969), the roots of intentionality can be 
found in the ancient thought of Aristotle and Cicero. 
Brought to the West by Arabic philosophers, this concept 
acquired central importance during the Middle Ages, refering 
to the knowledge of reality or epistemology. 
The issue of intentional existence however, was first 
considered in depth by the German philosopher and 
psychologist Franz Brentano in the late 1800 s. In his most 
well known quotation, Brentano (1874/1973) states: 
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Every psychic phenomenon is characterized by that 
which the scholastics of the Middle Ages have 
called the intentional inexistence of an object, 
and which we, in somewhat ambiguous terras would 
call the reference to a content, the direction 
toward an object (which need not be a real thing), 
or an immanent objectivity (p.124-125). 
Brentano takes the mental act as the object of study 
in psychology. Thus, mind intends to the objects of external 
world, and it is this intentionality that constitutes the 
content of consciousness. Therefore, Brentano1s theory could 
be understood realism, and empiricism. As Sullivan (1968) 
defended: 
He was an Idealist in his restriction of 
philosophical thought to the analysis of 
consciousness; he was a Realist in the sense that 
he denied that only acts of mind, or a mind that 
acts, exists; and an Empiricists in his consistent 
reference to the objects of consciousness, which he 
conceptualized as having a special form of 
existence in mental acts (p.251). 
The concept of intentionality was further developed in 
the philosophy of Husserl and Bergmann. Husserl maintains 
that intentionality is what gives meaning to the objects of 
reality. According to Husserl, the world of reality is, to a 
certain extent, a personal or intended world. However, this 
world has also some intersubjective qualities, making 
possible the existence of agreement and communication. 
Bergmann goes further, still in a different direction. He 
analyzed the logical links between acts and intentions, 
refering to these links as intentionality. 
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In sum, right from the begining, intentionality 
appears as a conceptual equivalent of epistemology. That is, 
a way of knowing the world - a link between the knower and 
the known. The writings of Brentano and followers can be 
understood as an important philosophical attempt to go 
beyond the dichotomy of idealism and realism. As well as the 
need to pay attention to both dimensions, the dimension of 
the subject and the dimension of the object. For Brentano, 
intentionality is the bridge between the two, knower and 
known, subject and object, idealism and realism. 
Intentionality in Counseling and Psychotherapy. 
Although most often cited as a philosopher, Brentano was 
part of the environment that gave birth to scientific 
psychology. He published his most influential book 
Psychologie vom Standpunkte in 1874, exactly in the same 
year when Wundt was publishing Grundzuge der Physiologishen 
Psychologie. These two books marked completely different 
conceptions of what psychology should be. As was long ago 
stressed by Titchner (1921), there are no mid-points between 
Brentano and Wundt. Although the latter is widely recognized 
as the founder of experimental psychology, the influence of 
Brentano in clinical psychology is by far, much more 
important. Freud was a student of Brentano, and took with 
him the only nonmedical courses of his career. As was 
defended by May (1969), some roots of Brentano's conceptions 
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of intentionality can be found in Freud's free association 
and dream analysis techniques. However, it was probably only 
with Rollo May that the concept of intentionality was used 
most explicitly by the fields of counseling and 
psychotherapy. It is important to recall that May published 
in this country, in 1939, what can be considered the firt 
book on counseling - The Art of Counseling. 
In contrast, inspired by a behavioral approach, Ivey 
(1971, 1983; Ivey & Authier, 1978; Ivey & Rollin, 1974) 
defines the intentional counselor as the one who has several 
skills available, and is able to choose among them in order 
to produce different effects on clients. The raicrocounseling 
model is concerned with training counselors in the use of 
specific skills, to make them able to act on clients. Thus, 
Ivey's view of intentionality, as formulated within the 
microcounseling paradigm, is pragmatic, realistic, and 
mainly concerned with specific behaviors or skills. The 
general idea is that if the counselor uses specific skills 
she or he will be expected to produce specific effects on 
clients. Ivey's conception describes one important dimension 
of the counseling process that has influenced, and still 
influences our models of practice, training, and research. 
In the next chapters I will refer to this dimension, as 
behavioral intentionality. 
More recently, however, Clara Hill and colleagues 
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(Hill, Carter, & O'Farrell, 1983; Hill & O'Grady, 1985) have 
been refering to intentionality in still a different way. 
According to Hill, each counselor's actions are the concrete 
translation of cognitive intentions. Rather than looking for 
counseling skills, she studies the reasons given by 
counselors for the selection of their actions. This time, 
intentionality seems to be more focused on the inner world 
of the knower, close to the idealist position. However, Hill 
stresses the importance of establishing the relationship 
between cognitive intentions and specific skills, in an 
attempt to link the ideal world of the knower with the real 
world of the known. In a similar way, Elliott and colleagues 
found that the effects on clients were not determined by 
counselor actions, but instead by client perceptions of 
counselor's intentions (Elliott, 1979; Elliott, Barker, 
Casky, & Pistrang, 1982). Hill and Elliott, in their work, 
seem to be pointing to another dimension of counseling 
intentionality. In this dimension, cognitions and 
perceptions are stressed, rather than skills. This dimension 
represents part of what I will be refering to as cognitive 
intentionality. 
May (1969), departing from a phenomenological 
perspective, presents a still more complex and integrated 
conception of intentionality. Three main characteristics are 
stressed. First, and linking Ivey's and Hill's conceptions, 
intentions are seen as coming from our minds as well as from 
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the objects. That is. "you cannot understand the overt 
behavior except as you see it in relation to and as an 
expression of its intentions " (p.230) . Second, and going 
even further than the cognitive approach, intentionality is 
not only seen as a conscious process. Instead, unconscious 
intentions are seen as important components and determinants 
of our thoughts and actions. Finally, the process of therapy 
is seen by May as an attempt to bring together the following 
three dimensions of intentionality: wish, will, and 
decision. All three dimensions are co-determinants of our 
existence. Wish refers to the most basic level of awareness, 
the organic level, and includes body needs and desires. The 
second dimension, will, brings wish or desire into 
self-conscious ("I am the one who has these wishes”). And 
the third dimension, decision, refers to responsibility and 
action. 
Similarly, Ivey (in press ; Ivey & Goncalves, 1985) 
has recently presented a stage model of intentionality. 
Following a Piagetian model of development, Ivey generates 
four stages of intentionality. The first level, called 
sensori-motor, refers mostly to the unconscious determinants 
of our behavior. In this stage, the child as well as the 
adult is able to act. However, he or she is unable to 
understand the causes and to anticipate the consequences of 
his/her actions. As an illustration, we have the counselor's 
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absence of eye contact when the client focuses on certain 
issues. Although unaware of this behavior, the counselor is 
unconsciously influencing the client not to discuss certain 
issues. 
The second level of intentionality, called concrete 
intentionality, refers to the ability to concretely operate 
in the environment. One of the important characteristics of 
this stage is not only to report and undertake specific 
courses of action, but also to understand cause-effect 
relationships, and to anticipate the effects of a given 
action. This level of intentionality is well illustrated by 
the assumptions underlying the raicrocounseling model. One 
can say that the objective of microcounseling, as it was 
conceptualized in the past, was to train counselors to 
operate at the concrete intentional level. At this level, 
the counselor is able to anticipate the specific effects of 
using a reflection of feeling or a paraphrase. Additionaly, 
the concrete intentional counselor is able to correct his or 
her own action as a consequence of the feedback provided by 
the client. 
The third level of intentionality, refered to as 
formal operations, requires the ability to think about our 
own*"_thinking processes. Here, counselors recall their own 
thoughts In the therapeutic work, formulate hypotheses, 
revise hypotheses, and establish intentions for their 
actions. In this level of intentionality, counselors are 
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thinking systematically about their own thoughts in the 
counseling process. The pioneering work of Kagan (1975) with 
Interpersonal Process Recall is a good example of this 
level. 
Finally, the fourth level, called joint construction 
of reality, refers to the interaction between client and 
counselor of these different levels of intentionality. That 
is, in the counseling relationship, a fourth level of 
intentionality is co-constructed by counselor and client. 
This level is illustrated by the research showing that 
"counselor may be impacted as much by the client in the 
moment as the client is by the counselor" (Ivey & Goncalves, 
1985, p.19). 
Besides, Ivey states that these dimensions do not 
exist in. a hierarchical way. All of them co-exist and 
represent important dimensions of our everyday interactions. 
Summarizing, according to Ivey and colleagues, the following 
three levels of intentionality co-exist in the individual: 
sensori-motor, concrete, and formal. Additionally, these 
levels of client and counselor intentionality interact in 
the therapeutic process generating a dialectic movement 
toward the synthesis of a fourth level of co-constructed 
intentionality (see early work on direct mutual 
communication done by Higgins, Ivey, and Uhlmann, 1970). 
be traced between May's and Direct parallels can 
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Ivey’s conceptions. Both authors claim that different levels 
of intentionality co-exist in the same individual. The 
sensori-motor level of Ivey seems to have an equivalent to 
the wish dimension of May. Similarly, will seems to 
correspond, at least in part, with formal intentionality, 
and decision is May's equivalent for concrete operations. 
Additionaly, both authors agree that a process of mutual 
influence exists between counselor and client. This process 
generates, according to Ivey, a fourth level of joint 
intentionality. Whereas May (1969) stresses that the 
relationship between subject and object is not only a matter 
of master and slave. Instead, "the clay also forms the 
sculptor" (May, 1969, p.237). 
The perspective to be presented in this thesis is 
similar to the one advanced by May and Ivey. Three different 
levels of intentionality are hypothesized to exist in the 
counseling process: behavioral, cognitive, and unconscious. 
These dimensions correspond roughly to Ivey's concrete, 
formal, and sensory-motor stages, and to May's decision, 
will, and wish levels. Although recognizing the importance 
of a fourth, cogenerated level of intentionality, this 
aspect will not be directly addressed in the present thesis. 
Summarizing, two central ideas underly the present 
thesis. First, counseling and psychotherapy are seen as a 
process of knowledge construction, where two episteraic 
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subjects relate to each other in a dialectic way. Second, 
that the process of knowledge construction operates at three 
different levels: behavioral, cognitive and unconscious. The 
most central assumption of the multilevel conception of 
intentionality presented in this thesis is that counselor's 
intentionality, as that one of the client (i.e., his/her 
relationship with the world) results from the interaction 
between behavioral, cognitive, and unconscious processes. It 
should be obvious at this point that, in the context of the 
present thesis, intentionality is not synonymous of purpose 
or objective, such as it often appears in current language. 
Rather, intentionality is more an equivalent of 
epistemology, referring to the process of knowledge 
construction in the relationship between subject and object, 
knower and known. 
The present thesis will present a multilevel 
conception of intentionality in counseling and 
psychotherapy, where behavioral, cognitive, and unconscious 
mechanisms are articulated. An empirical study on the 
effects of subliminal presentations on counselor's 
conceptualizations, intentions, and responses, will test 
some of the assumptions of the multilevel intentionality 
model. 
Following, a brief outline of the thesis will be 
provided . 
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Outline of the Chapters 
Following this introduction, the second chapter will 
extensively review the research on the different dimensions 
of the counseling process, under the headings of behavioral, 
cognitive, and unconscious intentionality. The first section 
of this chapter will summarize the research on behavioral 
intentionality. Behavioral intentionality will be defined as 
the network of verbal and nonverbal behaviors occuring 
between counselor and client. Section two, will report the 
research on cognitive intentionality, defined as the 
internal experiences of counselor and client, including 
perceptions, attitudes, conceptualizations, formulation of 
hypotheses and establishment of intentions. Finally, the 
third section will review the research on unconscious 
intentionality. This dimension is there defined as the group 
of psychological processes of which we are unaware, even 
though they influence our thoughts and actions as clients 
and counselors. 
In the third chapter, the main conclusions of the 
research on each dimension of the counseling process will be 
briefly reviewed. Then, the major assumptions of the 
multilevel intentionality model will be presented. Finally, 
the empirical study, testing some of the major underlying 
assumptions of the model, will be introduced. 
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Chapter four and five, present respectively the 
methodology and the results of the research intended to test 
the effects of subliminal presentation of information on 
counselor's conceptualizations, intentions, and responses. 
Two central hypotheses, based on the multilevel 
intentionality model, will be tested. First, the 
presentation of subliminal information is hypothesized to 
impact the direction of counselor's conceptualizations, 
intentions, and responses toward the client. Second, the 
direction of this influence will be hypothesized to be 
dependent on the interaction between type of stimulus and 
the counselor's covert processes. 
Chapter six will discuss the main results of the 
empirical study. After exploring the data, some limitations 
of the research will be presented. Finally, several 
theoretical and practical implications will be drawn. 
As usual, the thesis will end with the presentation of 
a publishable article based on the empirical study. 
Before moving into chapter two, I would like to make 
two brief notes. First, throughout the thesis, the terms 
therapy, psychotherapy, and counseling will be used 
interchangebly. Second, although recognizing that most of 
the major assumptions of the model are valid for both client 
and counselor, and that counseling is a co-constructed 
process, the present thesis is focused on the counselor s 
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processes, in an attempt to analyze the metaknowledge of the 
therapist, the same one which Joyce-Moniz (1985) recognized 
as the most refractory to an epistemological inquiry. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter will review the research on behavioral, 
cognitive and unconscious dimensions of the counseling 
process. Most of the research reviewed is provenient from 
studies on counseling and psychotherapy. However, 
illustrations will ocasionally be presented from other 
fields with direct relevance to counseling. 
The first part will summarize the research on 
behavioral intentionality. After a description of Rogers 
(and followers’) studies on attitudes and facilitative 
conditions, the shift toward the concept of counseling 
skills will be reported. Then the review on the effects of 
different verbal and nonverbal skills will be presented. 
Next, the paper will review the studies on the use of skills 
within and across interviews, followed by the research on 
skills across different theoretical orientations. 
Part two will report the research on cognitive 
intentionality. This part begins with the presentation of 
Martin's model on the role played by cognitions in the 
counseling process. Following, this section will address 
itself to the conclusions of the studies done on attitudes 
and beliefs; perceptions, conceptualizations and hypotheses 
generation; and cognitive intentions. Finally, some 
methodological problems raised by the research on cognitive 
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intentionality will be discussed. 
The third part will review the research on unconscious 
processes. This part addresses some of the limitations of 
cognitive methodologies as well as some important positions 
which defend the need to study the unconscious processes 
inside and outside counseling. The role of affective 
processes on the unconscious will also be discussed, 
followed by a brief review of countertransference 
phenomenon. Finally, I will present a review of the research 
on subliminal perception, mainly in its relationship to 
social and clinical issues. 
The conclusion will finally summarize the main 
findings of the review. 
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Part 1 
Behavioral Intentionality 
Until the fifties, counseling and psychotherapy were 
viewed as mystical procedures. A complex set of devices were 
often used in order to produce dramatic changes in clients. 
However, the factors responsible for those changes were 
seldom clear. Different theorists argued about the 
effectiveness of different mechanisms. These postulated 
mechanisms often represented constructs of difficult 
operationalization. The difficulty in translating 
therapeutic variables into researchable questions was 
regarded suspiciously by behavioral psychologists (e.g., 
Eysenck, 1952). It was not until the behavioral researchers 
decided to approach the counseling process that some 
clarification began to emerge. 
Behaviorism developed, in fact, as a reaction against 
the internalist position that had dominated psychology 
almost since its beginning. As stated by Skinner (1974), 
"behaviorism calls for probably the most drastic change ever 
proposed in our way of thinking about man. It is almost 
literally a matter of turning the explanation of behavior 
inside out"(p.274). 
The bridge between the psychological laboratory and 
the structure of the counseling process was facilitated by 
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Skinner's (1957) conceptualizations on verbal behavior. 
Generally, according to Skinner, verbal behavior should be 
approached as a response in its own right, without the need 
to emphasize the symbolic mechanisms, so appreciated by 
dynamic theorists. The verbal behavior enabled, for the 
first time, researchers to explore the therapeutic process 
in an objective way. 
In an early review of the literature, Greenspoon 
(1962), showed how the "verbal behavior represents an 
excellent meeting ground for both the experimental and the 
applied psychologist" (p.511). Pioneer studies, reviewed by 
Greenspoon, showed how verbal behaviors in the interview 
follow the learning principles of operant conditioning. A 
classic example of a study on this domain was the classic 
research carried out by Greenspoon (1955). Greenspoon 
investigated the effect of the sounds "mmm-hmm" and "huh-uh" 
on the frequency of plural and non-plural nouns. The 
subjects were instructed to generate words for a period of 
50 minutes. During the first 25 minutes one of the two 
verbal sounds was offered contigently to either plural or 
non-plural nouns. During the second part no contigent sound 
was provided. Generally, the results showed that the sound 
"mmh-hmm" increased the frequency of both, plural and 
non—plural nouns, while the sound huh—uh produced a 
decrease in the amount of plural responses. These results 
were partly replicated in a clinical setting, where Ullman, 
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Krasner, and Collins (1961), demonstrate how head nodding 
and verbal encouragers ("mmra-hmra") to emotional messages, 
produce greater improvement in clients in group therapy. 
According to the behavioral perspective, the 
counseling process was operationalized in terms of 
stimulus-response conditions. The counselor was seen as 
providing certain discriminative stimuli for client's 
responses, and vice-versa. The same principles of any other 
learning situation were found in the therapeutic process 
(e.g., Bandura, 1961). 
The behavioral approach to counseling research brought 
many positive outcomes. Substantial research and subsequent 
understanding of the counseling process was achieved. 
Several programs for training counselors and clinicians were 
developed. And numerous research tools, such as verbal 
response systems and scales, were presented. As was 
demonstrated in research from Clara Hill (1974), the 
objective counting finally provided a less biased view of 
the counseling process. 
Inspired by this behavioral conception of the 
counseling process, Ivey and colleagues defended, in the 
early 70s, that the intentional counselor is the one who has 
several behavioral options, and selects specific skills in 
order to produce specific results on clients. The general 
idea is that if a counselor uses certain kind of skills, 
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verbal or nonverbal, he or she is expected to produce 
certain kind of consequences. The intentional counselor 
should be able to identify and anticipate the short and long 
terra effects of his/her actions, and select their responses 
accordingly (Ivey, 1971, 1983; Ivey & Authier, 1978; Ivey & 
Rollin, 1974). This conception triggered a considerable 
amount of research in verbal and nonverbal responses. It is 
to these verbal and nonverbal responses in the counseling 
process that I will be refering to as behavioral 
intentionality. Stated briefly, behavioral intentionality 
refers to the network of verbal and nonverbal behaviors 
occurring between counselor and client. 
I will begin this part with an analysis of the pioneer 
studies of Rogers (and followers) on attitudes. Following, I 
will describe the shift of attention from facilitative 
conditions or attitudes to counseling skills. Next, I will 
refer to the naturalistic and analogue studies on the 
effects of different skills. Then, some studies on the 
distribution of skills within and across interviews will be 
presented. Finally, I will report the research about the use 
of skills across theoretical orientations. 
Facilitative Conditions and Counseling Process 
Carl Rogers, the landmark of humanism, can be 
paradoxically identified as one of the first contributers to 
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a behavioral conception of intentionality. This fact 
represents a good illustration of the dialectic process that 
rules the evolution of human thought. That is, each thesis 
brings with it the main ingredients of its antithesis. 
In this section I will illustrate how the early 
studies of counselor’s attitudes or facilitative conditions, 
represented an initial commitment to a behavioral notion of 
intentionality. 
In a seminal article published in 1957, Carl Rogers 
addressed the question of whether it was "possible to state 
in terras which are clearly definable and measurable, the 
psychological conditions which are both necessary and 
sufficient to bring about constructive personality change? " 
(p.95). Rogers answered this question by establishing three 
basic conditions that he hypothesized were necessary and 
sufficient to produce clients’ growth. These conditions 
were: genuineness or congruence; unconditional positive 
regard; and empathy. By genuineness, Rogers refers to the 
necessity of counselors to be honestly themselves in the 
counseling situation, with a complete awareness of their 
organismic experience. Unconditional positive regard refers 
to the warm and full acceptance of clients in all their 
dimensions. Finally, empathy means the perception of the 
clients’ world as our own. Three additional conditions were 
also stated as fundamental: (1) that there exists at least a 
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minimal relationship between counselor and client; (2) that 
the client is in a state of incongruence, (3) and that the 
client is able to identify or perceive the three counselor’s 
attitudes. 
All these conditions were hypothesized by Rogers as 
being the effective ingredients of all type of therapies 
with all kinds of clients. 
With Rogers, someone was finally hypothesizing about 
the mechanisms of change in the counseling process, in a 
clear, straight-forward way. And, as was anticipated by 
Rogers at that time, this theoretical formulation gave "both 
direction and impetus to investigation. Since it sees the 
conditions of constructive personality as general, it 
greatly broadens the opportunities for study" (1957, p.102). 
The implications of Rogers formulations on subsequent 
research is well illustrated by the report of Husacker, 
Heppner, and Rogers (1982), showing that Rogers' 1957 
article figures as the second most quoted from those written 
before 1958. In fact, large amounts of research immediately 
followed Rogers hypotheses. According to a recent review by 
Patterson (1984), the research on facilitative conditions 
constitute one of the largest bodies of research literature 
ever produced. 
Most of the researchers following Rogers tried to 
identify the extent to which those conditions could be 
referred to as necessary and sufficient to produce 
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therapeutic change. 
The first reviews of literature found confirmatory 
evidence to Rogers’s hypotheses (Truax & Carkhuff, 1967; 
Truax & Mitchell, 1971). Reviewing 10 years of research, 
Truax and Mitchell (1971) conclude that counselors who 
exibit the conditions of congruence, unconditional regard, 
and empathy, are effective with their clients. Also, in 
consonance with Rogers, this was found to be true with 
counselors from different training levels and theoretical 
orientations, and with a wide variety of clients. However, 
this review was questioned because of the inclusion of 
research with serious methodological limitations (Mitchell, 
Bozarth & Krauft, 1977). 
A more recent review by Mitchell et al. (1977) pointed 
out much more limited conclusions. Despite the presence of 
some evidence to the importance of Rogerian facilitative 
conditions, the following three kinds of results were found 
in the literature; providing support, providing limited 
support, and a growing amount of evidence for no support. 
The existence of those conflicting findings encouraged 
Mitchell et al. to conclude that the relationship between 
facilitative conditions and clients’ change was much more 
complex than previously imagined. 
More recent and sophisticated reviews of Parloff, 
Waskow and Wolfe (1978), and Lambert, DeJulio, and Stein 
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(1978), are even less optimistic in respect to the 
sufficiency of the facilitative conditions. Reviewing 20 
years of research, Parloff et al. (1978) found evidence for 
the conclusion that the association between facilitative 
conditions and outcome is modest, and that the counseling 
process is probably more complex than Rogers thought. 
Similar findings were reported by Lambert et al. (1978) that 
suggest the existence of "other unaccounted for variables 
contributing to the changes occuring in clients" (p.472). 
Recently, Patterson (1984) in a review of the reviews, 
accused the previous reviewers of serious biases in the 
selection of studies, different criteria for evaluating 
confirmatory and disconfirraatory studies, excessive emphasis 
given to some studies, and partial mention of the results. 
Unfortunately, Patterson does not provide further 
clarification other than the reviews he is criticizing. And 
his conclusion that "the consistent positive findings 
regarding the elements of the therapeutic relationship are 
encouraging" (p.438), would, of course be accepted by most 
of the researchers on the counseling process. The remaining 
question which still needs to be clarified is: which are 
those elements? 
Summing up, Rogers was probably one of the first to 
present an attempt to operationalize the ingredients of the 
counseling process. Three specific actions of the counselor, 
referred to as attitudes or facilitative conditions, were 
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hypothesized as sufficient to explain the counseling 
outcomes. Despite the amount of research done, few 
definitive conclusions can be drawn other than the apparent 
necessity, but not sufficiency, of a good relationship 
between counselor and client. Probably the main limitation 
of Rogers’ formulations and subsequent research has to deal 
with the fact that facilitative conditions lack enough 
operationalization. Statements about the importance of a 
good relationship, were not satisfactory to researchers more 
accustomed to the manipulation of variables in the 
laboratory setting. This dissatisfaction with such 
constructs, and their obvious limitations in terras of 
descriptive, explicative, and predictable power, produced a 
shift to the concept of counseling skills. Within this later 
approach, counselor behavior began to be approached in a 
much more micro and operationalized level. This transaction 
between attitudes and counseling skills will be addressed in 
the next section. 
From Attitudes to Skills 
The dissatisfaction with the research on facilitative 
conditions produced a movement toward the search for more 
valid and reliable ways to explore the counseling process. 
Attitudes and facilitative conditions began to be accused of 
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ambiguity. What was presented as a undimensional mode was 
perhaps multidimensional. This awareness of the 
multidimensionality underlying Rogerian attitudes was 
probably the main reason for the shift of attention to 
counseling skills. 
In this section, I will summarize some of the early 
research which demonstrates the multidimensionality of the 
facilitative conditions, as well as the evolution in the 
conceptualization of the counseling process in terras of 
behavioral skills. 
During the 60s, two important studies were conducted 
by Zimmer and colleagues, supporting the evidence of 
multidimensionality of facilitative conditions. In the first 
study, Zimmer and Park (1967) tried to identify the 
existence of different dimensions involved in counserlor's 
warmth. Two sessions with a client were videotaped and 
analyzed by several counseling students. Each counselor's 
response was rated in a coldness - warmth dimension. A 
factorial analysis of the subjects responses reveal, among 
others, the existence of the following factors: restating 
and understanding, minimal activity, unstructured 
invitation, supportive communications, clarifications, 
probing, and interpretation. In conclusion, this study 
showed that it was possible to operationalize the 
characteristics of the client-counselor relationship, and 
that an attitude such as warmth could hardly be described as 
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a single factor. 
In a second study, Zimmer and Anderson (1968) used a 
similar methodology, this time to explore the dimensions of 
empathy and positive regard. An interview was taped and 
rated by several students in the conditions of empathy and 
positive regard. Again, they found that not one of the 
conditions were unidimensional, instead they were found to 
be composed of orthogonally related factors. 
From these two studies conducted by Zimmer and 
colleagues, one can conclude about the possibility of 
approaching the counseling process in a more operational 
way. That is, we can decompose the facilitative conditions 
in several factors, translated into different counselor's 
response modes. 
Following these early conclusions, some researchers 
began to identify that communication of attitudes was not 
only conveyed by verbal responses. Instead, nonverbal 
communication was found to be the most important contributor 
to the evaluation of counselor's warmth, empathy, and 
genuiness. The three studies summarized below are 
illustrative of this conclusion. 
Haase and Tepper (1972), devised a study intended to 
identify the diferential contributions of verbal and 
nonverbal channels in the communication of empathy. 
Forty-eight interactions between counselor and client were 
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videotaped. These interactions represented all possible 
combinations of the following conditions: two types of eye 
contact, two levels of trunk lean, two kinds of body 
orientation, two degrees of distance, and three levels of 
verbal empathy. These interactions were rated by the 
presence of empathy by 26 counselors. All the conditions of 
eye contact, trunk lean, distance, and verbal empathy, 
produced significant effects. However, the nonverbal 
dimensions accounted for most of the variance in the empathy 
ratings, twice more than the verbal messages. From this 
study, the authors concluded that "the communication of 
empathy is a multichannel process, one in which the channels 
are interdependent" (p.423). 
Tepper and Haase (1978), in a second study, extended 
this analysis to the facilitative conditions of respect and 
genuineness. New nonverbal cues were also added, such as 
vocal intonation and facial expression. Thirty-two 
interactions between counselors and clients were videotaped. 
These interactions include all possible combinations of 
different levels of trunk lean, eye contact, intonation, 
facial expression and verbal message. Each of 30 judges 
rated all the interactions in the dimensions of empathy, 
respect and genuineness. Again, the nonverbal cues were 
found to play the main role in the perceptions on each one 
of the facilitative conditions. Finally, Smith-Hannen (1977) 
also researched the contribution of several nonverbal 
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behaviors to client’s evaluation of counselor empathy and 
warmth. Forty videosegraents of counseling interactions were 
shown to 40 subjects. Half of the subjects (i.e., 
experimental group) viewed the totality of the counselor's 
body, while the other half (i.e., control group) only had 
access to the counselor's face, neck and verbal message. 
After each presentation, the subjects were asked to evaluate 
the counselors in the dimensions of empathy and warmth. The 
nonverbal behaviors controlled by the experimenter were arm 
and leg movements and positions. The results revealed that 
the movement of both arms and legs did not significantly 
affect the ratings. However, the various positions of arms 
and legs significantly affected the judgements of 
counselors' warmth and empathy. 
Together, these three researches showed how 
facilitative conditions can not only be decomposed in 
different verbal responses, but also in nonverbal behaviors. 
Both groups of research were important to legitimize the 
notion of behavior intentionality. They found that a good 
way to study the counseling process is to decompose all the 
situations in small, clear, operational, verbal and 
nonverbal behaviors. The shift to study counseling skills in 
counseling process research was well illustrated by Tepper 
and Haase's (1978) conclusion that "a complex combination of 
verbal and nonverbal cues play an important role in the 
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determination of perceived levels of empathy, respect, and 
genuineness" (p.41). 
Despite the fact that the research which justifies the 
need for considering counseling skills was only done in the 
60s, some authors in the early 40s were already proposing 
similar changes. I will now turn the attention to the 
evolution of the conception of counseling process in terras 
of behavioral intentionality (i.e., counseling skills). 
As early as 1943, Porter proposed a system to analyze 
Rogerian interviews (Porter, 1943 a, b). The system 
consisted of 20 categories, much more operational than those 
advanced by Rogers. At about the same time, Snyder (1945) 
introduced a similar system. Although much more operational 
than the Rogerian attitudes, these systems were mainly 
intended to study client-centered interviews. Probably the 
first system capable of describing counselors’ behaviors 
from different theoretical orientations, was the one 
introduced by Strupp (1957). Five scales were presented 
along with several categories for each scale. The five 
scales were: Type of therapeutic activity, depth 
directedness, dynamic focus, therapeutic climate, and 
initiative. The most clear of all was the first scale, the 
type of therapeutic communication, referred to the counselor 
verbal responses and included the following categories, 
facilitating communication, exploratory operations, 
structuring direct guidance, activity not relevant, and 
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unclassifiable. 
All these systems were important percursors of what 
appeared during the late 60s, being at that time the most 
complete description of the counseling process - the 
raicrocounseling model. Originally proposed by Allen E. Ivey 
(1971), this model was developed with the intention of 
training counselors, clinicians, and other kinds of 
professionals and paraprofessionals. But soon the model had 
broded its spectrum, beginning to be a frame of reference 
for most of the research done on the counseling process. One 
of the important characteristics of Ivey’s model is the 
inclusion of both verbal and nonverbal behaviors in the 
description of counseling process. 
In the early formulations, raicrocounseling introduced 
the following skills as characterizing the counselor 
contributions to the therapeutic process: attending 
behavior, open invitation to talk, minimal encouragers, 
reflection of feeling, paraphrasing, summarization of 
feeling and content, expression of feeling and content, 
direct mutual communication, and interpretations (Ivey, 
1971). Throughout the years the system has been modified to 
include other dimensions, more skills, and to refine some 
aspects (e.g., Ivey & Authier, 1978; Ivey, 1983). Recently, 
more skills were introduced (e.g., reflection of meaning), 
and new dimensions were added (e.g., focus). Early research, 
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such as the one conducted by Toukmanian and Rennie (1975) 
showed how the training in counseling skills was much more 
effective in increasing empathy, when compared with human 
relations training in facilitative conditions. 
Directly following the microcounseling paradigm, 
several scales and methodologies were devised to explore the 
behavioral intentionality of the counseling process. In a 
recent review, Highlen and Hill (1984) refer as 
approximately 20, the number of existing systems to analyze 
the response modes in the counseling situation. Probably the 
most complete and most widely used system in the last few 
years is the one introduced by Clara Hill and colleagues 
(Hill, 1978; in press; Hill et al., 1981). This system has 
the advantage of including categories of counselor, as well 
as client, verbal response modes. The 14 counselor’s 
response modes are: minimal encouragers, silence, 
approval-reassurance, information, direct guidance, closed 
question, open question, restatement, reflection, 
interpretation, confrontation, nonverbal referent, 
self-disclosure, and other. The client system contains the 
following 9 categories: simple response, request, 
description, experiencing, exploration of client-counselor 
relationship, insight, discussion of plans, and other. The 
system was developed in order to include exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive categories. On a review of all the 
studies using her system, Clara Hill (in press), found it 
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valid and effective to explore the verbal behaviors of 
clients and therapists with different orientations in 
different phases of the counseling process. However, as was 
recognized by the author (Hill, 1982), the response modes 
only represent one dimension of counselor and client 
behaviors in the counseling process. Other dimensions 
include what Hill (1982) refers to as ancillary behaviors 
(i.e., extralinguistic, linguistic, nonverbal, and 
physiological processes), as well as the content or topic of 
the conversation. Similarly, Russel and Stiles (1979) 
proposed that the study of the therapeutic process should 
include content categories, intersubjective categories, and 
extralinguistic categories. Unfortunately, and probably 
because they are more easier to research, most of the 
studies done were focused on verbal responses ( for a review 
on extralinguistic and content studies, see Highlen and 
Hill, 1984). 
In this section, the evolution from the research on 
attitudes to the more operational approach of counseling 
skills was illustrated. Some of the early studies showing 
the raultidimentionality of facilitative conditions were 
presented. It was concluded that facilitative conditions are 
composed of a multitude of verbal and nonverbal skills. 
Initial conceptualizations of the counseling process in 
terms of skills were described. Ivey’s microcounseling 
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model, and Hills’ Verbal Response Category System were 
presented as main examples of frameworks for exploring 
counselor and client behavioral intentionality. 
An important question to be answered now is: what are 
the effects of each of the counseling skills? This question 
will be addressed in the following section. 
The Effects of Different Skills 
Thus far I have referred to the evolution of the 
identification of response modes in the counseling process. 
Several verbal and nonverbal skills describing the 
therapeutic situation were presented. 
Several counseling skills training programs have 
assumed the presence of hypothetical relationships between 
counselor response modes and client behaviors. However, most 
of these assumptions are based on clinical intuition rather 
than controlled research. As Highlen and Hill (1984) 
recently recognized "more work clearly is needed to 
determine the effects of verbal response modes and other 
components of the counseling process before more complete 
training packages can be developed” (p.373). Thus, there is 
a strong need for the clarification of the relationship 
between counselor’s verbal and nonverbal skills and client 
responses. This section will summarize the research on this 
I will begin with the presentation of studies on the issue. 
46 
effects of nonverbal behaviors. Then, the naturalistic as 
well as the analogue studies on verbal responses will be 
reviewed. The present review is not intended to report on 
all the overwhelming amount of studies done. Instead, I will 
restrict my presentation to the main conclusions, 
illustrated with examples of some of the most important 
studies. 
Nonverbal behaviors. It is widely recognized that nonverbal 
behaviors represent an important part, if not the most 
important one of our daily interactions. Several researches 
were done, with humans as well as with other species, 
illustrating the importance of nonverbal communication (see 
review of Harper, Wiens, & Matarazzo, 1978). Based more on 
clinical intuition than on empirical evidence, several 
training programs have suggested the importance of nonverbal 
behaviors such as eye contact, forward trunk lean, facial 
expressions, etc. (e.g., Hackney & Cormier, 1979; Ivey, 
1983). As was already pointed out, some evidence was found 
suggesting that the facilitative condition of empathy, 
warmth, and genuineness, are communicated by nonverbal 
behaviors similar to those recommended in the training 
literature (e.g., Haase & Tepper, 1972; Tepper & Haase, 
1978; Smith-Hanen, 1977). 
Gladstein (1974), reviewing the research on nonverbal 
47 
communication in counseling and therapy did not find 
empirical support for most of the directions provided by the 
theoreticians in the field, "unfortunately the state of our 
empirically based knowledge does not permit the conclusions 
and the practical suggestions presented by many writers" 
(p.40) . While recognizing the importance of nonverbal 
communication, only three reliable findings were 
extrapolated by Gladstein from the research literature: (1) 
Nonverbal communication can be reliably classified in 
counseling; (2) the area of paralanguage is the one we know 
more at the moment, even though we cannot say too much about 
its functions; (3) paralanguage and kinesics seem to be 
indicators of emotional changes occuring in the therapeutic 
situation. 
About 10 years after Gladstein’s review, few more 
definitive conclusions can be drawn from the research. Few 
authors would disagree about the importance of nonverbal 
behaviors in counseling. However as it was pointed out in 
Highlen and Hill’s (1984) review, despite the overwhelming 
amount of research, few conclusions can be extrapolated for 
the counseling situation. The main problem seems to be due 
to the absence of studies in real counseling situations. As 
was stressed by Wilbur and Wilbur (1980) in a more recent 
review, "with only one empirical study in 115 references on 
nonverbal communication incorporating real counseling with 
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real clients - we need to consider this area as one of 
several research agendas for our profession" (p.207). 
I will turn now to the presentation of several studies 
conducted by Hill and colleagues, illustrating several 
problems and issues faced by the research on nonverbal 
behaviors. Most of the studies reviewed by Gladstein in 
1974, were mainly analogue using short vignettes or even 
pictures. Besides, little attention was given to the 
interface between verbal and nonverbal behaviors. Hill, 
Siegelman, Gronsky, Sturniolo, and Fretz (1981), organized a 
series of three studies intended to overcome some of the 
problems of early research. 
The objective of the first experiment of Hill et al. 
(1981) was to study the relationship between counselor and 
client uncoding/decoding abilities, and counseling outcome. 
Forty volunteer clients and 20 Doctoral students 
participated in this experiment. Each counselor conducted an 
interview with two clients (one female and one male). After 
the interview, clients completed the Barret-Lennard 
Relationship Inventory (BLRI), the Counseling Evaluation 
Inventory (CEI), and the Counselor Rating Form (CRF). The 
counselors completed the counselor form of the BLRI. Two 
weeks after the sessions, the subjects completed the 
decoding (i.e., PONS) and the encoding evaluation tasks. The 
results did not show the existence of any significant 
relationship between encoding and decoding abilities and the 
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four outcome measures. That is, the ability to encode or 
decode nonverbal behaviors was not found to have any impact 
on counseling outcome. However, the measures of 
encoding/decoding were not taken from the relationship 
between counselor and client. Instead, they were post-hoc 
measures consisting of evaluation of vignettes and 
role-playings with instructed scenarios. The artificiality 
of these measures may well have contributed to the 
production of biased results. In a second study, Hill et al. 
(1981) explored the relationship between counselor and 
client nonverbal behaviors and counseling outcome. The 
following nonverbal behaviors were hypothesized to be 
positively related to outcome: affirmative head nods, 
smiles, forward trunk lean, vertical and horizontal arm 
movements. Legs crossed by the ankle were hypothesized to be 
negatively correlated with the outcome. The data for this 
study came from the 40 interviews reported in the first 
experiment. The outcome measures were also the same as those 
reported in experiment one. The sessions were divided into 
five second segments and rated by trained judges. The 
results revealed that only counselor vertical movements were 
significantly related to client evaluation of the outcome. 
Counselors smiles and forward trunk lean were related 
(although weakly) with counselors' ratings on BLRI. No other 
statistically significant relationship was found between 
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nonverbal behavior and outcome measures. These data suggest 
that more naturalistic studies reveal the connection between 
several kinds of variables and that the linear relationship 
found in analogue studies is not adequate to describe the 
function of nonverbal communication in counseling settings. 
The objective of the third experiment was to compare 
client and counselor perceptions of their own 
verbal/nonverbal congruence and to relate this congruence 
with outcome measures. The subjects, the sessions and the 
outcome measures were the same as experiments one and two. 
Following the completion of the outcome measures, the 
subjects reviewed their session, stopping the tape each 
minute, and answering the following questions: (1) What was 
your major feeling during this segment?; (2) What feelings 
are you expressing through your words?; (3) What feelings 
are you expressing through your voice tone?; (4) What 
feelings are you expressing through your movements, facial 
expressions, and/or gestures?; (5) What do you believe the 
other person was feeling in this segment?. From the response 
to these questions it was possible to identify five 
different types of congruence: (1) verbal congruence (i.e., 
consistency between questions 1 and 2); (2) paralmguistic 
congruence (i.e., between questions 1 and 3); (3) kinesic 
congruence (i.e., between questions 1 and 4); (4) 
intracongruence (i.e., between questions 1, 2, 3, 4); and 
(5) intercongruence (between questions 1 and 4). Two 
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findings deserve mention here. First, the data revealed that 
all the first four types of congruence for both client and 
counselor were significantly correlated. However, the first 
four types of congruence (i.e., based exclusively in 
counselor and client's own perceptions) was not related 
significantly with intercongruence, as expressed by the 
responses to question five. Second, concerning the 
relationship between congruence and outcome, several 
significant findings were reported. In respect to client 
congruence measures, only verbal and intracongruence were 
significantly related to at least one of the outcome 
measures. Four of the five counselor congruence measures 
were significantly related to counselor outcome measures. 
However, only the intercongruence was found to be related 
with one of the client's outcome evaluations. That is, if 
counselors are congruent they tend to rate themselves as 
more effective. And when they are able to communicate their 
feelings in a clear way to their clients, clients tend to 
evaluate them as more effective. Clients tend to perceive 
counseling as more effective when they, themselves, are more 
congruent. Briefly stated, the data suggests that 
"especially in an initial session, each participant is more 
aware and critical of his/her own behavior" (Hill et al., 
1981, p.211). 
Together, the results of these studies suggest that 
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nonverbal behaviors cannot be taken in an isolated way. 
Instead, if one intends to make sense of the behavioral 
dimensions of the counseling process, close attention should 
be paid to the interaction between verbal and nonverbal 
behaviors. 
Since Gladstein's (1974) review, several studies were 
conducted to explore nonverbal dimensions such as eye 
contact (e.g., Tipton & Rymer, 1978), gestures (e.g.. Young, 
1980), touch (e.g., Hubble, Noble & Robinson, 1981), and 
spatial-environmental conditions (e.g., Lecorate, Bernstein, 
& Dumont, 1981). Few more definitive conclusions can be 
drawn from these studies. Most of them persist on the same 
problems already pointed out by Hill et al. (1981). 
The state of our present knowledge about the function 
of nonverbal behaviors in counseling is still limited. In 
the conclusion of their review, Highlen and Hill (1984) 
no t e: 
...the nonverbal area is generally exciting and 
rich. Counselors certainly can use the knowledge 
about nonverbals to enhance their counseling 
abilities. The research as applied to counseling, 
however, has not been especially useful thus far. 
Less frequently used methodologies (such as case 
studies) and use of more qualitative data in 
conjuction with quantitative data may help 
researchers study the phenomena more adequately. 
Contextual examination of nonverbal and verbal 
behavior beyond the * stimulus — response1 microscopic 
analysis also seem warranted, (p.372). 
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Verbal responses. A great amount of research was conducted 
in order to test the effects of different response modes. As 
stated above, most of the counseling skills training 
programs tend to hypothesize the existence of linear 
relationships between the counselor's verbal responses and 
client behaviors. The objective of the research reported in 
this section is to investigate this hypothetical 
relationship. 
It is beyond the objective of this section to present 
a complete description of all the studies done on the 
effects of different skills. Besides, most of the research 
follows analogue designs and has produced many conflicting 
results of difficult interpretations. I will restrict the 
present review to two types of studies: (1) research testing 
the effects of more than one skill; and/or (2) research in 
real counseling situations. 
Barnabei, Cormier, & Nye (1974) conducted a study 
trying to identify the effects of indiscriminate use of the 
following counselor verbal responses: reflection of feeling, 
probe, confrontation, and free style. The subjects, 20 
female college students, were interviewed by four 
counselors. After a warming-up period, the interview was 
divided into four segments of 10 minutes. In each of those 
segments, the counselors were instructed to use one of the 
four types of response modes. The dependent variables 
include Counseling Evaluation Inventory, number of affect 
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words used by the client, self-reference pronouns and time 
orientation. The results did not show any significant 
effects due to the manipulation of verbal response modes. 
That is, the authors found that, at least in an initial 
interview, the clients did not seem to react differently in 
terms of affect words, self-reference, and time orientation, 
to different counselor response modes. 
On a subsequent study, Hill and Gormally (1977) tested 
the effects of reflection, restatement, probe, and nonverbal 
behavior on client’s expression of feeling. Forty eight 
subjects were interviewed by two counseling psychologists. 
The experiment followed an ABAB design: warming-up, followed 
by six minutes of baseline. After that the counseling period 
was introduced, where the client was instructed (via lights) 
to use one of the different response modes. After nine 
minutes of counseling, the counselor returned to the 
baseline condition (six minutes), followed again by nine 
minutes of counseling. The authors found that only the use 
of probes produced significant effects in clients' 
expression of feeling. However, in all the treatment 
conditions the clients talk significantly more than in the 
baseline. In sum, all the responses were effective in 
encouraging clients to talk, and only prompts were able to 
produce significantly more expressions of feeling. 
Still another study carried out by Highlen and Baccus 
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(1977) tested the effects of probe and reflection of feeling 
on clients' self referenced affect. Forty female students 
were interviewed by two female counselors. Using a between 
group design, each subject was assigned to one interviewer 
and one of the two interview conditions (i.e., reflection of 
feeling or probe). The interviews were divided into three 
different parts: warm-up period; experimental interview; and 
post-experimental inquiry. The experimental interview period 
itself had three distinct moments: baseline; conditioning; 
and extinction. During the conditioning phase, the client 
was exposed to either reflection of feeling or probe. While 
in the baseline and extinction periods, the counselor only 
provided minimal responses. During the post-experimental 
phase, the subjects completed the Counselor Evaluation 
Inventory. Clients' statements, after being unitized, were 
classified by the presence and absence of self-referenced 
affect. The authors found that either probes or reflection 
of feeling were effective in producing increases in the 
amount of self-referenced affect. However, no significant 
differences were found between the two skills. 
A more complete study was further conducted by 
Ehrlich, D'Augelli, and Danish (1979). The objective of this 
study was to test the effectiveness, according to both 
counselor and client, of six verbal responses: affect, 
content, influencing, advice, open questions, and closed 
questions. Ninety female students were interviewed by a 
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counselor in a simulated interaction. In order to control 
the verbal content of the interview, the counselor read a 
typescript using one among the different verbal response 
modes. The client, also following the script, read 20 
responses and were asked to select the response that they 
would use in that situation. The dependent variables were 
clients’ perceptions of helpers, and content of the clients’ 
responses. The authors found that different verbal response 
modes produced different effects on clients. The affect 
responses were found to be the most desirable, immediately 
followed by content responses and open questions. Closed 
questions were badly perceived by clients. Affect, although 
rated highly by clients, was not found to be effective in 
terms of changes in client’s behaviors. The authors 
concluded that the training literature is correct in 
advising the use of affect, content, and open questions in 
an initial counseling situation. 
Despite many conflicting results among the reported 
studies, one fact seems to stand up. That is, different 
skills produce different effects. 
Further research was conducted testing the effects of 
single skills in laboratory controlled situations. For 
example, McCarthy (1979) found that counselor's 
self-disclosure produced an increased number of client's 
questions about the counselors, longer responses, and use of 
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past and future tenses. 
Other studies were done comparing the effects of 
different characteristics of the same skill. For instance, 
Lopez & Wambach (1982) compared the effects of using 
paradoxical versus self-control directives with clients 
whose identified problem was procrastination. They found 
that the two kinds of directives were effective in producing 
client’s change. 
Still another group of studies exists, comparing the 
effects of combining different types of skills. An example 
is Feldman, Strong, and Danser’s (1982) research on the 
effects of different combinations of paradoxical and 
nonparadoxical interpretations with consistent and 
inconsistent directives. All the clients (moderately 
depressed college students) improved. However, paradoxical 
interpretations were found to be superior than 
nonparadoxical interpretations. The effects produced by the 
combination with different kinds of directives made little 
difference. The scores on Beck Depression Inventory were not 
affected by the consistency between interpretations and 
directives. However, clients reported more positive 
impressions from counselors using directives which were 
consistent with their interpretations. 
In sum, the analogue studies seem to suggest that 
different skills produce different effects. Additionally, 
there is evidence that specific effects can be obtained by 
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the combination of skills, as well as by the manipulation of 
different characteristics of the same skill. However, 
despite the amount of research, the analogue characteristics 
of these studies raise strong limits to their generability. 
As Highlen and Hill (1984) concluded Mit is not surprising 
that the results of analogue research is highly conflicting, 
and that no general conclusions about the relative 
effectiveness of various response modes can be drawn from 
these results" (p.374). 
More promising is the research on naturalistic 
counseling situations. Unfortunately, little research has 
been done to explore the relationship between counselor’s 
responses and client's behaviors in actual counseling 
settings. One of the rare examples comes from an intensive 
single-case study conducted by Hill, Carter, and O'Farrell 
(1983). In order to study the immediate effects of 
counselor's verbal responses on client behavior, Hill et al. 
conductedo a sequential analysis of 12 sessions with a 
female neurotic client. Only the two first client units 
following each counselor intervention were analyzed. The 
results show that clients tend to respond more with 
description after closed questions and least likely after 
direct guidance and interpretations. Client's experiencing 
most often follows silence and was least likely to occur 
after closed questions. Insight, although rare in this case, 
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most often follows counselor's silence, open question, or 
confrontation* These data, although finding some support to 
the hypothetical relationship advanced by some writers in 
training packages, present some limitations. The limitations 
are recognized by the authors themselves when they admit 
that the sequential analysis added little to their 
understanding of the case. In fact, each client response is 
not only determined by the counselor's immediate previous 
intervention. Instead, all the past counselor responses 
could be identified as possible antecedents of the client's 
response. The sequential analysis used by Hill et al (1983) 
was restricted to one-step/first-order dependency. As was 
defended by Lichtenberg and Heck (1983), further research 
should consider the hypotheses of second and third order 
sequences. 
Another example of a research in a naturalistic 
seeting was recently presented by Friedlander, Thibodeau and 
Ward (1985). In order to test the relationship between 
certain dimensions of the counseling process and the 
evaluation of good/bad sessions, Friedlander et al. 
proceeded to an intensive analysis of eight counseling 
dyads. As an evaluation measure, both counselor and client 
completed the Session Evaluation Questionnaire. Besides, 
several linguistic analysis were carried out: distribution 
of talk, discourse activity level, degree of structure, and 
type of therapist response. Among several interesting 
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results, the researchers found significantly more 
encouragement/approval/reassurance, interpretation and 
providing information, in the better sessions, while the 
worse sessions were characterized by more direct 
guidance/advice , and information seeking. More interesting 
however, was the authors finding of a high degree of 
variability among dyads, leading to the conclusion that 
"each dyad creates a unique culture that client and 
therapist evaluate phenomenologically" (p.631). 
One of the main limitations of the research on the 
effects of counseling skills derives from the lack of 
attention to clients' perceptions of counselors behavior. As 
I will illustrate in more detail later, client's perceptions 
are the main predictors of the effects of each skill (e.g., 
Elliott, Barker, Casking, and Pistrang, 1982), Recent 
research by Lee, Uhlemann, and Haase (1985) illustrates well 
how counselors, judges, and client's perception differ. The 
main objective of this study was to analyze the effects of 
different counselor's verbal and nonverbal behaviors on 
client's perceptions of counselor's expertness, 
trustworthiness, and attractiveness. Each one of 47 
counselors interviewed a volunteer cient for 20 minutes. 
After the interview, clients completed the Counselor Rating 
Form (to measure the perception of counselor's 
attractiveness, expertness, and trustworthiness) and the 
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Behavior Rating Form (to investigate nonverbal decoding 
skills). Trained judges analyzed the first 15 minutes of the 
interview for verbal and nonverbal behaviors (using the Hill 
Counselor Verbal Response Category System, as revised by 
Friedlander) . The results showed that when evaluation of 
counselors verbal and nonverbal behaviors was done by 
judges, few significant predictions of client's perceptions 
were found. Instead, clients perceptions of counselors 
behaviors were found to predict in a significant way their 
ratings of counselors' attractiveness, expertness, and 
trustworthiness. That is, it is the clients perceptions of 
counselors' behavior that determines their evaluation. 
Further, the client's perceptions are not significantly 
related to observations from trained judges. Based on the 
results of this research, one can understand how biased the 
study on the effects of different skills can be if we do not 
take into acount the client's perceptions on counselor's 
behavior can be. 
In conclusion, an overwhelming amount of research was 
conducted testing the effects of different kinds of verbal 
and nonverbal skills. However, the results remain somehow 
conflicting. Some nonverbal behaviors were found to produce 
positive effects on clients. However, their interaction with 
verbal components tend to make difficult the interpretation 
of results. Similarly, some evidence was found for the 
existence of differential effects of certain verbal skills. 
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However, the direction of these differences is not yet 
completely understood. The conflicting data seems to be due 
to three main factors. First, most of the research was 
conducted in analogue situations with limited external 
validity, i.e., generability to counseling settings. Second, 
verbal and nonverbal behaviors seem to interact in complex 
ways. Most of the research simply ignores this interaction. 
Third, client’s cognitive perceptions of counselor responses 
seems to be the main predictor of the effects of a given 
skill. Thus, the reliance on ratings of external judges 
certainly biases the results and makes them difficult to 
interpret. 
The general picture that one gets from this research 
is that the complexity of the counseling process asks for 
more complex models of research. One of the promising 
methodological tools to study the effects of different 
skills is to look for proximal as well as dystal effects 
using more complex sequential analysis procedures (see 
Lichtenberg & Heck, in press). 
Another important area for our understanding of the 
counseling process is the descriptive study and 
identification of patterns or stages within and across 
interviews. The research on these aspects will be analyzed 
in the following section. 
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Skills Within and Across the Counseling Process 
Another approach that researchers have been using for 
the understanding of behavioral intentionality, is the study 
of skills within and across the interview. Several 
theoretical models of the counseling process referred to the 
existence of different stages within and across the 
counseling process. For example, Carkhuff (1980) argues that 
there are four different stages: attending, responding, 
personalizing and initiating. According to Carkhuff, 
effective counseling should follow this sequence of stages. 
Different skills are needed to accomplish the objectives of 
each stage. Similarly, Ivey (1983), and Ivey and Matthews 
(1984) have proposed a meta-model for structuring the 
interview. Ivey defends that a common structure can be found 
in interviews from counselors of different theoretical 
orientations. And that this same structure seems to be 
useful in order to integrate in a coherent way different 
approaches to counseling and psychotherapy. Briefly, Ivey 
proposed the following stages: (1) rapport and structuring; 
(2) gathering information, defining the problem, and 
identifying the assets; (3) defining outcomes; (4) exploring 
alternatives and confronting the incongruenties; (5) 
generalization and transfer. Different skills also 
characterized different stages. Ivey defends that this same 
structure tends to appear itself within a single interview, 
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as well as across a long treatment process. 
Several studies were conducted in attempt to identify 
the different stages of an interview. These studies analyze 
the use of skills within a single interview and across 
different interviews. This section will summarize the main 
results of that research. I will begin with a presentation 
of the data on the use of skills within an interview, 
referring next to the same analysis across the counseling 
process. 
In order to validate her verbal response system, Clara 
Hill (1978) did an analysis of 12 intake interviews with 
clients with personal/emotional problems. In order to study 
the use of skills in different moments of the interview, 
each session was divided into thirds. Two groups of findings 
deserve mention here. First, counselor activity (i.e., 
number of verbal response units) increased significantly 
during the final third of the interview. Second, and in 
terms of skills, the data revealed significant decreases 
during the final third for minimal encourager, closed 
question, and open question. And there were significant 
increases during the final third for structuring, 
information, direct guidance, interpretation, and friendly 
discussion. This shift, from a less active exploration of 
the problem to a more active guidance, appears to be 
consistent with the meta—model proposed by Ivey. Even within 
a single interview (in this case an intake interview) some 
65 
evidence was found that different stages exist. 
In their intensive single case study, Hill, Carter, 
and O'Farrell (1983) also studied counselor and client 
verbal behavior within each interview. The final two thirds 
of each interview were averaged and compared with the first 
third. The findings revealed that the client decreases, from 
the first to the final thirds, in terms of description 
responses, activity level, and increases in simple 
responses, experiencing, insight, and silence. The counselor 
decreases the number of minimal encouragers, and increases 
the number of silences and interpretations. Again, the data 
points to the existence of a movement, in both counselor and 
client, from stages of attending to the client needs to 
stages of influencing client changes. 
Hill, Carter, and O'Farrell (1983) have also studied 
the counselor and client verbal responses across the 12 
sessions. The same changes found for clients within an 
interview, were evident across the process. That is, 
description decreases and insight and experiencing increases 
as one moves along the process. Even though no statistical 
analysis was used for the counselor behavior, a greater use 
of minimal encouragers was evident in the early interviews 
(i.e., interviews 1 to 4). Whereas, during the final stages 
(i.e., interviews 5 to 12) the counselor used more 
information and interpretation. Similarly, Friedlander 
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(1982) in her revision of the Hill Counselor Verbal Response 
Category System, compared the two first counseling 
interviews for 17 dyads. As was expected, only slight 
changes were found across the two interviews. Both 
interviews were mainly characterized by skills of seeking 
information. 
Together, the results show that the hypothesis about 
the existence of different stages of an interview is 
supported by the research literature. And that Ivey's 
meta-model seems to be an accurate way of describing the 
structure of interviews, both within and across the 
counseling process. Surprisingly enough, the existence of 
stages is also found in the research on the patterns of 
control in the interview.For example, the study of sequences 
of topic following/topic initiation revealed the existence 
of cycles of symmetry and complementarity (e.g. Tracey, 
1985; Tracey & Ray, 1984). 
A question not answered from this research is: to 
which extent do different theoretical approaches use the 
same skills and follow the same stages? The research 
addressing this issue will be presented in the next section. 
Skills Across Theoretical Orientations 
Different theoretical perspectives use different ways 
to approach clients' problems. If behavioral skills are 
67 
accurate descriptions of what is going on between counselors 
and clients, one should expect different uses of skills by 
therapists of different theoretical orientations. For 
instances, Ivey (1983) hypothesized that the use of skills 
differs not only across theoretical approaches, but also 
across fields. Rogerian counselors are characterized by 
frequent use of attending skills, while behavioral and 
gestalt therapists tend to rely more in the use on 
influencing skills. Several studies were done exploring the 
use of skills across therapeutic orientations. This section 
will review those studies. 
Within the Rogerian tradition of the early 50s, 
Fiedler (1950) has done one of the first studies analyzing 
the counseling relationship offered by therapists of 
different theoretical orientations. Ten interviews from 
Adlerian, psychoanalytic and nondirective therapists were 
recorded. The interviewers were selected in order to 
include, within each school, at least one therapist of 
national reputation and one beginner. Only sessions between 
the sixth and the seventeenth were recorded. The judges 
evaluated each interview by means of Q-technique, consisting 
on 75 evaluative statements of the interview. Two main 
findings were reported. First, the therapeutic relationship 
of experts correlated more with the ideal relationship than 
nonexperts. Second, higher correlations were found between 
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experts of different schools, than between experts and 
nonexperts of the same school. The findings were consistent 
with Rogers’ (1957) position that the facilitative 
conditions are the elements responsible for change in no 
matter what kind of therapy. However, and as can be easily 
expected, when the "therapeutic relationship" began to be 
operationalized in terms of behavior skills, a completely 
different picture began to emerge. The following studies, 
covering almost three decades of research, illustrate this 
aspect well. 
Strupp (1955) conducted to do a comparison of the 
verbal responses of Rogerian and psychoanalytical 
therapists. Twenty-four clients' statements were read by 15 
therapists. Each therapist was instructed to generate 
responses to those statements. Therapists' responses were 
rated according to the 12 categories developed by Bales. For 
almost all the categories, the author found statistically 
significant differences between Rogerian and psychoanalytic 
oriented therapists. As could be expected, Rogerians were 
most likely to use reflective responses, while 
psychoanalists relied mostly on exploratory responses but 
using a wider spectrum of skills. Contrary to Fiedler 
(1950), Strupp's findings suggest that by using more clearly 
defined variables, such as counseling skills, it is possible 
to realize differences between different theoretical 
approaches. 
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Trying to overcome some of the artificiality of 
Strupp s (1955) study, Zimmer and Pepyne (1971) compared the 
styles of three eminent counselors using the film Three 
Approaches to Psychotherapy, In this film, Carl Rogers, 
Albert Ellis, and Frederick Peris, conducted an interview 
with the same client. Trained judges rated a random 
selection of each therapist interview, A factor analysis of 
the ratings revealed the existence of six factors accounting 
for 70.04% of the variance: rational analyzing, eliciting 
specificity, confronting, passive structuring, 
reconstructing, and interrogating. The results of the 
comparisons for each factor showed significant differences 
among the three therapists. Rogers differed from Ellis in 
terms of rational analyzing and passive structuring. Ellis 
differed from Peris in the category of rational analyzing. 
And finally, Rogers differed from Peris in all the 
categories. Again, and contrary to the opinion of Rogers and 
the data from Fiedler (1950) these results show that three 
wellknown effective therapists differed, supporting the 
conclusion that "differences in counseling style are related 
directly to counselor’s theoretical orientation" (Zimmer & 
Pepyne, 1971, p.446). 
More recently, Snyder (1979) studied several available 
transcripts from interviews with Rogerian, gestalt, and 
psychoanalyticaly oriented therapists. Nine judges coded 
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each unit according to the classification system developed 
by Stiles. Consistent with the research reported above, 
Stiles found that client-centered counselors tend to use 
more reflective responses, gestalt counselors tend to rely 
on advisements, and psychoanalytic oriented therapists used 
mainly interpretation. 
Brunink and Schroeder (1979) extended the comparison 
in order to include behavioral oriented therapists. More 
specifically, the verbal responses of behavior, 
psychoanalytic, and gestalt oriented therapists, were 
compared. Tapes of 18 expert therapists were rated using the 
System for Assessing Therapist Communication, developed by 
the authors. The system measures the following dimensions: 
therapeutic activity (e.g., clarification, interpretation, 
direct guidance, etc); temporal focus (e.g., present or 
past); interview focus (e.g., client, therapist-client 
relationship, therapist); degree of initiative (e.g., 
absence, mild, moderate, and strong); communication (e.g., 
additive or nonadditive communication); therapeutic climate 
(e.g., minimal supportive, supportive, etc.). Several 
significant results were found. First, differences among the 
three groups were found for techniques such as facilitation 
and direct guidance. Psychoanalytic and behavioral-oriented 
therapists used the facilitation techniques significantly 
more then gestalt therapists. Gestalt oriented therapists 
were found to use significantly more direct guidance when 
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compared with the two other groups. Second, therapists from 
all three theoretical orientations showed a temporal 
orientation toward the present. Third, concerning the 
interview focus, behavior and psychoanalytic therapists tend 
to focus more on the client, whereas gestalt therapist 
placed more emphasis on the focus of the therapist. Fourth, 
gestalt oriented therapists were found to use significantly 
higher degrees of initiative. Fifth, psychoanalists used 
more accurate nonadditive communications than gestalt 
therapists. Finally, concerning the therapeutic climate, 
behaviorists revealed significantly higher number of 
supportive communications when compared with gestalt and 
psychoanalitic therapists. In sum, this research brings 
additional support to the conclusion that therapists of 
different theoretical orientations tend to behave 
differently with their clients. Interestingly enough, these 
differences were also found in other dimensions than the 
verbal responses. 
In the same line of research, Hill, Thames, and Rardin 
(1979) did a more recent comparison of Ellis, Rogers, and 
Peris in the interviews of the film Three Approaches to 
Psychotherapy. This time, the typescripts of the entire 
interview were rated according the Hill Counselor Verbal 
Response Category System. The results showed that Rogers 
used mainly minimal encourager (53%), restatement (11%), 
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interpretation (7%), and information (7%). Peris used mainly 
direct guidance (19%), information (12%), interpretation 
(12%), open question (10%), minimal encourager (8%), closed 
question (6%), confrontation (6%), approval-reassurance 
(5%), and nonverbal referent (5%). Finally, Ellis used 
mostly information (30%), direct guidance (21%), minimal 
encourager (14%), interpretation (12%), closed question 
(6%), and restatement (5%). Again, and despite the fact that 
no inferential statistics were used, the extreme differences 
in the verbal behaviors of these three therapists were 
apparent. 
Lee and Uhlemann (1984) did a similar study, but this 
time using an up to date version of the film Three 
Approaches to Psychotherapy. This time, the counselors were 
Rogers (client-centered therapy), Shostrom (actualizing 
therapy) and Arnold Lazarus (multimodel behavior therapy). 
The verbal responses were analyzed according to a revised 
version of the Hill Counselor Verbal Response Category 
System (Freidlander, 1982). Again, clear differences emerged 
from the data. Rogers was found to use mostly 
reflection/restatement (52.78%), encouragment/approval 
/reassurance (27.78%), and information seeking (7.64%). 
Shostrom relied more on guidance/advice (27.50), 
encourageraent/approval/reassurance (21.25%), information 
providing (15.63%), reflection/restateraent (15.00%), and 
information seeking (13.13%). Finally, Lazarus tended to use 
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mostly direct guidance/advice (28.21%), information 
providing (22.44%), information seeking (18.59%), 
encouragement/approval/reassurence (17.31%), and 
reflection/restatement (10.26%). Again, the differences 
found were consistent with the theoretical approaches of the 
counselors . 
Hardy and Shapiro (1985) compared exploratory (i.e. 
dynamic and humanistic) with prescriptive therapy (i.e., 
cognitive and multimodal) in the use of verbal responses. 
Twenty-seven clients were assigned to one of two therapists. 
One of the therapists was trained in exploratory counseling 
while the other one was trained as a prescriptive therapist. 
Again, and as it was predicted, the exploratory therapist 
was found to use significantly more interpretation and 
exploration skills, whereas the prescriptive therapist gave 
significantly more advisements and information and asked 
more open and closed questions. 
Mahrer, Nifakis, Abhukara, and Sterner (1984) went a 
step further, trying to study the microstrategies used by 
counselors of different theoretical orientations. By 
microstrategies the authors refer to the fact that actual 
statements made by psychotherapists follow organized 
patterns of interlocking sequences" (p.465). The therapists 
studied were Joseph Wolpe (behavior therapy), Carl Rogers 
(client-centered therapy), and Joel Fagan (gestalt therapy). 
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The interviews were rated using a classification system of 
verbal responses developed by the authors. The unit of study 
in this research was a two—statement sequence instead of a 
single response. The three different therapists were found 
to follow different interlocking sequences or 
microstrategies. Wolpe generelly used sequences of 
information-gathering statements. Rogers used more sequences 
of reflections or simple acknowledgment. And finally, Fagan 
was found to use much more fluid sequences. Further, these 
same microstrategies were found to be used by Rogers and 
Wolpe across different clients.In conclusion, these data 
show that different therapists not only use different skills 
but also tend to be consistent across different clients. 
Additionally, they combine skills in different and specific 
sequences, determining particular microstrategies for 
action. 
Extending the research to situations other than 
individual counseling, Friedlander and colleagues did a 
series of two studies comparing the work of different family 
therapists. In the first study, Friedlander and Highlen 
(1984) explored the differences, in terms of interpersonal 
structure, of initial interviews done by Ackerman, Bowen, 
Jackson, and Whitaker, with the same family. The 
communication patterns were analyzed by means of a 
multidimensional scaling (MDS). " M D S takes proximities 
among stimuli (objects or people) as input, and the major 
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output is a geometric configuration in which the distance 
between points corresponds to the empirical measure of 
relatedness" (Friedlander and Highlen, 1984, p.479). The 
interviews were taken from the Hillcrest Family Series. 
Generally the authors found high correlations among the four 
counselors, mainly between Ackerman and Whitaker, and Bowen 
and Jackson. 
In a second study of the same interviews, Friedlander, 
Highlen, and Lassiter (1985), made comparisons among the 
four therapists in the following factors: semantic content, 
type of counselor intervention, and distribution of talk 
among the therapists. The three following measures were 
used: an extralinguistic measure (i.e., distribution of talk 
among speakers), content (i.e., temporal orientation, 
interpersonal structure, and system membership), and 
intersubjective measure (i.e., type of response). Even 
though several commonalities were found in terms of 
distribution of talk, and interpersonal structure, the 
differences clearly emerge. Jackson used more minimal 
responses (41%) while Whitaker seldom used them (7%). Bower 
(51%) and Ackerman (39%) used much more requests than the 
other two (Jackson 11% and Whitaker 19%). Whitaker used more 
self-referent responses when compared with the other three. 
Finally, Bower used very few inferential responses (4%), the 
type of response most often used by Whitaker (36%). The 
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results of these two studies show how the differences in 
terms of verbal behavior and structure can be found in 
situations other than individual counseling. Therapists of 
the same school, although not differing in some practical 
aspects, were found to differ in the way they interact with 
the families. 
In this section, the research on the use of skills 
across theoretical orientations was reviewed. An example of 
an early study of comparison following the Rogerian 
hypotheses was presented. Then illustrations of research on 
the use of skills by therapists of different theoretical 
orientations, with different clients, in analogue and more 
naturalistic studies, was reported. A recent example of one 
study enlarging the comparison to the concept of 
microstrategies was also discussed. Finally, two studies 
extending the comparisons to situations other than 
individual counseling were discussed. 
Together, the data shows that different therapists use 
different skills, in both individual and familial 
counseling. Additionally, their patterns of skills usage is 
consistent with their reported theoretical assumptions. 
Also, some initial evidence exists that counselors not only 
differ in the skills they use, but also in the way they 
combine skills. Future research should study how different 
therapists combine different skills across the entire 
process. 
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Conclusion 
During the fifties, two approaches were fundamental to 
increase our understanding of the counseling process. The 
first contribution came from the behaviorist approach. 
Rejecting the major philosophical assumptions of the 
internalism, behaviorists refused to analyze the counseling 
process in terms of hypothetical constructs. Instead, 
building a bridge between the consulting room and the 
laboratory, counselor and client responses were translated 
into verbal behaviors viewed as following the same learning 
principles of any other response. A second important 
contribution came from the studies of Rogers and colleagues 
on facilitative conditions. In fact, Rogers' attitudes or 
facilitative conditions were the real percursors of 
counselor response modes that constitute the core of what I 
refered to as behavioral intentionality. Behavior 
intentionality was defined as the network of verbal and 
nonverbal behaviors occuring between counselor and client. 
Five different aspects were reviewed throughout this 
chapter. In the first section, Rogers' attempt to identify 
the main ingredients of the counseling process was 
presented. The results of almost three decades of research 
on the effects of the facilitative conditions of empathy. 
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genuineness, and positive regard were reviewed. The main 
conclusions stress the fact that, although necessary, these 
attitudes cannot be described as the sufficient ingredients 
of the counseling process. The dissatisfaction with the lack 
of operationalization of such variables was presented as the 
main reason for shifting from the concept of attitudes to 
the one of microskills. 
The second section reported with the same detail the 
shift to the notion of microskills. Studies were reported in 
which some support was found to the notion that facilitative 
conditions are composed of a multidiraensionality of verbal 
and nonverbal responses. The conceptualization of the 
counseling process in terms of skills was presented, with 
particular emphasis on the microcounseling model of Allen 
Ivey, and the verbal response system of Clara Hill. 
The third section reported the research on the effects 
of different skills. The studies on the effects of both 
verbal and nonverbal skills were discussed. An overwhelming 
amount of studies exist on these aspects. However, there are 
many conflicting results which makes it difficult to 
generate definitive conclusions. Certain nonverbal behaviors 
were found to have positive effects on clients. However, the 
interaction with verbal components and the analogue 
characteristics of most of the studies present obstacles to 
extrapolating conclusions. Different skills were found to 
produce different effects on clients, but the directions of 
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these effects is not yet completely understood. It was 
concluded that research on the effects of different skills 
should bemfit more in the future from the contribution of 
more naturalistic studies (e.g., Hill, Carter, & O’Farrell, 
1983), testing not only proximal but also dystal sequences 
(c . f . , Lichtenberg & Heck, in press). 
The fourth section, analyzing the research on the use 
of skills within and across the counseling process, found 
support for the existence of different stages. These stages 
were consistent with most of the phases hypothesized by the 
training literature (e.g., Ivey, 1983). Generally, the 
existence of a movement from attending to influencing 
skills, both with and across interviews, was found. 
Finally, the fifth section reviewed the studies on the 
use of different skills by therapists of different 
theoretical orientations. Together, the research shows that 
behavioral skills are accurate ways to differentiate 
therapists from different theoretical orientations. Besides, 
the differences found in the use of skills by different 
therapists appear to be consistent with their main 
theoretical assumptions about clients and therapy. Some 
initial evidence was also presented to the idea that 
counselors of different theoretical orientations not only 
differ in terms of the skills they use, but also in the ways 
they choose to combine the skills. Finally, the same 
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differences were also found in situations other than 
individual counseling, like family therapy. 
Summing up, the research on behavioral intentionality 
shows that the study of concrete behaviors of clients and 
counselors is fundamental to our understanding of the 
counseling process. This intentionality also represented an 
important landmark in the development of more effective ways 
of training counselors. The shift to a philosophy of realism 
contributed to a clarification of the mechanisms of the 
counseling process, and has probably added to our 
effectiveness as counselors and trainers. However, the 
presence of conflicting and inconclusive results gives the 
idea that something is missing in the explanation of the 
counseling process exclusively in terms of behavioral 
intentionality. For example, some studies are showing that 
client’s perceptions of counselor behavior are better 
predictors of client’s actions, than the measures done by 
trained judges (e.g., Lee, Uhlemann, & Haase, 1985). Data 
like this suggests that the behavioral intentionality 
approach has perhaps failed to take into account cognitive 
processes of both client and counselor, such as attitudes, 
perceptions, beliefs, and hypotheses generation. It is to 
that "small part of the universe (...) contained within the 
skin of each of us" (Skinner, 1974, p.24), both as 
counselors and clients, that I will be refering to in the 
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next part of this chapter. 
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Part 2 
Cognitive Intentionality 
In the first part of this chapter, I made reference to 
research on behavioral intentionality. The behaviorist 
movement brought some tools for the study of the concrete 
determinants of human behavior, often operationalized in 
terms of stimulus-response conditions. 
Breaking with the internalist and idealist traditions 
in the history of psychology was an important contribution 
of behaviorism. Our understanding of human behavior was 
substantially increased by eminent researchers and 
theoreticians as Skinner and Watson, and therapists like 
Wolpe and Lazarus. 
The description of concrete behaviors of counselor and 
client, and the understanding of the effects of certain 
skills is the central aspect of what I have refered to as 
behavioral intentionality. Accompanying this behavioral 
intentionality came a clarification of the therapeutic 
process. But probably the most pragmatic effect was in terms 
of the development of several effective programs for 
training clinicians. 
The behaviorist movement presents a reaction, and 
generally a strong rejection to internalism. However, during 
the 70s a tendency toward an approximation of internalism 
and externalism, idealism and realism was apparent. Mahoney 
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(1977), refers to this movement, stating that "behaviorists 
and cognitive psychologists appear to be cautiously easing 
into the same theoretical bed" (p.5). This process of mutual 
approximation was not without pain, as is illustrated by the 
controversy regarding the arising of cognitive issues within 
the Association for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy (see 
Mahoney , 1984). 
As was defended by Stone (1980), psychology never 
stopped to have cognitive influences. However it was only 
during the 70s that most of the fields began to experience a 
dramatic change toward the cognitive orientation. This 
phenomenon is often referred to as "cognitive revolution".In 
the field of experimental psychology, according to Hilgard 
(1980), perception, learning, and memory began to be 
interpreted in cognitive terms. The use of informational 
concepts and approaches in the experimental laboratory, 
shifted the psychologists interests to the study of private 
mental experiences. This cognitive movement was generalized 
to other areas of psychology, such as developmental 
psychology (e.g., Piaget, 1929/1971), psycholinguistics 
(e.g., Chomsky, 1959), social psychology (e.g., Cognitive 
Dissonance Theory from Festinguer, 1957), motivation (e.g., 
Atkinson, 1964), and the psychology of personality (e.g., 
illustrated by the growing emphasis in concepts such as 
schema, plans, and scripts, as was reported in a recent 
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review by Pervin (1985). 
This movement was extensive to the field of counseling 
and psychotherapy, demonstrated by the rapid growth of the 
cognitive-behavioral approaches. The cognitive movement in 
therapy is well exemplified by the work of Albert Ellis 
(1971) in Rational Emotive Therapy, Aaron Beck (1976) in 
cognitive restructuring techniques for depressed clients, 
and Donald Meichenbaum’s (1977) self-instruction methods. In 
the chapter on counseling psychology in the 1984 Annual 
Review of Psychology, Borgen (1984 b) refers to the 
cognitive-behavioral approach as one of the major trends 
experienced by the field. Similarly, Smith (1982), surveying 
clinical and counseling psychologists, refers to the 
cognitive-behavioral model as the strongest theoretical 
commitment. 
Cognition began to be the central word in psychology. 
Most of the therapeutic theories are now being interpreted 
according to cognitive models. A typical example is Wexler s 
(1974) formulation of client centered therapy in terras of 
information processing theory. Empathy is interpreted by 
Wexler as a facilitative response for increasing the levels 
of differentiation and integration in the individuals 
information processing system. Ivey, Ivey, and Simek-Downing 
(in press) state that almost all theories of therapy can be 
conceptualized within a cognitive frame of reference, and 
that our function "... as therapist(s) or counselor(s) is to 
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help the client bring cognitions or thoughts about the world 
together with being-in-the-worId". 
The "cognitive revolution" was not just another 
theory. Rather, it was an important step toward the 
integration of two philosophical traditions separated by the 
Cartesian dualism, the idealism and the realism. However, 
this cognitive approach is still seen by some authors as a 
mere sophistication of the traditional associationist 
paradigms. That is, cognitive processes are still conceived 
in an isolated manner. More constructivist perspectives, 
intending to provide a more integrative conception of 
thoughts and action, are currently being developed (e.g., 
Guidano, 1984, 1985; Joyce-Moniz, 1985; Mahoney, 1980, 1981, 
in press). Associationists and constructivists tend however 
to share the same basic assumptions concerning the 
importance of the cognitive processes. These assumptions are 
briefly summarized by Mahoney (1977): 
(1) The human organism responds primarly to 
cognitive representations of its environments 
rather than to those environments per se. (2) These 
cognitive representations are functionally related 
to the process and parameters of learning. (3) Most 
human learning is cognitively mediated. (4) 
Thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are causally 
interactive (pp. 7-8). 
According to these assumptions, it is clear that we 
can no longer approach human behavior without taking 
internal experiences into account. The internal experiences, 
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including perceptions, attitudes, conceptualizations, 
formulation of hypotheses, and establishment of intentions, 
constitute what I will be referring to as cognitive 
intentionality. 
The second part of this chapter will review the 
research on cognitive intentionality in the fields of 
counseling and psychotherapy. In order to do that, I will 
first present a general model concerning the role of 
cognitions in the counseling process, recently advanced by 
Martin (1984). The following sections will illustrate data 
from the research on each of the components of Martin’s 
model: attitudes, client conceptualization process, and 
intentions. Finally, the methodological problems raised by 
the verbal reports of cognitive processes will be addressed, 
along with some examples of ways to explore cognitive 
intentionality in counseling and psychotherapy. 
Although the limitations of the cognitive 
methodologies are evident and will be more deeply explored 
in the next chapter, it will be defended that cognitive 
dimensions are crucial, even for the justification of our 
existence as a profession. The importance of the study of 
our own cognitive processes as a main characteristic of our 
professional identity, was long ago underlined by Meehl 
(1960) : 
If there is anything that justifies our existence - 
other than the fact that we come cheaper - it is 
that we think scientifically about human behavio 
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and that we come from a long tradition going back 
to the very origins of experimental psychology in 
the study of human error, or being critical to 
ourselves as cognizing organisms and of applying 
quantitative methods to the outcomes of our 
cognitive activity (pp. 26-27). 
A Cognitive Mediational Paradigm for Counseling 
Probably the most complete model concerning the role 
of cognitive dimensions of counseling process, is the one 
recently presented by Martin (1984). In this section, the 
main ideas of the Martin model will be introduced and the 
results of a research intended to test its major underlying 
assumptions will be presented (Martin, Martin, Myer, Sleraon, 
in press). 
Martin defends the idea that counseling research 
cannot advance without taking into account the counselor and 
client cognitive processes. The counseling outcomes are seen 
as mediated by several cognitive variables that Martin 
attempts to specify. 
The model rests on two basic assumptions. First, 
contrary to most of the research on behavioral 
intentionality, counselor’s behaviors are not seen as 
affecting directly the client behavior. Instead, the actions 
of the counselor are processed by the client's cognitive 
structures. These cognitions, rather than the counselor 
behaviors, represent the best predictors of client s 
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actions. Secondly, Martin challenges the traditional 
univocal influencing model, in which only the counselor is 
viewed as influencing the client. Instead, the client 
actions are also hypothesized as impacting the cognitive 
process of the counselor. 
Figure 1 illustrates this complex interaction of 
cognitive and behavioral variables in the counseling 
situation. 
Two basic ideas are presented in the figure: 
(1) The counselor cognitively processes the client 
behavior. Several steps are involved in this 
process. First, the client behavior is perceived 
and conceptualized by the counselor; these 
conceptualizations are then transformed into 
clinical hypotheses. Next, the hypotheses are 
further translated into intentions or purposes. 
Finally, the cognitive intentions reveal themselves 
in counselor’s behaviors. 
(2) Similarly, the client cognitively processes 
each of the counselor’s interventions. First, she 
or he attends to the counselor’s behaviors, 
perceiving them by infering the counselor s 
intentions. Then, if able and motivated, will carry 
out the cognitive implications of the therapist 
intervention. This is done by alowing change in 
his/her cognitive system in the direction intended 
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by the counselor. Finally, the client generates 
responses that translate the impact of her/his 
cognitive processing of counselors' interventions. 
As the counseling process continues, this cycle is 
continuously repeated in a process of mutual cognitive 
influence. 
Martin's conceptualization appears to be quite close 
to the Assumptive Reciprocal Interaction Model recently 
introduced by Highlen and Hill (1984), and summarized as 
follows: 
...in this process the counselor functions as an 
inductive scientist, putting pieces of information 
together to formulate specific hypothesis about the 
client that are then tested, revised and retested. 
Through the inductive process of drawing 
conclusions from the complex configuration of 
client data, the counselor develops an ongoing 
model of the client. Then, conceptualizations, in 
turn, influence counselor intentions and behaviors, 
which are modified by client responses, and so on 
(p.347). 
According to Martin, the effective counseling will be 
the one where we can find high levels of consistency between 
cognitions and behaviors. That is, couselor behaviors are 
consistent with the intentions; client cognitions are 
consistent with counselor behaviors; and client behaviors 
are consistent with their own cognitions. 
As will be illustrated later in research from Rennie 
(May, 1984; February, 1985), it is obvious that the 
achievement of this consistency is not an easy task.It could 
that the counselor is not translating the be the case 
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intentions into adequate actions - a contradiction between 
what she/he wants to do and what she/he really does (i.e., 
"counselor inconsistency"). It could also the case that the 
client misperceives the counselor’s behaviors - a 
discrepancy between what the counselor does and the client's 
own perceptions and interpretations (i.e., "counselor-client 
inconsistency"). Finally, it could be that the client's 
actions are not accurately translating his or her own 
cognitive processes or intentions - contradiction between 
what the client is expressing and his/her perceptions, 
intentions, and cognitions in general (i.e., "client 
inconsistency"). Going a little bit further, I would add a 
fourth type of inconsistency, in which counselor 
misperceives client behaviors, causing what we can refer to 
as "client-counselor inconsistency". 
In order to test some of the model underlying 
assumptions, Martin et al. (in press) carried out an 
intensive analysis of 10 counseling dyads engaged in 
time—limited counseling. Three times during the counseling 
process data was collected on counselor and client behavior. 
Additionally, during the recall sessions the authors 
gathered data on counselor intentions, client perceptions of 
counselor intentions, and client cognitive processing. The 
main objective of the research was to analyze the level of 
consistency on each point of the counseling chain: counselor 
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intention — counselor behavior — client perception of 
counselor intention and behavior — client cognitive 
processing client behavior. Generally speaking, two 
central results deserve to be mentioned. First, the level of 
consistency was lower for the interpersonal cognitive (e.g., 
counselor intention — client cognitive processing) than for 
the interpersonal behavioral (e.g., counselor behavior — 
client behavior) or intrapersonal cognitive-behavioral 
(e.g., client cognitive processing — client behavior). 
Second, counselor rating on counseling effectiveness was 
found to be significantly influenced by the level of 
consistency across different elements in the chain. In sura, 
this research brought initial evidence to Martin’s Cognitive 
Mediational Paradigm, namely for the importance of the 
consistency between cognitions and behaviors. 
The importance of Martin's model rests with the fact 
that it clearly describes the cognitive dimensions of 
counselor and client intentionality. In order to understand 
the counseling process, a simple description of behaviors is 
not enough. Instead, a study of the perceptions, 
conceptualizations, hypothesis generation, and cognitive 
intentions or proposes is needed. 
However, the unconscious cognitive dimensions seem to 
be absent from this model . For example, the model does not 
address questions such as these: 
- Are the counselor's perception of the client only 
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determined by the client’s behaviors, or are they 
also influenced by factors outside counselor's 
awareness ? 
- Why does the counselor attend more to certain 
aspects of the client than to others? 
Which factors contribute to the selective 
attention of the client toward certain aspects of 
counselor’s responses? 
These and other questions, basic to the understanding 
of the inconsistencies within and between counselor and 
client, will be addressed in the next part of this chapter. 
In the following sections I will review the research 
on some of the aspects pointed out by Martin. I will begin 
with the research which regards the relationship between 
attitudes, beliefs and counseling skills. Then, the studies 
of client conceptualization processes and hypotheses 
generation will be discussed. Following, I will present the 
research on cognitive intentions of the counselor. Finally, 
some methodological considerations for the study of 
cognitive intentionality in counseling will be made. 
Attitudes, Beliefs, and Counseling Skills 
Most of the existing counseling skills training 
restrict themselves to behavioral intentionality. programs 
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According to this perspective, the intentional counselor is 
the one who is able to master several skills in a flexible 
way, in order to produce different effects on clients (Ivey, 
1983). These programs are based on a behavioral learning 
philosophy. If the trainer supplies the adequate input 
(i.e., training program), the trainee is expected to show 
the appropiate output (i.e., skills mastery). 
According to the cognitive perspective, these programs 
are easly criticized. They fail to recognize the active role 
played by the subject in the learning process. Several 
authors have argued that this approach is a reductionistic 
view of human relations, one which applies exclusively to 
interpersonal skills (e.g., Mahon & Altman, 1977; Stone 
1980, 1982). Stone stated that "to reduce human relations 
training programs to skills only is to neglect professional 
development, including the development of personal beliefs 
and attitudes" (1982, p.450). The cognitive approach assumes 
the existence of a reciprocal interaction between cognitions 
and behaviors. Therefore, the counseling skills shall be 
hypothesized as having some kind of interaction with 
counselor’s attitudes and beliefs. 
Two studies, exploring the relationship between the 
attitudes and counseling skills, were conducted by Stone and 
colleagues. In a first study, Hirsch and Stone (1982), 
analyzed how attitudes toward reflection of feeling and 
interpretation influence the learning and performance of 
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those skills. The subjects, 37 students, were briefly 
trained (i.e., 90 minutes) in the use of reflection of 
feeling and interpretation. After the training, their 
attitudes toward both skills were evaluated. Finally, an 
interview with a coached client was conducted. In this 
interview, the trainees were instructed to use, in different 
moments, either reflections of feeling or interpretations. 
The results showed that students with positive attitudes 
toward reflection of feeling produced higher quality 
reflective responses. The same result was not found for 
interpretation. The explanation could be that 
interpretation, a fairly complex response, cannot be learned 
in a so short period of time, and/or applied intentionally 
in this too brief interview. In fact, the subjects in this 
experiment were not able to give interpretations when 
prompted to do so. They were not able to master the skill 
(Ivey, 1983) and thus were unable to make the transformation 
to cognitive levels. Even with the limitations inherent in 
an analogue study, this research brought some support to the 
existence of interactions between attitudes and counseling 
skills. 
In subsequent research, Stone and Kelly (1983) studied 
the effects of a traditional counseling skills training 
program, on the trainees’ skills acquisition and attitudes 
change. 37 students were randomly assigned to one of the 
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three following conditions: interpretations, reflection of 
feeling, and no training control. The first two groups were 
exposed to a short training program in either, 
interpretation or reflection of feeling. After the training, 
the subjects completed a 10 minute interview with a coached 
client, and two measures of attitudes: a thought-listing and 
ranking of adjectives describing persons seeking 
psychological counseling, and the questionnaire "Opinions 
About Psychological Distress and Professional Counseling". 
The results showed the efficacy of the program in terms of 
learning of counseling skills. However, the attitudes toward 
clients and counseling were not different between the 
groups, and were generally negatively valenced. 
In a supplementary study, Stone and Kelly applied the 
same measures, this time with a pre and post-test, to 
subjects involved in a longer counseling skills training 
program (i.e., 16 weeks). Again, the program was effective 
in producing increases in skills of open inquiry. However, 
the attitudes remained basically unchanged and negatively 
valenced. The authors concluded that "...the major finding 
of these studies could suggest that negative attitudes 
expressed through the listing of adjectives about an 
individual seeking psychological counseling are pervasive 
even following training in skills thought to imply a 
positive view of the client" (p» 213). 
Taken together, the research on attitudes, although 
97 
still in an exploratory phase, strongly suggests two 
conclusions. First, the attitudes of counseling trainees 
seem to interact with the learning and performance of 
counseling skills. Second, the traditional counseling skills 
training programs, seem to be less effective in affecting 
counselor's attitudes, than they are with counselor's 
skills. The absence of effects at the cognitive level can 
produce a lack of retainment and generalization of 
counseling skills, as it was earlier suggested by Ivey and 
Authier (1978). 
The belief system is another cognitive dimension 
often referred to as interfering with counselor's behaviors. 
The behavioral and emotional implications of irrational 
beliefs is underlined by Rational Emotive Therapy (Ellis, 
1971). According to Ellis, in the course of our development 
we overlearn certain kinds of beliefs. Some of these beliefs 
are irrational in that they lack empirical evidence. The 
objective of RET is to challenge these irrational beliefs, 
confronting the client with the absence of data for their 
empirical support, and providing clients with more rational 
and adequate ways of thinking about themselves and their 
world . 
Some authors have been referring to counselor's 
irrational beliefs that can interfere with the efficacy of 
the counseling process. For example. Stone (1980), reports 
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some of the irrational beliefs of beginning students in 
counseling skills training programs: "These helping skills 
are simply not my natural way of helping people"; and "I 
must be able to demonstrate these skills without error". 
Schmidt (1979) defends that the major focus of 
supervision should be on the beliefs supervisees bring to 
therapy. Schmidt reports the existence of three central 
irrational beliefs: I must show the supervisor how perfect 
I am in therapy"; "I must make the right decision or 
something terrible will happen"; and "I must love doing 
therapy to be a good therapist". Concerning the supervisee 
work with the client, four emotions are often refered by the 
first: anger, boredom, guilt, and anxiety. According to 
Schmidt, these emotions came from the presence of 
self-statements such as: "The client should do what I say"; 
"The client should be more appreciative of me"; "The client 
should be more interesting or share more important 
information"; "How awful I am to feel bored by this person"; 
"I should like ray client"; "I should be more competent"; "I 
don't know what to do and I should". The presence of 
negative emotions, caused by irrational self-statements 
could play an important counterproductive role in 
counseling. Rather than responding to the client, the 
counselor is often found to be responding to her/his own 
emotions. 
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In sura, counselor's attitudes and belief systems seera 
to play an important role in the way a counselor thinks and 
acts. Any comprehensive approach of the counseling process, 
either for training or research, should take these aspects 
into careful consideration. 
Perceptions, Conceptualizations, and Hypothesis Generation 
From the research reviewed in the preceding section, 
it is clear that the attitudes and beliefs of counselors 
influence their thoughts and actions. These attitudes and 
beliefs, along with data from client's observations, 
determine counselors' perceptions and judgements of the 
client. Some authors defend that, from a collection of 
information, we form early impressions of the client. 
Assembling these impressions we construct 
conceptualizations. Then, these conceptualizations generate 
hypotheses, subject to testing and retesting (Highlen & 
Hill, 1984). According to this model, the counselor is 
functioning as an inductive scientist, where she or he (1) 
observes client behaviors, (2) originates tentative 
conclusions, (3) translates those conclusions into 
hypothesis, and finally (5) subjects them to reality testing 
(Pepinsky & Pepinsky, 1954). 
If one assumes a complete analogy between the human 
mind and computer mechanisms, this model can be seen as 
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quite plausible. However, and as we will see later in more 
detail, several weaknesses can be found in this conception. 
The first one, as was already pointed out, lays with the 
fact that perceptions of the client are not only determined 
by client behaviors. Instead, counselor's attitudes and 
beliefs seem to play an important role. Second, as it was 
recently reported by Miller (1985), perceptions of the 
client are formed very early in the interview. Also, the 
testing of hypothesis is found to follow a confirmatory 
strategy, rather than an open inquiry to hypothesis 
revision. Additionaly, several unconscious dimensions, to be 
discussed in the next third part of this review, also seem 
to play an important role on our judgments. 
This section, without the intention of being an 
exhaustive description of the research in the field, will 
review the most important studies on client's perceptions 
and conceptualizations, hypothesis generation and testing. 
The cognitive processes involved in counselor's 
perceptions, conceptualizations, and judgements, were 
objects of extensive discussion since the appearence of 
Meehl’s (1954) important book on Statistical versus Clinical 
Prediction. Comparing the studies on clinical and 
statistical prediction, Meehl concluded that the evidence 
goes clearly toward the statistical side. According to him, 
this is not surprising given the fact that the " • • • human 
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brain is poor at weighing and computing" (Meehl, 1984). 
Therefore, psychotherapy is seen as the application of a 
science that does not yet exist (Meehl, 1960). While the 
cognitive processes involved in clinical conceptualization 
have not been fully explored, these early studies pointed to 
the limitations of the human cognitive processes, and to the 
possible inadequacy of a computer analogue model. 
Early studies done during the 50s and 60s also 
contradict the idea that conceptualizations are a slow, 
continuous process, always subject to testing and revision. 
Meehl (1960) has shown that counselor’s perceptions are 
formed very early in the interview (i.e., between the second 
and the fourth session) and remain basically unchanged 
throughout the process. Similar findings were reported by 
Parker (1958). Counselors were not found to change their 
predictions from the first to the following interviews. 
These early studies go in the same direction as the 
conclusions of a more recent review of studies on early 
impressions about clients. Among several findings, Wills 
(1978) reported the tendency of the counselor to make 
judgements based on small samples of client's behaviors. 
More recently, Friedlander and Stockman (1983) 
conducted a study in order to test the presence of anchoring 
and publicity biases in clinical judgment. Anchoring refers 
to the effects of early presentation of information on 
subsequent clinical judgments. Publicity effects refer to 
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the tendency of the clinician to moderate their judgments as 
a function of having to publicly disclose their opinions to 
expert observers. The subjects, 46 clinicians, were asked to 
read a detailed synopsis of five interviews with one 
moderately and one severely disturbed client. After each 
interview they evaluated the clients's level of functioning 
and estimated their progress. The anchoring effects were 
tested by manipulating the time when salient pathogenic 
information was introduced! early (i.e., end of the first 
interview) or later (i.e., end of the fourth interview). In 
the publicity conditions, the subjects were asked to justify 
their estimates, whereas in the non-publicity condition they 
did not have to disclose any justification at any time. 
Generally, the results revealed a significant anchoring 
effect in the judgment of the moderately disturbed client. 
That is, bias was introduced in the clinical judgment by the 
presentation of early information about the client. No 
significant effects were found for either the manipulation 
of publicity or anchoring effects in the evaluation of the 
severely disturbed client. Again the data points to the 
tendency of clinicians to rely on information presented 
earlier in the interview in order to make their judgments 
and predictions. However, there also seems to exist some 
kind of interaction between anchoring effects and client 
characteristics. 
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In sum, "what seems to emerge from the literature is 
that counselors are abundantly influenced by early 
observations and form relatively quick impressions about the 
clients" (Miller, 1985, p. 277). 
Apparently, the counselor makes early inferences based 
on client’s behaviors, which in turn influence the 
construction of conceptualization and judgements. In other 
words, the input provided by the client interacts with the 
counselor’s cognitions in order to produce counselor's 
output. The question which remains is: how complex are those 
counselor’s cognitive processes? According to the studies of 
Meehl and others, it seems that the conception of the 
counselor’s mind as a computer analogue is more fiction than 
reality. The computer analogue model, also referred to as 
full model (Strohraer, Haase, & Biggs, 1982), assumes that 
the data coming from the client's observations impact 
counselor's inferences and attributions. Counselor’s 
conceptualizations of the client are dependent not only on 
these inferences and attributions, but also from the direct 
influence of observations per se. This model assumes the 
existence of an almost unlimited capacity of the human 
information processing system. Given the well known 
limitations of capacity for processing simultaneous 
information, it will be more plausible to hypothesize more 
simple models. 
Strohraer et al. (1982) conducted research intended to 
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analyze the adequacy of the full model when compared with 
less complex models of clinical judgement. The subjects, 46 
doctoral students were presented with observations of a 
hypothetical client's personality, achievement and 
disability. Based on this information, the subjects were 
instructed to make inferences of client's actual level of 
fuctioning, to make causal attributions, and a prediction of 
the client's progress in counseling. The results of this 
research point to three main conclusions. First, any 
adequate model of clinical inference shall include the 
counselor's cognitive mediation processes. Second, the 
observations of the client directly influence counselor's 
inferences, but not counselor's judgements. Finally, and 
contrary to some suggestions coming from the literature on 
attribution theory (Kelley & Michela, 1980; Weiner, 1975), 
attributions seem not to play an important role in clinical 
judgments. Although needing replications in real counseling 
situations, this data suggests that counselor's judgments of 
client are only determined by counselor's inference on the 
client's actual level of functioning. This model goes beyond 
the simple input - output linear models, and is less complex 
than the "ideal" computer or full model. 
The human mind seems not to be functioning similarly 
to the computer. Counselor's perceptions, conceptualizations 
and judgments follow a model probably more closely aligned 
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to the one described by Strohraer et al. Thus, the computer 
model describes inadequately how therapists think, as is 
captured in Sarbin's (1984) words: 
••.hardly anyone would today challenge the claim 
that the clinician {...} does not and cannot 
function as a computer. The clinical context is 
always a flux {...}. The clinician, (like the 
client and the rest of us), is an inveterate story 
maker and story teller. Like the literary critic, 
the clinician interprets the text of the client's 
self-narrative, emplotting yet another story. The 
test of the truth value of the therapist's story is 
coherence, rather than correspondence (p. 13). 
According to Strohmer et al. (1982) it seems that 
counselors' judgments are determined by their inferences 
based on client's observations. Additionally, the research 
tends to support the conclusion that these inferences are 
formed very early in the interview based on small samples of 
client's behavior. Further, these early inferences remain 
basically unchanged throughout the counseling process. These 
findings are consistent with the primacy effects reported in 
the social cognition literature (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). 
Primacy effects refer to the observers' tendency to be 
influenced in their impressions, by early observations. In 
the course of social interaction, people tend to search for 
information that is consistent with those early impressions 
(Snyder & Swann, 1978). Extrapolating from the social 
psychology literature, one can then state that the 
counselor's hypothesis testing strategies are not so 
divergent and open to change as was defended by the 
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advocates of the computer model. I will now turn to some 
recent research atteratpting to clarify the dilemma in 
hypothesis testing, regarding the use of convergent versus 
divergent strategies. 
Hirsch and Stone (1983) conducted one piece of 
research with the intention of studying the cognitive 
processes involved in the client conceptualization and 
hypothesis testing strategies. The subjects, 27 counseling 
psychology doctoral students, were asked to read a 
description of a client, followed by a videotape showing 
five minutes of an interview with the same client. Then, the 
subjects were asked to write about their conceptualizations 
of the client, the most important focus for counseling, the 
basis for their impressions, what they would like to know 
next, what question they would ask, and how those questions 
might help them. This entire sequence was repeated two more 
times, with the presentation of additional written and video 
information each time. The dependent measures (e.g., new 
conceptual statements, number of questions asked, proximity 
between questions and conceptualizations, strategy, 
confidence) were organized in order to answer the main 
question, which was to know if the participants used 
convergent or divergent conceptualization and questioning 
strategies. The findings confirmed the existence of 
phenomena of early convergence, with significant 
with subjects’ level of counseling experience. interactions 
The higher 
convergence. 
the 
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experience, the greater the early 
Hirsch and Stone's findings are consistent with the 
research reported above. That is, the primacy effects and 
confirmatory questioning reported by researchers in social 
psychology, was found to be an important characteristic of 
the counselor's cognitive processes. Additionally, these 
effects seem to be more evident with more experienced 
counselors. 
Holloway and Wolleat (1984) investigated the same 
phenomenon, but this time exploring the relationship between 
clinical hypothesis formation and testing, and counselors' 
conceptual level and degree of experience. The subjects, 37 
counseling students, after completing a conceptual level 
measure (i.e., Paragraph Completion Method), viewed a 
videotape of a counseling interview. Following the 
interview, they were asked to complete a measure of clinical 
hypothesis formation and testing (i.e., Clinical Assessment 
Questionnaire). The results showed a significant 
relationship between quality level in forming and justifying 
a clinical hypothesis, number of divergent questions asked, 
and counselor's conceptual level. That is, conceptualy 
complex counselors tend to elaborate clinical hypothesis of 
higher quality, and tend to look for more divergent 
information. Contrary to the study of Hirsch and Stone, no 
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significant relationship was found between hypothesis 
formation/testing and counselor’s level of experience. 
Extrapolating from Hirsch and Stone, and Holloway and 
Wolleat studies, we can hypothesize that there is an 
interaction between counselors' characteristics (demographic 
and cognitive) and the use of convergent/divergent 
questioning strategies. However, the direction of this 
interaction is not yet clear. 
Different findings concerning the use of convergent 
questioning strategies have been reported by several studies 
conducted by Strohmer and colleagues. In the first of a 
series of two studies, Strohmer and Newman (1983) presented 
a list of 38 questions to 60 undergraduate students. From 
this list, the subjects were asked to select the 12 
questions that would best help them test the personality 
type of a hypothetical person (i.e., introvert vs 
extrovert). The questions were of four types: extroverted 
questions (i.e., solicitation of information confirmatory of 
extroversion); introverted questions (i.e., solicitation of 
confirmatory of introversion information); irrelevant 
questions (i.e., not related to intoversion/extroversion 
variable); and finally, unbiased questions (i.e., equally 
like probability of soliciting information of either 
traits). The majority of participants in this study chose 
the unbiased questioning strategy, and did not adopt the 
covergent stategy found in social psychology (Snyder & 
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Swann, 1978) and counseling studies (Hirsch & Stone, 1982). 
In a subsequent study, Strohmer and Newman tested the 
same hypothesis but within a counseling analogue situation. 
Advanced students in counseling psychology were asked to 
write and verbally produce questions intended to evaluate 
the presence or absence of self-control in students with 
whom they interacted for 10 minutes. Again, the participants 
were found to rely almost exclusively on an unbiased 
questioning strategy. 
Perhaps the most serious limitation of these studies, 
when compared with those done by Hirsh and Stone and 
Holloway and Wolleat, rests on the fact that the hypothesis 
to be tested were not constructed by the subjects, but 
instead given by the experimenter. Therefore, the subjects 
were only involved with the hypothesis testing, rather than 
with the overall process of conceptualization, hypothesis 
generation, and testing. In order to overcome these 
limitations, an additional series of studies were conducted 
by Strohmer and Chiodo (1984). In the first study, they 
tested if the involvement on hypothesis construction had any 
effect on the use of convergent versus divergent questioning 
strategies. Subjects, 40 master level counselors, after 
reading a psychological report of a client, were divided 
into two groups: experimenter-generated hypothesis, and 
self-generated hypothesis. In the experimenter generated 
no 
hypothesis condition, subjects were given the hypothesis by 
the experimenter; in the other group, they were asked to 
elaborate their own hypothesis. Participants from both 
groups were then instructed to generate questions in order 
to test the hypothesis. The results showed two main 
findings. First, subjects from the two groups did not differ 
in the frequency of questions of any category (i, e., 
confirmatory, disconfirraatory, irrelevant, and unbiased). 
Second, participants from both groups tended to develop 
significantly more unbiased questioning strategies. Thus, 
the results of this study provided additional support for 
the conclusion of Strohmer and Newman. That is, counselors 
tend to develop unbiased questioning strategies, regardless 
of their level of involvement with hypothesis generation. 
The research on social cognition suggests that 
observers’ self-schema (i.e., cognitive generalizations 
about the self), tend to influence their questioning 
strategies in order to find, in others, information 
confirmatory with their own self-schema (Fong & Markus, 
1982). The second study of Strohmer and Chiodo evaluated how 
counselors’s self-schema influenced the choice of 
questioning strategies. The subjects, 40 counselors in 
training, were assigned for one of the following conditions: 
schema consistent (i.e., extraverted schematics asked to 
test an extravert hypothesis); schema inconsistent (i.e., 
extravert schematics asked to test an introvert hypothesis); 
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and ascheraatics conditions (i.e., ascheraatics asked to test 
an extravert hypothesis). The subjects were asked to choose 
12 among 38 questions, in order to test either introversion 
or extroversion of a hypothetical person. Similarly to the 
previous studies, the questions were of four types: 
confirmatory, disconfirmatory, irrelevant, and unbiased. The 
results revealed that the participants in the two groups did 
not differ in the frequency they selected different kinds of 
questioning strategies. Again, and like in the previous 
studies, the subjects selected significantly more unbiased 
questions. 
From this group of four pieces of research by Strohraer 
and colleagues, it seems that counselors tend to use 
divergent questioning strategies, opening their 
conceptualizations and hypothesis to challenge and change. 
These data are clearly in contradiction with the findings of 
the research reported above either inside or outside 
counseling. However, several limitations could be pointed to 
both groups of studies. First, all the studies were 
conducted in analogue situations. Although the subjects on 
Hirsch and Stone's study were closer to the counseling 
situation in the sense that they presented initial and 
subsequent information about the client, we were still in 
the presence of an analogue situation with limited 
generalizations to the counseling process. 
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Second, both groups of studies, with the exception of 
the research of Hirsch and Stone, seem to have instruction 
that could bias the subjects' responses. Strohraer and 
colleagues accused Snyder and Swann (1978) of using biased 
instructions. However, the instruction given by Strohmer to 
their subjects is also questionable as can be seen in the 
following quotation: 
...before accepting this tentative conclusion about 
the client, good counseling requires that more 
specific information be gathered relative to 
client's likes and dislikes, their favorite 
activities, (...) in order to confirm and 
disconfirm the hypothesis (Strohmer & Chiodo, 1984, 
p.512). 
With these instructions, the participants were clearly 
directed to use unbiased strategies consistent with the so 
called scientist model. In other words, the biases of the 
researchers themselves, seem to be a good example of the 
question they are trying to study. They are using 
confirmatory research strategies in order to conclude 
predetermined hypotheses. 
Despite the amount of research on conceptualizations 
and hypothesis testing strategies, few secure conclusions 
can be drawn. Bringing the research together, it seems that 
counselors tend to form their conceptualizations very early 
in the interview and based on small amounts of information. 
These early convergences seem to depend on several 
counselor's characteristics, such as experience and 
conceptual level. The use of convergent or divergent 
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questioning strategies is still an issue of considerable 
controversy, given the presence of disparate findings and 
methodological limitations of the research. Finally, 
counselor s processing of client information seems to be 
inadequately described by the computer analogue model, the 
reason why probably most of the research, following this 
model, has failed to provide consistent results. Future 
research should address these phenomena within actual 
counseling situations. 
Cognitive Intentions 
In the preceding sections I referred to the effects of 
attitudes, beliefs, and conceptualizations on counselor’s 
response. As was defended by Martin (1984), another factor 
mediating between conceptualizations and responses still 
exists . I will be referring to that factor as counselor’s 
intentions. These intentions are now becoming an object of 
increased attention due to the recent publication of a 
specific measuring instrument by Clara E. Hill and 
colleagues. According to Hill and O’brady (1985) Intentions 
can be defined as the therapist's rationale for selecting a 
specific behavior, response mode, technique, or intervention 
to use with the client at any given moment within the 
session" (p. 3). In this section, I will refer with some 
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detail to the recent studies of Clara Hill and colleagues on 
the validation of their list of intentions. Then, the 
research on the relationship between counselors' intentions, 
behaviors, and clients' perceptions will be summarized. 
Hill's research on intentions tries to explore the why 
of counselor's behavior rather than the what. Each 
counselors' response, technique or strategy is viewed as the 
concrete translations of their cognitive intentions. 
According to the theoretical model provided by Hill and 
O'Grady (1985), the counselor's conceptualizations are 
translated into goals or intentions. These intentions guide 
the selection of a particular skill or strategy. Next, the 
client perceives the counselor's responses and tries to 
understand her/his intentions. Then the client formulates 
his/her own intentions for selecting a response. Based on 
client's responses, counselors' adjust their 
conceptualizations and subsequent actions. 
Recently, Hill and O’Grady had presented the 
validation of a scale to measure the counselor's cognitive 
intentions. This scale consisted of a list of 19 
pantheoretical and nonrautually exclusive categories. In 
order to measure their intentions, the counselors are 
instructed to review a session within 24 hours, and to note, 
for each turn, all the intentions that had guided their 
choices. A complete description of the instructions and list 
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of intentions can be found in the appendix. 
Hill and O’Grady (1985) reported two studies about the 
role of these intentions in real counseling situations. In 
the first study, 20 entire sessions with a female neurotic 
client were analyzed in order to explore: (1) if intentions 
vary across the counseling process, (2) the relationship 
between counselor's intentions and counselor’s response 
modes, and (3) the relationship between counselor’s 
intentions and client's response modes. The data showed 
that, across treatment, there was a significant decrease in 
the intentions of getting information, clarify and cathart, 
from the first to the final third of each interview. The 
sequential analysis revealed several associations between 
counselor's intentions and counselor and client response 
modes. The associations of counselor's intentions and 
responses are consistent with most ideas defended in the 
theoretical literature. These associations also pointed to 
the fact that there is not one single response mode with 
which to translate each intention. However, few associations 
between client's responses and counselor's intentions 
obtained statistical significance. These data suggest the 
presence of some intervening variables between counselor's 
intentions and client's responses. 
The objective of the second study of Hill and 0 brady 
was to compare the intentions of experienced therapists from 
different theoretical orientations. The sample was 
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constituted of 42 practicing, experienced, Ph.D therapists. 
Subjects were asked to choose a middle session with a 
neurotic client, tape the session, review and classify it 
within a period of 24 hours. Additionally, they were asked 
to rate their theoretical commitment to different schools of 
therapy (i.e., psychoanalytical, behavioral, and 
humanistic), and to rate the overall quality of the session. 
Several conclusions from this research deserve to be 
emphasized here. First, the intentions were found to 
represent useful measures to differentiate among various 
schools of psychotherapy. Psychoanalytical oriented 
therapists tend to underline intentions such as feelings and 
insight. Behaviorists report more intentions of change, set 
limits, and reinforce change. Finally, humanists score 
significantly higher on the intention of therapist needs. 
Second and consistent with data from the first study, the 
session tends to begin with intentions to clarify and get 
information, and to end with cathart, insight, and change. 
Third, the qualitative ratings of the sessions were 
positively related with the intentions of focus and 
feelings, and negatively related to get information and 
support. Finally, several clusters of intentions were found: 
assessment intentions (get information, focus and clarify), 
therapeutic work intentions (cognition, behavior, 
self-control, feelings, and insight), change (change, and 
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reinforce change), problems (set limits, give information, 
resistence, therapist needs), and finally nonspecific 
factors used at all points of therapy by all kinds of 
theoretical orientations (support, cathart, hope, challange, 
relationship), 
In a recent study Fuller & Hill (1985) looked for the 
differences between client and counselor perceptions of 
intentions. In order to analyze this and other questions, 
four counselors saw four volunteer clients for a single 
session. After the interview, both counselors and clients 
reviewed the session listing their intentions and rating the 
helpfulness for each turn. The results showed that clients 
perceived significantly more support, focus, and clarify, 
while counselors perceived more self-control, and 
resistance. The matching between counselors intentions and 
clients perceptions was higher for get information, set 
limits, and clarify, and lower for relationship, resistance, 
and therapist needs. The central idea that one gets from 
this study is that "after participating in the same 
counseling session, counselors and helpees perceived 
different things to have occured" (p.335). These results 
confirm in part Martin's et al. (in press) finding of a 
lower degree of matching for interpersonal cognitions. 
However, and contrary to Martin's data, here the match was 
not found to relate significantly with the outcome. However, 
these diferences can be explained by the fact that Martin s 
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research is not restricted to the interpersonal cognitive 
matching. 
Taking these three studies together, several 
conclusions can be drawn. First, intentions seem to be an 
important mediating factor between conceptualizations and 
responses. Second, intentions seem to vary across and within 
the interview, consistently with most of the theoretical 
models of the helping process (e.g., Carkhuff, 1969, 1980; 
Ivey, 1971, 1983). Third, associations can be found between 
intentions and counselor's responses, showing, however, that 
each intention can be translated into different verbal 
responses. Finally, intentions seem to be useful tools in 
identifying the discrepancies as well as the commonalities 
among theoretical orientations. 
One interesting finding from Hill and O'Grady was the 
absence of strong associations between counselor's 
intentions and client responses. That is, only a very small 
amount of variation in client's responses was explained by 
the therapist’s intentions. These data suggest the existence 
of mediating mechanisms. Probably as suggested by Fuller & 
Hill (1985) the client is directly influenced neither by the 
counselor's responses nor by the counselor's Intentions. The 
client’s perceptions of the counselor's intentions could be 
an important factor, if not the most important, mediating 
his/her own responses. A series of studies by Elliott and 
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colleagues explored this hypothesis. 
Elliott (1979), in a series of two studies, 
investigated how clients perceive different counselors' 
response modes. From the theoretical literature, the 
following relationships between counselors' responses and 
clients' perceptions of their intention can be established: 
"(a) Advisements are perceived as guiding the client, (b) 
Acknowledgement ('uh-huhs') are perceived as reassuring the 
client, (c) Reflections are perceived as communicating 
understanding of the client's message, (d) Interpretations 
are perceived as explaining the client to himself or 
herself, (s) Questions are perceived as gathering 
information or understanding the client, (f) 
Self-Disclosures are perceived as using (the helper's) self 
to help the client" (p. 286). Elliott tested these 
associations. In the first, an analogue study, 24 
helper/client pairs interacted for a period of 30 minutes. 
Three portions of the interview (i.e., initial, middle, end) 
were videotaped. After the interview, a tape assited recall 
was conducted. During this recall an inquirer asked the 
client what she/he thought was the helper intention at each 
turn. The results found a significant but weak support for 
all the association hypotheses. That is, only a small 
portion of client's perceptions of counselor's intentions 
was explained by the counselor's responses. 
A second study was conducted by Elliott (1979), this 
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time within a counseling context. The participants were 16 
pairs of clients and helpers actually in counseling. Similar 
to the first study, a session was recorded and recalled. The 
measures for the intentions and verbal responses were the 
same of the first study. Partial correlational analysis 
showed the existence of significant but weak associations 
for five of the six hypotheses. Few statistically 
significant differences were found between the analogue and 
the counseling studies. The data from both studies clearly 
shows the presence of some relationship between counselors* 
responses and clients' perceptions of their intentions. 
However, counselors' responses have very limited capacity in 
the prediction of clients' perceptions. 
In a subsequent study, Elliott, Barker, Casky and 
Pistrang (1982) reported additional data from the two 
researches reported above. This time the objective was to 
analyze the perception of helpfulness of different response 
modes. The response modes were analyzed from three different 
perspectives: (1) external observers' measure of counselor 
behaviors; (2) client's perception of counselor's 
intentions; (3) counselor perception of her/his own 
intentions. Additionally, clients and counselors reported 
the perceived helpfulness of each response mode. Two main 
findings deserve mention. First, and consistently with part 
of the data reported by Hill and O'Grady (1985), 
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interpretations and advisements were perceived as the most 
helpful responses, for either the counselor or client. And, 
questions were perceived as the least helpful. Second, and 
most important, strong effects of the measuring perspectives 
were found. It was the client's perception of the counselors 
intentions that predicted the helpfulness ratings, rather 
than the response modes or the counselor's perceptions. 
Additionally, counselors' perceptions of their own 
intentions predicted their own helpfulness ratings, but not 
clients' ratings. Third, the relationship between response 
modes and helpfulness ratings was small. 
In sum, the research from Elliott and colleagues shows 
that client perceptions cannot be directly predicted from 
counselor responses or reported intentions. Additionally, 
the helpfulness of a response depends upon the client's 
perception, rather than the response itself. Given the fact 
that verbal responses were found to be weak predictors of 
client responses, Elliott and colleagues (Elliott, 1985; 
Elliott, James, Reimschuessel, Cislo, & Sack, 1985) are 
currently developing methodological tools to analyze the 
immediate impact of therapeutic interventions based on 
clients' description of this impact. 
Summarizing, the research on intentions seem to be a 
good way to observe the cognitive dimensions of counselor 
and client behaviors. This research gives reason to believe 
that the perceptions of each participant are more important 
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than the concrete behaviors in the interview. However, an 
important problem surrounds the verbal report of cognitive 
intentions. Counselors and clients can only report the 
intentions of which they are aware. As I will demonstrate 
later on, there are reasons to believe that some unconscious 
determinants can influence our behaviors in the interview. 
Hill and 0 Grady (1985) seem to recognize these limitations 
when they give the example of "...a therapist response based 
on countertransference issues of he or she is unaware, these 
issues cannot be reported" (pp. 19-20). 
Cognitive Intentionality and Therapy Recall 
Some methodological problems exist in the study of 
cognitive intentionality. Since we do not have direct access 
to cognitive processes, we have to either infer them from 
actions, or ask the person to report what is going on 
"inside". The validity of the inference made is highly 
questionable. Inferences of anothers’ cognitive processes 
are seldom accurate and vary according to the observer lens. 
The second mode, self-report of cognitive processes, has 
been a subject of debate since the existence of scientific 
psychology (e.g., Bakan, 1954; Boring, 1953). 
The validity of introspection as an acceptable 
methodology was challenged by the behaviorist movement. 
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Psychologists were instructed to rely exclusively on the 
observation of concrete behaviors. However, the cognitive 
revolution, along with the shift of attention to the inner 
world, had brought the necessity of reconsidering 
methologies for the study of cognitive processes. 
During the last few years, some methodologies were 
developed in order to explore the cognitive processes ( see 
Merluzzi, Glass, & Genest, 1981). Martin (1984) had recently 
suggested three methods from the research on instructional 
effects (i.e., process training, stimulated recall, 
cognitive training). Probably the most complete method is 
the one presented by Kagan several years ago, called 
Interpersonal Process Recall (Kagan, Krathwohl, and Miller, 
1963). Briefly, this method consists of three basic 
components. First, an interview is taped. Second, counselor 
and client review the interview. Third, during the review, 
the participants are asked to recall the cognitive processes 
that took place at each moment. Some of the early reported 
research, like the one of Hill and O’Grady (1985), follow 
this methodology. The advantages of this method are that it 
has raultipotentiality for practice, training, and research. 
Early studies have shown the usefulness of this methodology 
in accelarating the client's process in short and long term 
therapy (e.g., Kagan, Krathwhol, and Miller, 1963; Resnikof, 
Kagan, and Shauble, 1970) and training and supervision of 
clinicians (see review of Ford, 1979). Other studies are 
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either finding validity to the method (Katz & Resnikoff, 
1977), or divising tools to facilitate the research on 
I.P.R. (e.g., Tuckell, 1980). 
Rennie (May, 1984; February, 1985) is involved in a 
deep study of client's recall of therapy. He developed a 
recall, inquirer and analysis of therapy sessions of eight 
clients from different experienced therapists. By means of a 
ground theory analysis (i.e., breaking the communication 
into meaning units), he found that "clients operate within 
more than one level of awareness and that some of these 
levels are not verbally expressed to their therapists" 
(1984, p. 18). Rennie reported the most important emerging 
category on client recall, which he called client agency. By 
this, he refers to the way clients' internally process and 
evaluate their own as well as the therapists' responses. 
This is well illustrated by the functions that Rennie 
(February, 1985) was able to identify in the clients' 
narrative process. The process of story telling was found to 
have six different functions for the client: addressing 
tension associated with past events; re-experiencing and 
understanding the real feelings; ventilating these feelings, 
generating ideas that could contribute to 
self-understanding; sense of control; operation of private 
covert processes. 411 these data show how the client 
actively judges and processes all the information present on 
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the counseling process. An apparently simple process such as 
telling a story, can accomplish several useful therapeutic 
functions, of which the counselor is seldom aware. 
Of course no raethodolgy is without problems when the 
focus of concern is the internal process. As will be pointed 
out later, the existence of unconscious dimensions should 
alert us to the limitations of verbal reports on cognitive 
processes (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). However, several 
authors have been trying to improve our methodologies. For 
example, Ericsson and Simon (1980) found that the validity 
of verbal reports on cognitive processes could be improved 
if the subjects are given specific probes, and if we reduce 
the time between the event and the recall. Of course, these 
methodologies still need improvement, and we cannot satisfy 
ourselves with the tools of the early introspectionist. 
However, as it is pointed out by Rennie (personal 
communication, March 26, 1985) the material that we are 
getting from the research is sufficiently rich to neglect. A 
dimension other than the concrete communication, seems to be 
an important component of the therapeutic situation. The 
recall of therapy seems to be at least an initial toll to 
assess the dark side of counseling and therapy. 
Conclusions 
The cognitive orientation, ex perienced by all fields 
126 
of psychology since the 70s, had produced a shift from 
externalisra to internalism. The internal, covert processes 
have again become a focus of attention. In philosophical 
terms, this movement corresponds to the integration of the 
realistic and idealistic positions separated by the 
Cartesian dualism. The study of counseling and psychotherapy 
began to be approched within this cognitive point of view. 
The relationship between counselors' and clients' overt 
responses and internal processes has been the main issue 
addressed by the researchers during the last couple of 
years. 
The objective of the second part of this chapter was 
to review the research on the cognitive dimensions of the 
counseling process. The main underlining idea, defended 
here, was that there seems to be a complex network of 
cognitive processes beyond the concrete behaviors of the 
counselor/client interaction. Cognitive intentionality was 
defined as internal experiences, which includes perceptions, 
attitudes, beliefs, conceptualizations, formulation of 
hypothesis, and establishment of intentions, present in both 
client and counselor, in the course of the therapeutic 
process. 
This part began with the presentation of Martin's 
Cognitive Mediational Paradigm to counseling, in which the 
interactions between counselor and client were seen as 
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mediated by a complex network of cognitive processes. 
Second, the research on the relationship between 
counseling skills and attitudes and beliefs was reviewed. It 
was shown how our responses to the client are influenced by 
our attitudes and beliefs toward the skills, the clients, 
and ourselves. 
Third, the conclusions of the studies done on 
conceptualizations, hypothesis generation, and testing, were 
presented. Despite some conflicting results, there is 
evidence that counselors tend to form their 
conceptualizations very early in the interview based on 
small amounts of data. Additionally, they use questioning 
strategies that tend to confirm early conceptualizations, 
and these conceptualizations remain quite stable throughout 
the process. In sura, the computer model, where the counselor 
is viewed as carefully processing, and revising all the 
information, seems not to be an adequate description of 
counselor’s cognitive processes. 
Fourth, the studies of counselor intentions (by Hill 
and colleagues), and those about client perceptions of 
counselors' intentions (by Elliott and associates) were 
reviewed. From the studies of Hill and colleagues, the 
following findings were emphasized: (1) intentions are 
important factors mediating between conceptualizations and 
responses; (2) intentions vary within and across interviews; 
(3) there are strong associations between counselor s 
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intentions and verbal responses; (4) intentions are useful 
in identifying commonalities and discrepancies across 
schools of therapy. From the research of Elliott and 
collaborators, the main conclusion is that clients' 
perceptions cannot be directly predicted from counselors' 
responses and intentions. 
Finally, some methodological problems raised by the 
research on cognitive intentionality were addressed, along 
with some examples from the research using recall of 
therapy. 
From the research reviewed here, it is evident that 
some light appears inside the tunnel of the cognitive 
processes. There is no doubt that few understandings will be 
achieved without a dive into the internal processes of 
counselor and client. Of course, the conscious cognitive 
processes represent only a small part of the internal, and 
covert dimensions. The other part, usually referred to as 
unconscious, represents an even darker side waiting 
clarification. These unconscious dimensions of the cognitive 
processes will be addressed in the third part of this 
chapter. 
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Part 3 
Unconscious Intentionality 
I have refered thus far to two dimensions of 
intentionality, behavioral and the cognitive. However, as 
stressed by May (1969) "intentionality... goes below levels 
of immediate awareness and includes spontaneous bodily 
elements and other dimensions which are called 
’unconscious’" (p.234). As I pointed out, the behavioral 
intentionality is represented by most counseling and therapy 
research. In giving some concreteness to the counseling 
situation it is possible to gain some beginning 
understanding on the regulating mechanisms of the 
counselor/client interaction. Additionally, and as a direct 
consequence, the training of counselors and therapists 
becomes much more practical. 
However, the reality of the counseling situation is 
much more complex than it was originally conceived by 
pioneering researchers. Under the influence of the cognitive 
movement, (which has affected nearly all the fields of 
psychology since the 1970s), counselors and clients began to 
be seen as active information processors rather than as 
simple recipients of external stimuli. Consequently, 
counseling researchers redirected their attention to the 
exploration of covert variables, which are illustrated in 
studies of perception, attributions, intentions, and 
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attitudes. Simultaneously, it was apparent a movement 
searching for new and alternative methodologies, exemplified 
by intensive single case studies and recall of therapy 
sessions. Also the training programs began to discover 
increased preocupation with the necessity of establishing 
objectives at the cognitive level. 
While this cognitive movement is in its beginning 
stages in the fields of counseling and therapy, other areas 
of psychology are already experiencing what some authors 
have chosen to call Mcognitive unconscious revolution" (Van 
Den Bergh & Eelen, 1984). In this third part, some of the 
characteristics of this emerging unconscious movement will 
be described, and several implications to the concept of 
intentionality in counseling and psychotherapy are 
discussed. Although the concept of unconscious comes from a 
long tradition in counseling and psychotherapy (e.g., 
psychoanalysis), it was only during the last few years that 
it has become an object of researchers’ interest. 
Researchers are only now trying in the laboratory, to find 
validity for such a controversial construct. 
Before reviewing the literature it will be useful to 
define what is meant by unconscious. The easiest and also 
the most complete way is to adopt the broader definition 
recently offered by Bowers (1984), in which he presents 
unconscious influences as the "determinants of thought and 
131 
action that are not noticed or appreciated as such" (p.228). 
The present definition includes two important concepts: the 
intrapsychic notion defended by the psychodynaraic theorists; 
and the notion of the unconscious external influences, a 
recent object of study by cognitive psychologists. 
Additionaly, this definition encompasses the concepts of 
unconscious defended by Zajonc (1980): an affective 
unconscious, exemplified by the research on selective and 
subliminal perception; and another, related to the automatic 
processing of information produced by overlearning. 
In this section I will present a review of the 
research on the different dimensions refered in Bowers* 
definition. I will begin with a presentation of Nisbett and 
Wilson's (1977) argument on the limitations of the cognitive 
methodologies, mainly focused on the verbal report of 
cognitive processes. Following that presentation, some of 
the most important positions in defense of the unconscious 
will be reviewed. Then the role of the affective processes 
on the unconscious will be analyzed. Next, the literature on 
subliminal perception, and its relations to social and 
clinical phenomena will be discussed. I will end this part 
of the literature review with a brief overview of the 
concept of countertransference. 
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Limitations of the Cognitive Methodologies 
In an important revision of literature on the validity 
of the introspective processes, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
concluded that there is an absence of evidence supporting 
the idea that it is possible to gain access to our own 
cognitive processes. In other words, the subjects verbal 
reports on the cognitive processes during the execution of a 
given task, are generally inaccurate and based on causal 
theories constructed a priori by the subject. 
The research in fields such as attribution, 
insufficient justification, learning-without-awareness, 
reported weights assigned to certain stimuli, subliminal 
perception, problem solving, effects of the presence of 
people in helping behaviors, as well as some exploratory 
studies conducted by Nisbett and Wilson has found evidence 
in support of the following conclusions: (1) in some cases 
the subjects are not aware of the existence of the stimuli; 
(2) in other situations the subjects are not aware of the 
existence of a given response; (3) and still in other 
situations the subjects are not aware that a given stimulus 
has effected a response. A good example can be found in a 
study done by Nisbett and Wilson. Ninety students watched a 
film under one of the three following conditions: (1) 
distractibility by noise; (2) distractibility by an 
unajusted focus; and (3) no distraction. After the film, the 
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subjects were asked to rate their interest to the film. 
Then, the experimenter apologized for the disturbing 
conditions, and asked the subjects to report the influence 
of the disturbing conditions in their ratings. The results 
revealed no significant differences among the ratings of the 
three groups. However, subjects in the noise condition 
perceived significant effects of the disturbing conditions 
in their ratings. According to the authors, this study is a 
good example on how instropection access is "not sufficient 
to produce accurate reports about the role of critical 
stimuli in response to questions asked a few minutes or even 
seconds after the stimuli have been processed and a response 
produced" (p.246). 
Although still controversial, the core of Nisbett and 
Wilson’s conclusions have been widely accepted (see Bowers, 
1984; Lundh, 1979). Assuming these conclusions are valid, 
one can raise strong doubts regarding the accuracy of the 
recall of cognitive processes reported by counselor and 
client. And data from the recall of therapy sessions (e.g., 
Rennie, August 1984) and counselor's reports on intentions 
(e.g., Hill & O’Grady, 1985), must be regarded with caution. 
Evidence from the research, points to the fact that what is 
reported is usually nothing other than the application of 
aprioristic causal theories. That is, subjects reported as 
their own cognitive processes, those that they see as 
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logically adapted to a given situation. This explains why 
the actor s explanation seldom differs from the one given by 
an observer. 
These data call attention to the existence of certain 
variables influencing our actions and thoughts (i.e., 
concrete and cognitive intentionality) and of which we are 
completely unaware. It is to this unconscious influence on 
our thought and action that I will refer to as unconscious 
intentionality. Briefly stated, unconscious intentionality 
is the group of psychological processes of which we are 
unaware, even though influencing our thoughts and actions as 
clients and counselors. 
The Importance of the Unconscious Processes 
Shevrin and Dickman (1980), in one of the most widely 
cited articles supporting the importance of the unconscious, 
defend the idea that no psychological theory can operate 
without taking into account the concept of unconscious. 
According to Shevrin and Dickman, the unconscious processes 
present three main characteristics: (1) they are 
psychological; (2) they are active; (3) and they are 
different from the conscious processes. Two postulates 
follow from these characteristics. The first, called "weak , 
assumes the existence of the unconscious and its effects on 
counscious processes. The second, designated as "strong", 
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assumes that the unconscious processes follow their own laws 
and organization principles, and are necessarily different 
from those ruling the counsciousness. 
Reviewing the research in areas such as selective 
attention, subliminal perception, retinal image 
stabilization, binocular rivalry, and backward masking, 
Shevrin and Dickman found enough evidence to confirm each of 
the referred postulates, and additionally, to confirm that 
the initial phase of information processing occurs outside 
conscious. The authors also state that the awareness of a 
given stimulus depends on the existence of three groups of 
factors: 
1. Stimulus factors (e.g.,loudness, brightness, 
figural coherence, etc.). 
2. State factors (e.g., level of arousal, sleep 
stage, fatigue, distractibility, etc.). 
3. Motivational factors (e.g., avoidance, anxiety, 
guilt, conflict, etc.), (p.431). 
It is particularly important to mention that 
motivational states are unconscious contributing factors. 
The admision that uncounscious processes have internal as 
well as external determinants is consistent with the 
definition adopted above, and offers some promising ground 
for the integration of clinical and laboratory data, as it 
is stated in the following conclusion of Shevrin and 
Dickman: 
The clear message from much recent thinking in 
psychology appears to be that behavior cannot be 
understood without taking conscious experience into 
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account and that conscious experience cannot be 
fully understood without taking unconscious 
psychological processes into account. The 
laboratory and the consulting room seem to be 
sharing at least a common wall, which may in fact 
turn to have a door in it (p.432). 
Recently, Van Den Bergh and Eelen (1984) have proposed 
that the cognitive revolution should preferentially be 
called "cognitive conscious revolution" since several fields 
of psychology are extending their frontiers beyond the study 
of consciousness, anticipating what the authors chose to 
call "unconscious cognitive revolution". As examples of this 
revolution. Van Den Bergh and Eelen's pointed to research on 
the domains of selective attention, unconscious processing 
of meaning, unconscious effect of meaning in automatic 
responses, and unconscious activation of overt motor 
responses. 
Similarly to the review of Shevrin and Dickman, Van 
Den Bergh and Eelen's analysis of the literature indicates 
that part of our behaviors are controlled, or at least 
mediated by unconscious psychological processes. 
If the unconscious revolution is an established fact, 
there still remains some confusion around most issues in 
unconscious research. In order to clarify some of those 
issues. Bowers (1984) has introduced an important 
distinction on the mechanisms of information processing. He 
proposes a distinction between perceived and noticed 
information: perceived information is defined as the one who 
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is "registered and influential" (p.229), and noticed is seen 
as "perceived information that is, in addition, selectively 
attended (i.e., consciously perceived)" (p.229). 
Based on a vast amount of experimental 
(®•S•»sub1imina1 perception, memory) and clinical evidence 
(e»S«» blind — sight, dissociation, repression), Bowers 
defends that unconscious phenomena as refering to 
information that is perceived but not noticed. However, it 
is particularly interesting that Bowers has enlarged the 
notion of unconscious to information that even though 
noticed, its influence on thought and action is not 
comprehended. 
Thus, the lack of understanding about cause and effect 
relationships represents a second type of evidence for the 
existence of unconscious processes. In other words, and as 
it was already pointed out by Nisbett and Wilson (1977), in 
most of the situations we are anaware of the causes of our 
behaviors, and this unwareness represents another argument 
in defense of the importance of the study of the 
unconscious. 
A good example of this situation is a research example 
presented by Bowers. He presented a series of portraits and 
landscapes pairs to the subjects. After determining the 
subjects preferences on a baseline of 20 trials, he began to 
reinforce the kind of illustration not preferred by the 
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subject. As was expected the subjects increased their 
preferences to the reinforced pictures. Questioning the 
subjects about the experiment, Bowers found the following 
typical responses: 
Experimenter: Did you pick landscapes or portraits 
more often? 
Subject: Landscapes. 
Experimenter: Did you noticed whether I said 
anything during the course of the 
experiment? 
Subject: You said good whenever I picked 
landscapes. 
Experimenter: Do you think your tendency to pick 
landscapes was influenced by ray 
reinforcement of them? 
Subject: Of course not! I picked the landscapes 
because I liked them better than the 
portraits. Besides, you only said "good" 
after I made ray choice, so what you said 
couldn’t possible have influenced my 
selection of pictures (p.245). 
This example illustrates how our behavior is often 
influenced by factors outside consciousness. 
In summary, according to Bowers, we can postulate the 
existence of two types of unconscious processes: information 
that is perceived but not noticed, and information that is 
noticed but not comprehended or evaluated as influential. 
"In either case, people’s thoughts and actions are 
determined by factors outside awareness" (p.246). In a 
footnote, Bowers refers to the former as type one 
unconscious , and to the second as type two. 
As was expected this unconscious revolution is also 
affecting the fields of counseling and therapy. Particularly 
interesting is the fact that some cognitive therapists (like 
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their experimental cognitive colleagues) are now arguing for 
the necessity of taking into account the unconscious 
dimensions of the therapeutic process (e.g., Bowers & 
Meichenbaura, 1984; Mahoney, 1980, 1982). 
Although recognizing that unconscious processes are " 
a tropical jungle of which the diversity and fertility 
present ample opportunities for entanglement, confusion, and 
obfuscation" (1981, p.95), Mahoney refers to the need to 
take into consideration the unconscious dimensions, both in 
research and in clinical practice. According to Mahoney the 
cognitive therapies have systematically ignored the 
potential importance of the psychological unconscious, even 
though the research has brought evidence for the following 
conclusions: 
(a) we probably learn more than we can verbalize; (b) 
unless we practice verbalizing them many of our motor 
and cognitive skills tend to became progressively 
less accessible to language; and (c) stored 
information does not have to be communicated to exert 
an influence on our thoughts, feelings, or actions 
(Mahoney, 1980, p.163). 
Mahoney's conclusions seem to be consistent with data 
from the researches reported above. Due to this we can 
understand how misleading the therapeutic assumption 
regarding the validity of verbal reports on cognitive 
processes could be. 
Recognizing the importance of paying attention to the 
study of psychological processes outside awareness. 
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Meichenbaura and Gilmore (1984) have recently advanced a 
cognitive-behavioral perspective of the unconscious. Three 
components of the human cognitions are presented: cognitive 
events, cognitive processes and cognitive structures. For 
each of those components, Meichenbaum and Gilmore present 
examples of aspects that, although being unconscious, they 
systematically affect our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. 
Additionally the authors describe some of the 
methodological tools that could be used by the therapist in 
order to make the client aware of some of these unconscious 
dimensions. Interestingly enough, Meichenbaura and Gilmore 
present their conceptualization as an attempt to build a 
bridge between psychodynamic and behavioral approaches. 
However, recognizing the distance that still exists between 
the two conceptions of unconscious. Meichenbaura and 
Gilmore's formulation of the unconscious only refers to the 
existence of automatic chains of information- processing due 
to overlearning. As was already indicated, and as we shall 
see and attempt to defend in more detail later, there is 
another concept of unconscious in which "behavior ... is 
entirely under the influence of affective factors without 
the participation of cognitive processes" (Zajonc, 1980, 
p.172) . 
As was demonstrated, interest in the study of the 
unconscious is apparent in several fields of psychology. The 
distinction, presented by Bowers, between unconscious types 
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one and two seems to be particularly useful. As such, we can 
postulate that two kinds of unconscious phenomena exist: 
information perceived but not noticed; and information 
noticed but not apprehended as influential. More important, 
however, is the understanding of the determinants of each of 
these two types of unconscious. It seems that external 
factors, such as stimulus characteristics (e.g., loudness, 
brightness, etc.), represent part of the determinants. 
However internal factors, both cognitive (e.g., level of 
arousal, overlearning, selective attention, etc) and 
affective (e.g., guilt, repression, defensiveness, etc.), 
also seem to play an important role in the determination of 
unconscious processes. 
The following sections on affective processes and 
subliminal perception will explore the external and internal 
determinants of the two types of unconscious. 
Affective Processes and Psychological Unconscious 
The importance of the intentional dimensions of 
feelings and emotions was recognized long time ago 
by 
theorists and researchers of human behavior . Most of 
the 
psychodynamic and humanistic approaches stress the emotional 
components of human experiences. However, the cognitive 
revolution brought the affective dimension to a second plan 
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of the laboratory and clinic. As was noted by Zajonc (1980), 
words like "affect", "attitude", emotion",and "feeling", are 
seldom found in the indexes of major cognitive psychology 
books. A similar phenomena, in the field of personality 
psychology, was recently reported by Pervin (1985). 
With respect to the therapeutic field, Mahoney (1980) 
comments that the recent cognitive therapies "tend to view 
feelings narrowly, as phenomenal artifacts that are to be 
controlled rather than experienced" (p.159). According to 
Mahoney, the idea that feelings are by-products of 
cognitions is inconsistent with the recognized role played 
by the affective aspects on the learning and changing 
processes. It is also inconsistent with the ontogenetic and 
philogenetic evolution, which is illustrated in the anatomic 
divisions of the central nervous system. 
Contrary to the dominant position in cognitive 
psychology, Zajonc (1980) defends the idea that the 
affective processes happen independently and prior to the 
cognitive processes. Therefore it is possible to have 
affective discriminations in absence of recognition memory. 
In defense of the idea that "preferences need no 
inferences", Zajonc reports several research studies done on 
preferences, attitudes, impression formation, decision 
making, and clinical situations. His theory about the 
mechanisms of information processing is well illustrated in 
the figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Time Course of the Stimuls (Zajonc, 1980) 
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The sequence of information processing, according to 
fig 2, is the following: (1) sensory reactions; (2) 
affective reactions. The two following stages, (3) 
recognition memory, and (4) feature descrimination, can 
alternate their order, depending on the kind of information 
to be processed. As illustrated by the figure, the affective 
reaction in R2 and R3 is represented by a broken line, 
meaning that although existent, the affective reaction is 
not powerful enough to affect the subsequent cognitive 
processes. Finally, and as can be seen in R2 and R3, the 
cognitive processes can themselves influence the affective 
reactions. The bottom of the figure illustrates Zajonc’s 
conceptualization of the semantical structure of the memory, 
which is seen as a predominantly affective structure. 
As expected, Zajonc’s formulations originated some 
reactions from those who have been defending the idea of 
cognitions as necessary and sufficient for the presence of 
emotions (e.g., Baars, 1981; Lazarus, 1981, 1982; Lazarus, 
Coyne, & Folkman, 1982). However the controversy was not as 
monumental as might be expected. In fact, if Zajonc had made 
a clarification of his terms, as was suggested by Baars 
(1981), stating that "cognitive" meant "process involving 
conscious judgement", and that inference meant conscious 
inference", one would not have found any disagreement at 
all. 
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Lazarus (1982) comments that Zajonc’s conception 
persists in the same mistake that most cognitive psychology 
does today. i.e, the conception of mind as a computer 
analogue. Finding disagreement with the notion that separate 
processing systems exist for cognitions and emotions, 
Lazarus defends the idea that emotions are present in every 
stage of information processing. He justifies most of the 
results reported by Zajonc, by the existence of early 
emotional reactions, however stressing that they are never 
separated from cognitions. In the initial moment of the 
cognitive processes there is a emotional inference of which 
the subject is not aware. One could be leaved with 
impressions that emotions are separated from cognitions, 
however it would be more accurate to state the existence of 
emotions separated from conscious cognitive processes. Such 
a conclusion is well ilustrated in an experiment performed 
long ago by Lazarus & McCleary (1951) in which they found 
that the association of nonsense sylables with a painful 
electric shock, produce a galvanic response to the 
subsequent presentation of the syllables, even when the 
subject was unable to correctly identify the stimuli. 
Analyzing the arguments from both sides, it is clear, 
as was noted by Baars (1981) and recently by Van Den Bergh 
and Eelen (1984), that emotions exist in the absence of 
conscious perception, judgement and inference. And, that in 
the future, according to Baars, "words like conscious 
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unconscious inference should not frighten us any more - they 
have perfectly good interpretations, both theoretically and 
empirically" (p.224). 
More recently, Zajonc, Pietromonaco, and Bargh (1982) 
had referred to the promising possibilities of studying the 
motor representations of emotions as a good way to 
understand the relationship between cognitions and affect 
and to clarify the role played by emotions in human 
behavior. The perceptual-motor theory of emotions proposed 
by Leventhal (1982) and the experiments on state-dependent 
memory carried out by Bower and colleagues (c.f., Bower, 
1981; Bower & Cohen, 1982) are gaining increasing popularity 
among clinical and counseling theoreticians. For example, 
Greenberg and Safran (1984a, 1984b) have used Leventhall’s 
perceptual-motor theory to describe the operation of 
emotional synthesis in counseling and psychotherapy. Central 
to their discussion is the "idea that the experience of 
emotion is the end product of a set of automatic or 
unconscious-processing activities" (Greenberg & Safran, 
1984b, p.591). Interesting is also Rachman's (1980, 1981, 
1984) attempt to apply some of Zajonc’s conclusions to 
clinical practice, namely what he refers to as the 
organization of affect modification strategies. 
Unfortunately, however, if some implications are already 
being drawn to the development of therapeutic strategies, 
there are no attempts to study the operation of these 
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emotional/unconscious mechanisms in the counseling 
interaction. 
Summing up, the research on several fields of 
psychology has been showing how we can be influenced by 
information of which we are not able to either notice or 
comprehend. A good illustration for the existence of 
unconscious phenomena comes from the research on affective 
processes. As was demonstrated by Zajonc we have emotional 
reactions to stimuli that we cannot consciously perceive. 
That is, we react emotionally to information presented 
outside consciousness. The following section will describe 
some of the most important studies on unconscious 
presentation of information - subliminal perception. 
Subliminal Perception 
One of the most controversial areas of research 
concerns the study of subliminal perception. Despite decades 
of research, the debate rages on regarding whether we can or 
cannot be affected by stimuli presented below threshold. In 
this section, I will briefly review the core of the 
controversy , and will present data which supports the 
substantial evidence of subliminal perception. Then, I will 
discuss some related phenomenon in the areas of social 
perception, and psychodynaraics of perception. 
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As was defined by Shevrin and Dickraan (1980), 
"subliminal research is concerned with stimuli too weak to 
become conscious immediately, no matter how much attention 
is directed to the stimulus field" (p.427). Thus this type 
of unconscious process (type 1, according to Bowers) is 
determined by external factors (i.e., conditions of stimulus 
presentation) rather than internal (i.e., conditions of the 
subject). Later in this section, some examples of internal 
determinants will be presented. 
Reviewing the different theories on subliminal 
perception (e.g., Klein & Holt; Spence; Fisher; Dixon, etc), 
Schevrin and Dickman found enough evidence to support their 
two postulates on the unconscious. That is, unconscious 
processes exist and exert influence on conscious processes. 
Additionally, they follow principles of organization, 
different from those of consciousness. 
One of the most prominent arguments against subliminal 
perception was presented by Eriksen (1960). The core of 
Eriksen’s ideas are well suramerized by Bowers (1984): 
Eriksen's position seems to be that perceptual 
experience is by definition conscious, and that if 
verbal report is occasionally insufficient to 
communicate such experience, then so much the worse 
for verbal report as an indicative of what the 
person consciously perceives or discriminates. 
Moreover, since perceptual experience is inferred 
from discriminative responses, any such response, 
verbal or nonverbal, is by definition a reflection 
of person’s conscious experience. Consequently, 
when verbal response does not successfully 
discriminate and other response indeces do, it is 
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taken as evidence for the inadequacy of language to 
communicate conscious experience, not as evidence 
for unconscious perception (p.232). 
Erikson s postulating that any discriminative response 
is an indication of consciousness, removes any theoretical 
possibility for the study of unconscious. Eriksen admits the 
existence of influencing information that cannot be 
reported, but refuses to call this information unconscious. 
Again, and similarly to the debate on eraotions/cognitions, 
the problem is due to an absence of clarification of terms. 
After clarification, Eriksen might agree with Dixon (1971, 
1981) that there is a strong argument for the influence of 
stimuli of which we are not aware. 
However, to complicate this issue further, and as was 
pointed out by Bowers, verbal discriminative responses 
might be possible in absence of conscious experience (e.g., 
blind-sight phenomena) . Because of this he proposes that 
future research should take in account the following issues; 
" (a) subliminal stimulation must involve some independent 
assessment of an awareness threshold, (b) below which 
discriminative responses (verbal or nonverbal) can 
subsequently be demonstrated " (p.234). 
Unfortunately, Bowers does not offer any operational 
way to define awareness threshold, a central aspect for 
subliminal research. 
Another way of studying unconscious perception is by 
means of masking effects. In masking experiments the 
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"presence of one stimulus impairs the perception of another 
stimulus in close temporal and/or spatial proximity (Marcel, 
1983 b, p.262). Manipulating the "stimulus onset asynchrony" 
(i.e., the temporal distance between the stimulus and the 
mask), we can study the differential effects on conscious 
experience. 
Using this methodology, Marcel (1983 a ) asked 
subjects to make judgements on the presence/absence, graphic 
and semantic similarity, of masked words. Progressively 
reducing the word-mask stimulus asynchrony, he found that 
the subjects first lose the ability to detect the stimulus, 
while still able to make relatively accurate judgements on 
graphical and semantical similarity; then they will lose the 
capacity for making graphic judgements, and finally 
semantical analysis. In other words, subjects seem to have 
access to semantic information, even while not able to 
report any visual information. The importance of this 
finding is that it clearly contradicts the traditional 
conceptions of information processing in stating that we 
have access to the meaning of information, the presence of 
which we are not aware. 
Based on this and four other experiments, Marcel 
(1983b) speculated on the nature of cognitive intentlonality 
(intentional aspects of phenomenal experience according to 
Marcel's terminology): 
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...nonconscious sensory analysis registers what 
impinges on external and internal receptors as a 
nondisjointed flow (it does not segment into event, 
objects, episode); it codes all aspects of what 
impinges at every level, and in every code with 
which the organism is equipped; within each such 
representational domain what impinges is 
represented in all possible articulations. 
Phenomenal experience consists in the imposition of 
a particular segmentation and structure on what is 
otherwise unsegmented (i.e., nonintensional) and 
the imposition of a particular interpretation on 
what otherwise consists of multiple interpretations 
(p.243). 
What Marcel is proposing is a theory on the 
relationship between unconscious and cognitive 
intentionality. Cognitive intentionality represents the 
subjects' attempt to make order, give coherence, and to 
interpret the apparent "chaos” of the unconscious. However 
the obliviousness of the unconscious processes, does not 
make them less intentional. On the contrary, in escaping 
from most of the cognitive selection, their effects on our 
thoughts and actions become even more powerful, as is 
demonstrated by the following researches. 
An interesting area of research comes from the study 
of the effects of unconscious presentation of information on 
social judgement or perception. The studies on social 
perception deraostrate that the understanding and 
interpretation of information is dependent on the category 
accessibility. In other words, we analyze social information 
according to different categorical judgements, and the 
accessibility in our memory of certain kinds of categories 
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will determine the characteristics of our evaluations. 
An example which illustrates the influence of category 
accessibility comes from the research of Srull and Wyer 
(1979). By means of sentence construction tasks they 
activated the concepts of hostility or kindness in their 
subjects. In subsequent tasks, the subjects were confronted 
with the description of a person who could be ambiguously 
evaluated in regard to the referred traits. The authors 
found that the evaluation of the person was influenced by 
the categories previously activated, and that this influence 
decreases as the time between activation and evaluation 
increases. 
Within a similar paradigm, although using subliminal 
presentation of stimuli (i.e., backwards masking), Bargh and 
Pietromonoco (1982) present lists of subliminal stimuli to 
their subjects, consisting of 0%, 20% or 80% of hostility 
related words. As in the Srull and Wyer experiment, the 
subjects were then confronted with an apparently unrelated 
task, which was to evaluate a person ambiguously described. 
The data strongly suggest that the evaluation of the 
person’s hostility is related to the number of hostility 
associated words presented in a subliminal way to the 
subjects. In other words, through subliminal presentation of 
information, it is possible to increase the hostility 
category accessibility, and consequently influence the 
subjects conscious judgements. 
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If it was already known that our judgements of a given 
situation are influenced by the categories that we have 
available, we can now add that the availability of these 
categories can be increased by presentation of information 
outside of consciousness. 
These data are of particular relevance to the 
counseling process, ks we saw in the previous chapter, the 
counselor’s cognitive intentions and actions depend on the 
evaluation and conceptualization of the client (see Martin, 
1984). This continuously ongoing evaluation, central to the 
therapeutic process, extrapolating from the above data, 
could be hypothesized as having a strong unconscious 
component. Therefore cognitive intentionality seems to be 
determined by another kind of intentionality which operates 
outside of awareness. 
Thus far, I have reported some of the research which 
analyzes the influence of unconscious external stimuli, 
stimuli that are presented below threshold and can influence 
our actions and cognitions. No attempt has yet been made to 
relate that external stimuli to other unconscious internal 
structures. The psychodynamic conceptions of the unconscious 
have been, by contrast, much more focused on the internal 
components of the unconscious processes. Some memories of 
our personal history can be hypothesized as stimuli that 
operates below threshold, and continuously influences the 
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way we think and interact with the world. These dynamic 
aspects of the unconscious have also been the focus of some 
research that I will now summarize. 
About 20 years ago, Silverman (1966) proposed a 
methodology for studying some of the dynamic propositions 
postulated by psychoanalysis. Such a methodology, called 
"psychodynamic activation method", consists of the 
subliminal presentation of stimuli (i.e., four 
milliseconds), by means of a tachistoscope. The stimuli are 
designed in order to activate some of the motivators which 
are considered central to psychoanalytic theory. 
About fifty studies have been conducted using the 
psychodynaraic activation method. According to a recent 
review of Silverman (1983), the research can be classified 
into three main groups: laboratory studies of clinical 
populations, laboratorial studies with nonclinical 
populations, and adjunct therapeutic and educational 
studies. 
Several laboratory studies with clinical populations 
have shown that by means of subliminal presentation of 
certain stimuli it is possible either to intensify or to 
reduce psychopathology. Reviewing the studies on pathology 
intensification, Silverman (1983) reports deterioration in 
schizophrenics after subliminal presentation of 
oral-aggressive stimuli (e.g.. CANNIBAL EATS PERSON), 
increasing depression after presentation of same stimuli; 
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intensification of homosexual orientation following the 
exposure to incest stimuli (e.g., FUCK MOMMY); and 
intensification of speaking disorders in stutterers after 
viewing anal stimuli (e.g., GO SHIT). In most of these 
studies the presentation of sentences is accompanied by 
related pictures, suggesting either anal, oral, or 
incestuous contents. 
Concerning pathology reduction, several studies 
summarized by Silverman, report that schizophrenics respond 
positively to the presentation of stimuli intended to 
produce feelings of symbiotic gratification. In most of the 
studies the stimulus consists of the sentence "MOMMY AND I 
ARE ONE" along with the picture of a man and woman merged at 
the shoulders. The data also points to the fact that 
schizophrenic males only decrease pathology after the 
message "MOMMY AND I ARE ONE" , whereas females only show 
positive results with the message "DADDY AND I ARE ONE". 
Similar findings with the same kind of messages were found 
with homosexual men. However, there were conflicting results 
with depressed women, which suggests an interaction with the 
sex variable, similar to the one described in respect to the 
schizophrenic samples. 
With nonclinical populations, the presentation of 
similar stimuli (e.g.,MY GIRL AND I ARE ONE or MY LOVER AND 
I ARE ONE) was found to reduce anxiety, whereas oedipal 
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stimuli (e.g., BEATING DAD IS O.K. or BEATING DAD IS WRONG) 
have shown some effects on competition performance (thrown 
darts). 
Finally, presentations of MOMMY AND I ARE ONE was 
found to be an effective therapeutic adjunct in, among 
others the treatment of insect phobias, obesity, alcoholism, 
cigarette smoking. The same message was also found to be an 
effective educational adjunct for students in residential 
treatment and for college students in group therapy. An 
interesting example comes from one study where Silverman, 
Frank, and Dachinger (1974) used a psychodynaraic variation 
of systematic desensitization in the treatment of insect 
phobia. Twenty adult females were randomly assigned to an 
experimental and a control group. The experimental group 
followed six desensitization sessions, where the relaxation 
was substituted by subliminal presentations of the message 
MOMMY AND I ARE ONE. That is, each time the client reported 
anxiety with a given scene, the therapist presented the 
subliminal message. The control group followed an identical 
procedure but with the message PEOPLE ARE WALKING. The 
experimental group was found to improve significantly more. 
The authors speculate on how the effects of systematic 
dessensitization can be attributed to the activation of 
unconscious fantasies. 
During the course of these 20 years of research there 
were also some non-supportive findings. However as it is 
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stressed by Silverman, the confirmatory ratio is still 3:1, 
and reasonable explanations can be found for the 
nonconfirraatory studies. For example, Condon and Allen 
(1980) failed to replicate the effects of subliminal 
presentations as an adjunct of systematic desensitization. 
However, as was pointed out by Silverman (1982), the 
psychodynaraic stimulus was only presented once a week, and 
the subjects were not real clients, but psychology students 
fulfilling the requirements of a course. 
Also interesting about this research are the 
conclusions that the supraliminal presentation of the same 
stimuli did not produce any effects. Thus, from the present 
data we can find further evidence that two kinds of 
unconscious processes exist . One operating from the outside 
(i.e., external information by subliminal presentation), and 
another one operating from the inside (i.e., memories, 
wishes, needs, drives, etc.). Interestingly, a communication 
channel between these two kinds of unconscious processes 
seems to exist. The unconscious external influence seems to 
be the best window from which we can elicit the activation 
of unconscious internal information. This fact is recognized 
by Westerlundh and Smith's (1983) statement that the range 
of activated, personally relevant material is much greater 
in this case {subliminal perception} than when the stimulus 
is presented on a conscious level" (p.607). 
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Another series of studies in the realm of perception 
psychodynamics, comes from researchers at the Lund 
University in Sweden (e.g., Smith, 1984; Westerlundh, 1984). 
According to their theory, perceptgenesis, "percepts develop 
from potentiality to actuality, from stages of ambiguity 
with many condensed meanings to stages characterized by a 
single definite one" (Westerlundh & Smith, 1983, p.605). In 
other words, the perception goes from stages of overloaded 
subjective meanings to stages of objective and 
intersubjective agreement. In using fractioning techniques 
(i.e., going from very rapid presentations at the beginning, 
to successively increased time exposures of stimuli) we can 
obtain the subjects' reports in different phases of the 
perceptual process. 
The different phases of perceptgenesis are illustrated 
in the figure 3. The left hand of the figure illustrates the 
first phase, where the perception of the stimulus is 
overloaded with personal meaning. The right hand represents 
the final phase, that of objectiveness and intersubjective 
agreement."Pi" refers to the "intersubjectively recognizable 
theme", and as can be seen it becomes much more defined as 
we move along the process. 
The study of the primary, secondary, and tertiary 
meanings attached to the successive presentation of 
threatening or nonthreatening stimuli, offers a wonderl al 
opportunity for the analysis of the personality structure of 
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individuals. Surprisingly enough, this "sequential-dynamic" 
analysis was found to have strong correspondances with the 
description of psychological mechanisms as done by 
psychoanalysis, mainly in respect to the organization of 
defense mechanisms. 
During the early phases of perceptgenesis, we find a 
greater concentration of personal meaning. This explains why 
the subliminal presentation of psychodynaraic information can 
have such a strong influence, and that supraliminal 
information is more linked to objective experience. It seems 
that the absence of restricting barriers of consciousness, 
we can find means of communicating with the subject at a 
deeper level. This was always the objective of 
psychoanalysis, in the light of the laboratory research it 
is much more understandable now. 
Counterttansference 
While the role of unconscious processes is becoming 
well established in several areas of psychology, the 
research demonstrating the operation of unconscious 
processes in the counseling relationship is virtually 
non-existent. 
Traditionally, psychoanalysis refers to the 
• of the therapist to the 
unconscious contribution 
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relationship as countertransference. In what is considered 
one of the first references to the countertransference 
issues, Freud (1910/1958) states: 
Now that a considerable number of people are 
practising psycho-analysis and exchanging their 
observations with one another, we have noticed that 
no psycho-analyst goes further than his own 
complexes and internal resistances permit, (p.145) 
Although there is some controversy between totalistic 
and classical approaches (see Watkins, 1985) in the 
definition of countertransference, one can accept as a 
general definition the reference to the unconscious 
reactions of the counselor toward the client. Or, as Gelso 
and Carter (1985) put it, in countertransference "the 
material presented by the client serves as a trigger that 
activates the counselor’s conflicts" (p.176). 
Unfortunately, the psychoanalists have been more 
productive in theoretical formulations than in the clinical 
research. As Singer and Luborsky (1977) recognized in a 
review of the research on countertransference, the 
quantitative investigation has not been able to analyze most 
of the problems raised by the clinical literature. 
One of the most interesting studies on the 
countertransference phenomenon was carried out by Peabody 
and Gelso (1982). They investigated the relationship between 
empathy, countertransference behavior, and 
counter transference feelings. 
Twenty dyads in a counseling analogue situation were 
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object of analysis. Counselors' empathy was measured 
from the dyadic interaction using the Barrett-Lennard 
Relationship Inventory, while the counter transference 
behavior was analyzed using counselors' responses to 
tapes showing a seductive, hostil, and neutral client. 
Finally, counselors' openness to countertransference 
feelings was analyzed through a survey. The authors 
found that empathy was negatively correlated with 
countertransference behavior to the seductive client, 
and that openness to countertransference 
feelings was positively correlated with empathy. This 
study, even though analogical, demonstrates two central 
points. First, the erapathic level of counselors' 
communication is affected by processes operating outside 
consciousness (i.e., countertranference). Second, the 
openness to countertransference feelings is an important 
condition for counseling effectiveness. 
Kagan (1975, 1984) discussing students reactions to 
his Affect Simulation Vignettes notes the occurrance of four 
central reactions: (1) fear of being hurt; (2) fear of 
hurting others; (3) fear of being engulfed; (4) fear of 
engulfing others. Interestingly enough, Watkins (1985) has 
recently pointed out four types of countertransference that 
in part parallel Kagan's: overprotective, benign, rejection, 
and hostil. These types of reactions, although coming from 
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clinical experience, seen to be important descriptions 
deserving research. 
To conclude, counselors are unconsciously impacted by 
clients' communication. That impact has been referred, in 
the psychoanalitical school, to as countertransference, 
however as Gelso and Carter recognized "counselor 
countertransference occurs in counseling of every 
theoretical orientation" (p.181), and as such deserves 
careful research. 
Conclusions 
In the third part of this chapter, I have reviewed the 
research which supports the idea that our concrete and 
cognitive intentionality is influenced by a third level of 
intentionality, refered here as unconscious. 
According to the definition provided above, 
unconscious intentionality refers to the group of 
psychological processes of which we are unaware, even though 
influencing our thoughts and actions. 
As we saw, these unconscious psychological processes 
are, according to Bowers (1984), mainly of two kinds: 
perceived information that is not noticed, and noticed 
information that is not comprehended. Both kinds of 
unconscious have internal as well as external components. As 
it was stressed by Dixon (1981) "entry to consciousness can 
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be determined from ’below’ as well as from ’above’, that it 
can be both stimulus determined and subject determined, both 
involuntary and voluntary’’ (p.5). The external components 
(e.g., conditions of stimulus presentation) are illustrated 
in most of the research in subliminal perception, where 
stimuli presented are masked or presented in short periods 
of time. The internal components, (e.g., subject 
motivational and state factors, both cognitive and 
affective) are particularly well exemplified by the 
psychodynamic research conducted in the United States by 
Silverman and associates, and in Sweden by Smith and 
colleagues. 
There seems also to exist a surprisingly strong link 
between internal and external components. The external 
presentation of unconscious information seems to be the 
ideal way to elicit the activation of unconscious internal 
meaning . 
From the data reviewed it is evident that counselors 
and their clients are communicating not only at a behavioral 
and cognitive level. In fact, most of the communication is 
occurring at the unconscious level, with a continuously 
hidden intentionality. The objective of the counseling 
situation, like the objective of science according to 
Bowers, should be to make the perceived noticed, and the 
noticed comprehended, for both client and counselor. 
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Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to review the 
research carried out on the behavioral, cognitive, and 
unconscious dimensions of the counseling process. The main 
idea underlying this review is that three dimensions 
co-exist in counselor and client during the counseling 
process: (1) the dimension of reality, or concrete 
behaviors; (2) the dimensions of ideas, thoughts or 
cognitive processes; and (3) the dimension of unconscious 
processes. It was argued that a comprehensive model of the 
counseling process shall include all three of these 
dimensions. 
The first part reviewed the research on behavioral 
intentionality, i.e. the concrete dimensions of the 
counseling process. Four main conclusions were drawn from 
the research. First, counseling skills represent valid and 
useful descriptions of what is going on between counselor 
and client. Second, different verbal and nonverbal skills 
produce differential effects on clients. Third, taking into 
account the differential distribution of skills, several 
stages can be identified within and across interviews. 
Fourth, therapists from different theoretical orientations 
tend to use different skills and to combine skills in 
different ways. However, in failing to take into account the 
cognitions of counselor and client, the research on 
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behavioral intentionality left several conflicting and 
unexplained results. This limitation is well illustrated by 
inconsistency of findings in the research about the effects 
of different skills. In fact, as was stressed, clients seem 
to be affected by their perception of skills, rather than by 
skills alone. This conclusion addresses the importance of 
looking to another dimension of the counseling process - the 
dimension of cognitive intentionality. 
The second part reviews the research on cognitive 
intentionality. Martin's model was presented as a framework 
for analysing the role played by counselor and client 
cognitions in the counseling process. Following, data from 
research on counselors' attitudes, beliefs, 
conceptualization processes and intentions was reviewed. 
Three main findings were reported. First, our concrete 
responses to our clients is not only influenced by the 
client input, but also by our attitudes and beliefs system. 
Second, counselors tend to form their conceptualizations 
very early in the counseling process, and to use response 
modes confirmatory of their hypotheses. Third, counselor 
intentions were found to be important mediators between 
counselor conceptualizations and responses. Additionally, 
counselors' perceptions were not found to be directly 
predicted from counselors responses and reported intentions. 
In sura, the research on cognitions shows that no 
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understanding of the counseling process can be achieved 
without consideration of the counselor's and client's 
cognitive processing. However, some recent research has been 
pointing to the existence of several factors influencing 
individuals' actions and thoughts, but of which they are not 
aware. In the counseling process this was referred to many 
years ago by Freud (1910/1958) in his description of the 
phenomenon of transference and countertransference. These 
hidden elements, not easily assessed by verbal reports, 
constitute the third dimension of the counseling process - 
the unconscious dimension. 
The third part reviewed the research on unconscious 
intentionality. The limitations of most of the cognitive 
methodologies in fully describing and explaining human 
behavior inside and outside the counseling process were 
presented. The role played by affective processes on the 
unconscious was discussed and the literature on subliminal 
perception was reviewed. Unconscious processes were found to 
represent a fundamental dimension of our experience. Two 
types of unconscious processes were described. An external 
unconscious referring to conditions of stimulus presentation 
was illustrated by most of the research in subliminal 
perception. The internal unconscious, referring to subjects 
motivational and affective states, is exemplified on the 
research on psychodynamic activation methods, and 
perceptogenesis. Interestingly enough, the external 
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unconscious (e.g., unnoticed or ambiguous stimuli) seems to 
be the ideal way to have access the internal unconscious 
(e.g., symbiotic fantasies). The counseling research on 
"unconscious level is very important but very difficult to 
tap" (Clara Hill, personal communication, April 22, 1985). 
More research is obviously needed in this dimension of the 
counseling process. 
From this review, it is apparent that these three 
dimensions are important contributors to the counseling 
process. The research linking these three levels of 
intentionality , however, is almost non-existent. If 
something is known about the relationship between cognitions 
and behaviors in the counseling process, the ignorance is 
almost absolute concerning the contributions of the 
unconscious process. Of course several theorists have been 
speculating on this process for a long time, but marginal 
empiral data has been collected so far. Future research 
should address the relationship among behaviors, cognitions, 
and unconscious processes of both counselor and client. 
The empirical study to be introduced in the next 
chapter will attempt to contribute to the clarification of 
relationship between behavior, cognitions, and unconscious 
mechanisms in the counseling process. 
CHAPTER III 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
From the literature review, it is apparent that 
behavioral cognitive and unconscious dimensions are all 
important contributors to the counseling process. 
Unfortunately the research linking these three levels of 
intentionality is virtually non-existent. If something is 
known about the relationship between cognitions and 
behaviors, the ignorance is almost absolute concerning the 
contributions of unconscious processes. Of course several 
theorists have been speculating on these processes for a 
long time, however, only marginal empirical data has been 
collected so far. 
In this chapter the main conclusions of research on 
each intentionality level will be briefly reviewed. Then, 
the multilevel conception of intentionality will be 
presented. Finally, the objectives and hypotheses of the 
present research will be introduced. 
Conclusions of the Research 
This section reviews briefly the main conclusions of 
the research on the behavioral, cognitive and unconscious 
dimensions of the counseling process. 
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The attention of behaviorists to human verbal behavior 
was a crucial step toward the clarification of the 
counseling process (e.g., Skinner, 1957). A classical study 
conducted by Greenspoon (1955) showed the reinforcing effect 
of different verbal sounds on plural nouns. These studies 
have inspired the formulation of several counseling process 
models in terms of behavioral skills. Amongst these models, 
microcouseling is probably the most complete and well 
researched (e.g., Ivey, 1971, 1983; Ivey & Authier, 1978). 
Although coming from a different theoretical vantage 
point, Rogers’ (1957) facilitative conditions stimulated 
abundant research. From the research program on facilitative 
conditions emerged a more operationalized description of 
verbal and nonverbal behaviors (e.g., Haase & Tepper, 1972; 
Zimmer & Park, 1967). 
In sura, both the behavioral and humanistic approaches 
were important contributors to a behavioral conception of 
intentionality in counseling and psychotherapy. 
The behavioral approach to the study of the counseling 
process provided an initial understanding of the effects of 
different verbal (e.g.,Hill & Gormally, 1977) and nonverbal 
skills (e.g., Hill et al., 1981), description of counseling 
process stages (e.g., Hill et al., 1983), and distinction 
among therapists from different theoretical orientations 
(e.g., Lee & Uhleman, 1984). 
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The research on behavioral intentionality was 
important for the clarification and deraythification of the 
counseling process. What was previously described in 
somewhat general terms, was now much clearer and 
operational. However, understanding of the counseling 
process was being severely limited by the failure to 
consider cognitive aspects fully. For example, Lee et 
al.(1985) found that clients’ perceptions of counselors’ 
behaviors were the best predictors of their responses. 
Similar findings were reported by Elliott (1979) and Elliott 
et al. (1982). Results such as these percipitated a 
cognitive revolution on counseling process research. This 
cognitive revolution paralleled what was happening in other 
areas of psychology (c.f., Hilgard, 1980; Mahoney, 1977). 
It was within this movement that a new cognitive 
mediational paradigm of the counseling process research 
emerged (Martin, 1984; 1985). According to Martin, client 
behavior is not directly affected by counselor’s behavior 
and vice-versa. Rather, counselor and client are seen as 
cognitively processing each other's behavior, in a sequence 
of several steps. First, client’s behaviors are perceived 
and conceptualized by the counselor. These 
conceptualizations are then transformed into clinical 
hypotheses. Second, clinical hypotheses are translated into 
intentions, and finally, these intentions give place to 
behavioral responses. On the other hand, clients perceive 
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counselors' behaviors by inferring their intentions. Then, 
if capable and motivated they will carry out the cognitive 
implications of the counselors' interventions. Finally, 
clients produce behavioral responses that reflect the impact 
of their cognitive processing. Several studies have been 
conducted illustrating the cognitive work at each of these 
stages. Particularly important is the research on 
conceptualizations and establishment of hypotheses (e.g., 
Hirsch & Stone, 1983; Strohmer & Chiodo, 1984) and 
intentions (e.g., Fuller & Hill, 1985; Hill & O'Grady, 
1985). Martin et al. (in press) have recently presented 
research confirming the major assumptions of the cognitive 
mediational paradigm. 
The cognitive movement has been very productive in 
uncovering some hidden mechanisms of the counseling process. 
However, by limiting their research to cognitive conscious 
variables, the advocates of cognitivism could be restricting 
the validity of their model. In fact several cognitive 
psychologists seem to be ignoring the fact that most of our 
cognitive processes are unconscious. 
Nisbett and Wilson have been arguing against the 
validity of cognitive methodologies based exclusively on the 
subject's recall. They state that our capacity to provide 
verbal reports on cognitive processes is severely limited. 
Arguments such as those from Nisbett and Wilson 
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contributed to what some authors choose to call unconscious 
cognitive revolution (Van Den Bergh & Eelen, 1984). This 
unconscious movement is already showing its effects in the 
formulations of well known cognitive therapists (e.g., 
Mahoney, 1982; Meichenbaura & Gilmore, 1984). 
In the present context, unconscious refers to the 
determinants of thought and action that are not noticed or 
appreciated as such” (Bowers, 1984, p.228). This definition, 
although vague, offers the advantage of including internal 
as well as external determinants of the unconscious 
processes (Schevrin & Dickman, 1980). Therefore, one type of 
unconscious (externelly determined) is characterized by 
conditions of stimuli presentation (i.e., loudness, 
brightness, etc). A second type (internal determined), 
includes internal affective and cognitive factors (i.e., 
level of arousal, avoidance, conflict, perceptual defense, 
etc). In sum, the level of awareness is seen as dependent on 
both external and internal factors. 
The role played by unconscious processes is well 
illustrated by the research on subliminal perception. In 
spite of some controversial issues (e.g., Eriksen, 1960) the 
scientific status of subliminal research is now widely 
accepted (e.g., Bowers, 1984; Dixon, 1981). Three groups of 
studies, with direct relevance to the counseling process, 
can be identified in subliminal research. 
The first group Is exemplified by the research on 
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masking effects. In these experiments, the perception of a 
given stimulus is impaired by the temporal or spatial 
proximity of a second stimulus, referred to as mask. Marcel 
(1983b) found that, by progressively reducing the temporal 
distance between stimulus and mask, the subject would lose 
first the capacity to detect the stimulus, then the capacity 
for making judgements on graphical similarity, and only 
finally the capacity for semantical analysis. That is, 
subjects were found to obtain semantical information even 
when they were not able to detect the presence of a given 
stimulus. 
A second group of studies is concerned with the 
effect of subliminal presentations on social perceptions and 
judgement. Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982) present a good 
example of these studies. They showed to their subjects, in 
a subliminal way, lists containing 0%, 20%, or 80% of 
hostile words. Subjects were then confronted with an 
ambiguous description of a person, which they were asked to 
evaluate. The data showed that the subjects' evaluations 
were significantly influenced by the amount of hostile words 
presented subliminally. 
Finally, the third group of studies is illustrated by 
the research program carried out by Silverman and associates 
(e.g., Silverman, 1983). The methodology introduced by 
Silverman - psychodynamic activation method - consists 
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the subliminal presentation of stimuli with psychodynaraic 
content (e.g.f Mommy and I are One). A considerable amount 
of research, completed during the past 20 years, found 
support for the effect of these messages on the 
intensification and reduction of psychopathology, and as 
adjuncts to therapeutic and educational interventions. 
Concluding, the research on subliminal perception 
tends to find support for the existence of unconscious 
processes, suggesting additionally, that the presentation of 
external unconscious information (i.e., subliminal) is 
probably the ideal way for the activation of unconscious 
internal processes. 
This section reviewed the research on behavioral, 
cognitive, and unconscious mechanisms of the counseling 
process. Together, the research tends to demonstrate the 
importance of these mechanisms in the therapeutic 
interaction. Unfortunately, however, no research has been 
conducted so far linking these three dimensions of the 
counseling process. In the next section I will present an 
attempt to relate behavioral, cognitive, and unconscious 
dimensions in a multilevel conception of intentionality. 
A Multilevel Conception of Intentionality 
Behavioral, cognitive and unconscious dimensions are 
recognized as important components for the understanding of 
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the counseling process. As stated above, however, if certain 
attempts were made toward the integration of cognitive and 
behavioral dimensions, an integrated model that includes 
unconscious processes is still absent. This section will 
refer to the attempts to take into account the complex 
interaction among behaviors, cognitions and unconscious 
mechanisms in the counseling process. Recent models advanced 
by Martin (1984, 1985) and Gelso and Carter (1985) will be 
introduced. Then, the present multilevel conception of 
intentionality model will be presented along with its main 
underlying assumptions. 
Recently, two models were introduced, representing an 
important step for this integration. These are the models 
from Martin (1984, 1985) and Gelso and Carter (1985) which 
will be described next. 
Rooted in Brand's (1984) model for intentional action, 
Martin (1985) advances a major revision of his cognitive 
raediational paradigm. As can be seen in figure 4, counselor 
and client perceptions of each other’s actions are 
determinad by a complex interaction between external and 
internal information. Internal information is constituted by 
the material stored on declarative and procedural memories. 
Martin emphasizes: 
Intentions of participants in individual 
counseling interactions are seen to arise from 
internal plans. These plans are constructed 
from complex combinations of processed 
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Figure 4. A Model of Cognitive Mediational Processes in Counseling 
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information drawn from current situations and 
long-term procedural and declarative memorial 
stores (p.7). 
Particularly important in Martin’s revised model is 
the idea that plans and actions result from the interaction 
between external information and internal memorial stores. 
If we go one step further, admiting that some of the memory 
mechanisms are unconscious, the resemblance between Martin’s 
and the present multilevel conceptions is obvious. Martin 
(personal communication, 11 September 1985) even though not 
refering directly in his model to unconscious processes, 
admits that "not all cognitive processes are conscious or 
subject to conscious recall". 
The acknowledgment that different memory processes 
differ in terms of level of awareness was recently pointed 
out by Tulving (1985a; 1985b). Tulving proposes a ternary 
classification of memory with three hierarchical levels: 
procedural, semantic, and episodic memory. These three types 
of memory are hypothesized to be distinct in terms of 
awareness levels. Procedural memory is characterized by 
anoetic consciousness (nonknowing), semantic memory is 
characterized by noetic consciousness (knowing), and 
finally, episodic memory by auto-noetic (self-knowing). 
It is beyond the scope of this presentation to discuss 
the validity of this taxonomy. However, it would be fair to 
emphasize the importance of the statement that different 
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levels of awareness exist in memory processes. Being so, it 
is again evident, how cognitive methodologies based 
exclusively on subjects conscious recall are of limited 
scope for the understanding of covert processes. 
Similarly, Gelso and Carter (1985) have recently 
completed an important review on the relationship mechanisms 
in counseling and psychotherapy. Recognizing the need for a 
new conceptualization of relationship factors in counseling, 
Gelso and Carter proposed a model emphasizing the 
contribution of three interrelated components: working 
alliance, unreal relationship, and real relationship. 
The concept of working alliance, although introduced 
by psychoanalysis, is concerned with the cognitive and 
rational side of the counseling relationship. As it is 
recognized by Gelso and Carter "in the working alliance, the 
client's reasonable side (...) aligns with the counselor's 
working side (which is his or her more reasonable 
side)"(p.163). 
The unreal relationship refers to the unconscious 
dimensions of the counseling process. These dimensions 
include what, in psychoanalitic terms, is currently referred 
to as transference and countertransference processes. 
Finally, the real relationship refers to the 
behavioral dimension. That is, what counselor and client are 
actually doing. This level is, according to Gelso and 
Carter, well illustrated by the research program on Rogers 
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facilitative conditions. In sura, both Martin's and Gelso and 
Carter's models seem to be integrating, either directly or 
indirectly, the three dimensions that I have been referring 
as behavioral, cognitive, and unconscious intentionality. 
However, the present model differs from those above 
presented in two ways. First, a different terminology is 
used. Second, the present model is conceptualized using the 
intentionality construct. Let us now turn to the discussion 
of the possible advantages of using a different terminology 
and the concept of intentionality. 
Martin's declarative and procedural memories, Gelso 
and Carter's unreal relationship, Ivey's (in press) 
sensory-motor intentionality, and May's (1969) wish 
dimension seem to be more or less equivalent to what is here 
defined as unconscious intentionality. As it was already 
pointed out, this dimension has been traditionally stressed 
by psychodynamic theorists, namely psychanalists. Within the 
psychodynamic framework these processes are labeled 
unconscious. Martin seems to be approaching the analysis of 
these same processes within a cognitive framework. Ivey is 
doing it within a developmental framework, and May following 
a phenomenological approach. On the contrary, the present 
conceptualization choose to stay within the terminology, and 
sometimes even the framework, of those that traditionally 
have been concerned with these aspects. This is true 
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unconscious, as well as for the cognitive and behavioral 
dimensions. That is, the terms used to label the three 
different dimensions reflect the terminology used by the 
theoretical approaches that have been traditionally focused 
on each one of the three dimensions. 
The second innovation of the present model consists in 
the use of the intentionality construct to conceptualize the 
counseling process. Three main reasons underly this choice. 
The first reason is a philosophical one. As it was stressed 
in the introductory chapter, intentionality has been a 
central concept in the philosophical thought. Within the 
philosophical tradition that concept has been used in an 
attempt to understand the relationship between knower and 
known. In other words, it reflects an attempt to understand 
the processes used to have access and relate with the 
external world. The search for the understanding of this 
relationship between knower and known can also be seen as 
the central theme for counseling process research. In other 
words, counseling process research is concerned with the 
relationship between two epistemic subjects, the counselor 
and the client. Both are simulateneously knower and known, 
and the counseling process is nothing else than the ’fight 
between and within these two epistemologies: the client and 
the counselor (Joyce—Moniz, 1985). In sura, if counseling 
process is the encounter and dialectical relationship 
between two epistemologies (Ivey, in press; Ivey 
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Goncalves, in press), and if intentional!ty is a conceptual 
equivalent of epistemology (May, 1969), therefore 
intentiona1ity appears to be an ideal construct for the 
conceptualization of the counseling process. Intentionality 
offers the additional advantage of an active and ever 
changing structure, referring more to the process o f 
knowledge construction rather then to the knowledge 
constructed. 
The second reason for choosing intentionality, comes 
from the increased interest on this concept in the 
counseling literature (e.g., Schmidt, 1984). The recent 
interest with the intentionality concept in counseling and 
psychotherapy has the risk of limiting the concept within 
the frontiers of the cognitive framework (e.g., Hill & 
O’Grady, 1985) as it happened in the past with behavioral 
approaches (e.g., Ivey, 1971). As it was long ago defended 
by Rollo May (1969) ’’intentionality (...) goes below levels 
of immediate awareness and includes spontaneously bodily 
elements and other dimensions which are usually called 
unconscious” (p.234). That is, the present conceptualization 
tries to prevent the risk that the recent interest with 
intentionality gets stuck within the cognitive framework, 
neglecting the contributions of behavioral and unconscious 
dimensions. 
Finally, and as the third reason, I have emphasized 
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that one of the characteristics of the epistemological 
orientation faced by counseling and psychotherapy is the 
search for new, hopefully more integrative concepts. 
Intentionality, by the two reasons discussed above, could be 
one of those concepts. 
I have discussed the reasons for the concepts used in 
the present model, let us now turn to the presentation of 
the main underlying assumptions. 
First, the present multilevel conception lies on the 
assumption that counselor and client are continuosly, 
intentionally involved - by their behaviors, cognitions and 
unconscious mechanisms - in a process of mutual influence. 
That is, three levels of intentionality exist in the 
therapeutic interaction: (1) the dimension of reality and 
concrete behaviors; (2) the dimension of thought processes 
and ideas; and (3) the hidden dimension of unconscious 
processes. Therefore, as stated previously, behavioral 
intentionality is defined by the network of verbal and 
nonverbal behaviors occuring between counselor and client. 
The second level, cognitive intentionality, is characterized 
by internal experiences of counselor and client, including 
perceptions, attitudes, conceptualizations, formulation of 
hypotheses, and establishment of intentions. Finally, 
unconscious intentionality refers to the group of 
psychological processes of which we are unaware, even though 
influencing our thoughts and actions as clients and 
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counselors. 
Second, these intentionality levels are present in 
both, counselor and client. In fact, none of these levels 
makes sense out of an interactive framework. Cognitions are 
always cognitions about something, behaviors are always in 
relation to someone, and even unconscious processes are 
always activated by something. Even though the present 
dissertation is more focused on the figure of the counselor 
or therapist, similar processes are hypothesized to take 
place with the client. That is, counselor and client's 
actions are filtered by their cognitive and unconscious 
processes. The present model refuses the linear causation of 
behavioral models on the direct impact of stimuli over 
responses (Watson, 1913) but also goes beyond the cognitive 
conscious paradigm on the role of cognitive conscious 
processes mediating between stimuli and responses (Mahoney, 
1977). According to the present model stimuli are both 
consciously and unconsciously mediated. Cognitive conscious 
mediation is illustrated by studies showing that the 
perceptions of each participant in the therapeutic 
interaction are the best predictors of their actions (e.g., 
Uhlemann & Haase, 1985). Unconscious mediation, although not 
fully demonstrated in counseling process research, is 
suggested by conclusions from the clinical and quantitative 
literature in countertransference processes (c.f., Singer & 
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Luborsky, 1977) . 
Third, the following sequence, illustrated in figure 
5, is hypothesized to take place in the therapeutic 
situation. Client behavioral intentionality (i.e., client’s 
behaviors) affect counselor's unconscious processes and 
cognitive intentionality. It is from the complex interaction 
between counselor's cognitive and unconscious intentionality 
that counselor's responses (i.e., behavioral intentionality) 
emerge. The same sequence is hypothesized for the client. 
Fourth, the more ambiguous or the more subliminal 
client's behaviors are, the greater the impact on 
counselor's unconscious intentionality. That is, the less 
defined the client's communication, the greater the 
opportunity for counselor's unconscious projections. As it 
was recognized by Westerlundh and Smith (1983) the range of 
activated, personally relevant material is much greater in 
this case (subliminal perception) then when the stimulus is 
presented on a conscious level (p.607). 
Summarizing, this section began with the presentation 
of Martin's and Gelso and Carter's models as examples of the 
attempt to take into account the full complexity of the 
counseling process. Then, the present multilevel conception 
of the intentionality model was presented, the main options 
were explained, and the major assumptions were introduced. 
The next section will briefly introduce the exploratory 
research of the main assumption of the multilevel conception 
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of the intentionality model. 
Objective and Hypotheses of the Empirical Study 
According to the assumptions of the multilevel 
conception it would be expected that the presentation of 
subliminal information, by or about the client would 
influence the counselor s cognitive and behavioral 
processes. Additionally, it would be expected that the 
direction of this influence would be dependent on the 
relationship between the type of subliminal information and 
the counselor’s covert processes. 
The research on subliminal perception tends to find 
support for the idea that our evaluations and responses are 
influenced by information presented outside conscious 
awareness. Therefore, it would be legitimate to hypothesize 
that in the counseling situation, counselors are influenced 
in their cognitions and behavioral responses, by information 
presented outside consciousness. 
The following research has two main objectives. First, 
it intends to make an exploratory analysis of the major 
assumptions of the multilevel conception of the 
intentionality model. Second, it will explore the 
possibilities of the subliminal methodology for analyzing 
the interaction among behaviors, cognitions and unconscious 
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processes in counseling and psychotherapy. 
More specifically, the research will test the effects 
of subliminal presentations of emotional concepts on the 
counselor’s conceptualizations, intentions, and responses. 
From the present model two main hypotheses were drawn. 
First, the presentation of subliminal information will 
affect the direction of conceptualizations, intentions and 
responses toward the client. Second, the direction of this 
influence will be dependent on the interaction between type 
of stimuli and the counselor’s covert processes. 
In order to test these hypotheses, 36 counseling 
students were randomly assigned to one of the following 
experimental treatments: (1) subliminal presentation of 
negative emotional concepts; (2) subliminal presentation of 
positive emotional concepts; (3) supraliminal presentation 
of negative emotional concepts; and (4) supraliminal 
presentation of positive emotional concepts. Following the 
tachistoscope presentation of the emotional concepts, all 
subjects were exposed to a client simulation vignette. 
Subjects were then instructed to give an evaluation of the 
client, provide a verbal response, and report the intentions 
which guided their responses. The methodological details of 
the experiment will be presented in the next chapter. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter had reviewed the main conclusions of the 
research on behavioral, cognitive, and unconscious 
dimensions of the counseling process. From this research, it 
is apparent the insuficiency of controled studies on the 
unconscious dimension. Additionaly, the research linking 
each one of these dimensions is also absent. Thus, the 
multilevel intentionality model was introduced, defending 
that the intentionality of the counselor, as well as that of 
the client, results from the interaction among behaviors, 
cognitions, and unconscious processes. The relationship 
between this model and those recently advanced by Martin and 
Gelso and Carter was discussed. Finally, the research 
exploring the effects of unconscious information on 
counselor’s conceptualizations, intentions, and responses 
was introduced. 
The next chapters will refer 
methodology, results, and discussion 
research. 
directly to the 
of the exploratory 
CHAPTER IV 
METHOD 
This chapter describes the methodology of the research 
intended to test the effects of subliminal presentation of 
information on counselors' conceptualizations, intentions, 
and responses. 
Two central hypotheses, rooted on the multilevel 
intentionality model, were drawn. First, the presentation of 
subliminal information was hypothesized to impact the 
direction of counselor conceptualizations, intentions and 
responses toward the client. Second, the direction of this 
influence was hypothesized to be dependent on the 
interaction between the type of stimulus and counselor's 
covert processes. 
Overview 
The subjects, 36 counseling students, were randomly 
assigned to one of the following experimental treatments: 
(1) subliminal presentation of negative emotional concepts; 
(2) subliminal presentation of positive emotional concepts; 
(3) supraliminal presentation of negative emotional 
concepts; and (4) supraliminal presentation of positive 
emotional concepts. Therefore, four groups were compared. 
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These groups emerged from the interaction of two independent 
variables (i.e., condition of presentation, and type of 
stimuli) with two conditions each (i.e., subliminal versus 
supraliminal, and positive versus negative). All subjects 
went through the following experimental sequence: 
(1) Tachistoscope presentations (either 
subliminally or supraliminally) of 14 
emotional concepts (either positive or 
negative). 
(2) After the tachistoscopic presentation, the 
subjects went through the stimuli recall task 
where they were asked to recall or guess ten 
words amongst the stimuli presented. 
(3) Subjects were shown a client simulation 
vignette. 
(4) Following the vignette, they were asked to 
write a verbal response to the simulated 
client, provide an evaluation of the client 
functioning, and report those intentions that 
guided their responses. 
Figure 6 summarizes the experimental sequence. 
This chapter will begin with a description of the 
subjects, followed by the apparatus and materials section 
where the experimental rooms, client simulation vignette, 
tachistoscope stimuli, measures, raters and rating process, 
are presented. Finally, the process section will detail the 
experimental treatments and the experimental sequence. 
Subjects 
Participants in this study were 40 students enrroled 
in a graduate course in counseling skills (#585 - Theories 
and Practice of Counseling), during the Spring semester of 
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Figure 6. Experimental Sequence 
TScope 
Pres. 
Sub. 
Neg. 
Sub. 
Pos. 
Sup. 
Neg. 
Sup. 
Pos. 
Recall 
Task 
Recall 
Task 
Recall 
Task 
Recall 
Task 
Vignette 
Present. 
Vignette 
Present. 
Vignette 
Present. 
Vignette 
Present. 
Verbal 
Response 
Verbal 
Response 
Verbal 
Response 
Verbal 
Response 
Client 
Evaluation 
Client 
Evaluation 
Client 
Evaluation 
Client 
Evaluation 
Report 
Intentions 
Report 
Intentions 
Report 
Intentions 
Report 
Intentions 
1985 at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. The 
subjects were volunteers that responded to a request asking 
for subjects during the lectures and sections of the same 
course. All participants were required to have English as 
their native language and normal or corrected to normal 
vision. 
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From the original sample, two subjects revealed 
inappropriate vision and two others did not complete all the 
dependent measures, and were subsequently withdrawn from the 
experiment. The final sample consisted of 36 subjects, four 
males and 32 females, with ages ranging from 20 to 42, with 
a mean of 25.4. 
The subjects were randomly assigned, counterbalanced 
by sex, to each of the four experimental treatments. 
Therefore each experimental group consisted of nine 
subjects, one male and eight females. 
Before initiating the experiment all the subjects read 
permission form in which they were assured of 
conditions: 
(1) Your name will not be disclosed in any 
recording of my data; 
(2) participation will not pose a physical 
risk, emotional hindrance or financial cost to 
you; 
(3) you will be awarded 5 bonus points for 
your participation, in the final grade of 
"Theories and Practice of Counseling". 
(4) you are free to withdraw at any point 
without any penalty and inconvenience; 
(5) you will receive an abstract with the main 
results of the experiment; (6) if you choose, 
we will meet with you personally to discuss 
the outcomes of this study. 
36 students from the University of 
Massachusetts participated in this study. They were randomly 
assigned to each one of the following experimental 
conditions. and they were credited with 5 bonus points on 
the average grade for their participation. 
and signed a 
the following 
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Apparatus and Materials 
This section will refer to the organization and 
equipment of the experimental rooms, the client simulation 
vignette, the tachistoscope stimuli, and measures used. 
Additionally, information will be provided about the raters, 
rating process, training, and agreement. 
Experimental Rooms 
Three experimental rooms were used (referred hereafter 
as experimental rooms 1, 2, and 3). 
Experimental room 1 was reserved for the tachistoscope 
presentations. The room was organized in order to protect 
subjects from any kind of distraction. It was equiped with a 
Harvard T-1C-3 two channel tachistoscope. The tachistoscope 
was placed over a large table, with two chairs on opposite 
sides of the tachistoscope. The subjects were seated in 
front of the tachistoscope, with the research assistant 
behind it. 
Experimental room 2, intended for the presentation of 
the client simulation vignette, contained a 36mm projector, 
a large screen, and a chair. Subjects were seated right in 
front of the screen, with the assistant behind them. 
Finally, experimental room 3, where additional 
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dependent measures were completed, consisted exclusively of 
one chair and one table. 
Tachistoscope Stimuli 
In the expperimental room 1, the subjects were exposed 
to tachistoscope presentation of stimuli words. All subjects 
were presented either the negative or the positive emotional 
concepts, in one of the following conditions: subliminal or 
supraliminal. These conditions of stimuli presentation will 
be described in the process section. The two neutral words 
were used as examples. 
The tachistoscope stimuli consisted of 14 positive 
emotional words, 14 emotionally negative words, 2 neutral 
words, and one mask stimulus. The 14 positive emotional 
words were: loving, affectionate, compassionate, pleasant, 
relaxed, wharmhearted, peaceful, serene, trusting, 
harmomious, tranquil, contented, thoughtful, and kindly. The 
negative emotional words were: morbid, cruel, tortured, 
repulsive, bloodthirsty, plagued, evil, and hateful. Two 
neutral words, window and garden, were used as examples. 
Finally, the mask stimulus consists of 12 capital X's in a 
straight line (i.e., XXXXXXXXXXXX). All the stimuli were 
printed in black capital letters, in the middle of white 
cards (15cm X 10 Cm). 
Both, the negative and the positive words were 
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selected from the Semantic Atlas of Emotional Concepts 
developed by Averill (1975). This semantic atlas consists of 
a list of 558 emotional concepts ranked by degree of 
emotionality and familiarity. A factor analysis revealed the 
existence of four dimensions: activation, evaluation, depth 
of experience, and lack of control. All the words selected 
came from the 15 concepts with highest and lowest scores on 
the evaluation factor, corresponding to a good-bad 
dimension. Reliability (split-sample and between subject 
variability) and validity for this factor is high. 
Additionally, all the words selected reveal high degree of 
familiarity (between 98 and 100%). 
In sum, half of the subjects were presented the 14 
positive emotional concepts (either subliminally or 
supraliminally) while The other half was i exposed to 14 
negative emotional concepts (either subliminally or 
supralim'inally) . 
Client Simulation Vignette 
After the tachistoscope presentation, and immediately 
following the stimuli recall task (described in the measures 
section), all subjects went into experimental room 2 where 
they were exposed to a client simulation vignette, selected 
from Kagan (1975b). 
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The Affect Simulation Vignettes, were produced by 
\ ————————————— 
Norman Kagan in order to ’’help students overcome their 
resistances to the often intense intimate communication that 
the use of interpersonal skills can encourage” (Kagan, 1984, 
p.231) . 
The Affect Simulation Vignettes is a film series, 
consisting of 70 short strips. In each vignette the actor 
speaks directly to the observer as if he/she was the client. 
Students are encouraged, in Kagan's method, to put 
themselves in the position of the helper, and to share their 
reactions toward the simulated client. 
According to Kagan (1975a, 1984) it is interesting to 
notice that the students' feelings toward these vignettes, 
fall into four basic interpersonal themes: (1) fear of being 
hurt; (2) fear of hurting others; (3) fear of being 
engulfed; and (4) fear of engulfing others. 
The client vignette selected for the present study, is 
one where an old man communicates directly to the observer 
the following message: 
Can you give me a minute? Something has been 
driving me frantic. For the last few years 
I've found myself ... thinking about... littie 
children. Wanting to touch them — where ^1 
shouldn't, I know it's wrong, I know it s 
evil, I know it's unnatural. I can t help 
myself. Please help me. You've got to help me. 
From the 70 vignettes presented by Kagan, I selected 
the present one due to two main characteristics. First, the 
topic - sex and child abuse - is frequently a shocking one, 
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and received at that time considerable attention by the 
press. Second, this old man tends to produce in the trainee 
an ambivalence of feelings. First, he is rejected for his 
nasty behavior, but on the other hand he tends to produce 
compassion due to his apparent weakness and desperate plea 
for help. Im my classes, as well as in a previous 
exploratory study, I found this vignette as one of the best 
in producing ambivalent feelings in counseling trainees. 
Summing up, after the tachistoscope presentation, the 
subjects were moved into experimental room 2, where they 
were exposed to a client simulation vignette with the 
instruction to put themselves in the counselor’s position, 
making the situation as real as possible. 
Measures 
Four dependent measures were used in the present 
study: (1) one measure of the level of the stimuli recall; 
(2) one measure of the subjects' verbal responses; (3) one 
client evaluation measure; and finally (4) one measure to 
report subjects' intentions. 
The first measure - level of stimuli recall - was 
introduced immediately after the tachistoscope presentation 
and was intended to test the efficacy of the experimental 
treatment. That is. to check if subjects from the 
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supraliminal and subliminal groups were consciously 
perceiving the stimuli presented. All the restant measures 
were introduced after the presentation of the client 
simulation vignette in order to test subjects behavioral and 
cognitive reactions toward the simulated client. 
Next, I will refer to each one of these measures. 
Stimuli Recall. The stimuli recall measure was intended to 
test if subjects from each of the four groups were actually 
consciously perceiving the tachistoscope stimuli. In order 
to validate the experimental treatment, sublirainally group 
subjects were expected not to recall the stimuli, while the 
supraliminal group subjects were expected to recall most of 
the stimuli. 
In order to measure the degree of stimuli recall, the 
following open question was introduced to the subjects after 
the tachistoscope presentations: 
Now, I would like you to write TEN WORDS that 
you remember from the past presentation. If 
you do not remember any words, try to guess; 
guess the TEN WORDS that first come to your 
mind. The order of the words does not make any 
difference. 
Only words that corresponded exactly to the original 
stimuli were considered correct. Additionally, and in order 
to test if subjects, even though not consciously perceiving, 
were being or not influenced by the semantical 
of the words presented, the amount of characteristics 
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positive and negative adjectives present in sublirainally 
groups subjects lists were also computed. 
Subjects Verbal Responses. Immediately after the the client 
simulation vignette, the subjects were instructed to 
generate a brief written response to that client. The 
response was then divided into units and classified 
according the Hill Counselor Verbal Response Category 
System - Revised (Friedlander, 1982a; 1982b). The system 
consists of the following nine exaustive and mutually 
exclusive categories: encouragement/approval/reassurance 
(EAR); Restatement/Reflection (RR); Self-Disclosure (SD); 
Interpretation (INT); Confrontation (CONF); Providing 
information (PI); Information seeking (IS); Direct 
guidance/advice (DGA); and Unclassifiable (UN). Additionaly 
the scale provides a measure of the Degree of structure 
(DS). Each one of the previous nine categories falls into 
three supercategories: low structure (LS); moderate 
structure (MS); and high structure (HS). The final score for 
the degree of structure is computed by the following 
formula: 
DS= (LSxl)+(MSx2)+(HSx3) 
The rules used in the division of verbal responses 
into units were those suggested by Friedlander (1982a), and 
more recently specified by Banaka, Birgh-Wilson, and 
Thompson (1985a; 1985b). According to these rules "the unit 
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consists of: an independent or main clause by itself or with 
one or more restrictive, dependent clauses; a 
nonrestrictive, dependent clause; element of a compound 
predicate; or quoted statements" (Banaka et al. , 1985b, 
P-8) . 
The system developed by Friedlander results from the 
revision of a system organized by Clara Hill and colleagues 
(e.g., Hill, 1978; Hill et al., 1981; Hill et al., 1983). 
Friedlander points out two main inconsistencies in Hill's 
system. First, Hill's scale is based on multiple principles 
of classification, requiring the use of different coding 
strategies (e.g., objective as well as inferential). Second, 
several inconsistencies were also found in the rules for 
constructing response units, producing inflation of certain 
categories such as minimal encouragers. 
Both systems, the original as well as its revision, 
were found to have acceptable levels of validity and 
reliability. Several studies have shown the validity of 
Hill's system to describe counselors' behaviors within and 
across interviews (e.g., Hill, 1978; Hill et al., 1983), and 
differentiate therapists from different theoretical 
orientations (e.g., Hill et al, 1979). Additionally 
acceptable levels of interjudge reliability were found in 
various studies, for each of the categories. Similar 
findings were reported for Frielander's revision, both in 
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the description of counselors’ behaviors across interviews 
and theoretical approaches (e.g., Friedlander, 1982a; Lee & 
Uhlemann, 1984). High interrater reliabilities were also 
found with relatively small amounts of training (k=.85). 
Concluding, in order to analyze counselors' behavior 
intentionality, the subjects were asked to generate a 
written response to the stimulated client. These responses 
were then rated according to Hill Counselor Verbal Response 
Category System - Revised. 
Client Evaluation. Following the verbal response, the 
subjects were asked to provide, on a rating scale, an 
evaluation of the client's functioning. The rating scale - 
Client Evaluation Form - constructed for this study (see 
appendix), consists of 10 emotional traits, five positive 
and five negative. Subjects were asked to rate the client 
they had seen, by circling a number from 0 (not at all) to 
10 (extremely) on each one of the 10 traits. All the traits 
were emotional concepts selected from Averill's (1975) 
evaluation factor. 
The final score results from the subtraction of the 
sum of ratings for the negative traits to the sum of ratings 
for the positive traits. 
This measure intended to provide information from one 
important dimension of counselors' cognitive intentionality 
- counselors' conceptualizations. 
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Report of Intentions. As explained earlier, one important 
dimension of counselor's cognitive intentionality is the 
cognitive intention. Here, intentions are defined as 
objectives behind any response. That is, they refer to the 
cognitive anticipation of the effects of a given response. 
The importance in the measurement of these intentions is 
well supported by the research showing the relationship 
between cognitive intentions and counselors' verbal 
responses (e.g., Hill & O’Grady, 1985). 
In order to evaluate subjects' intentions behind their 
response choices, the list of intentions developed by Hill 
and O’Grady was used (see appendix). This instrument 
consists of a list of 19 pantheoretical and nonmutually 
exclusive intentions: cathart, cognitions, behaviors, 
self-control, feelings, insight, change, reinforce change, 
resistance, challenge, relationship, and therapist needs 
(for more information on these intentions see 
appendix). After the verbal response and the client 
evaluation, subjects were instructed to report their 
intentions. The instructions, adapted from Hill and O’Grady, 
were the following: 
Intentions are here defined as the counselor 
rationale for selecting a specific response. 
Try to remember what was in your mind at the 
time you were writing your response to t e 
client.I am only interested in your intentions 
for the response you gave, and not your ong 
term objectives if you were going to work 
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further with that client. Following, you will 
find a list of 19 intentions. Choose those that 
best apply by circling the number before each 
intention. Please, choose all the intentions 
that best apply to your situation, even if the 
phrasing is not directly applicable. 
Hill and O’Grady define intentions as ’’the cognitive 
component that mediates the choice of interventions” (p.3). 
Thus, intentions are hypothesized as important mediators 
between conceptualizations and responses. 
Several studies were recently conducted with this list 
of intentions. The instrument has been found useful in the 
description of intentions. The instrument has been found 
useful in the description of intentions within and across 
interviews, as well as in the diferentiation of counselors 
from different theoretical orientations (Hill et al., 1983; 
Hill & O’Grady, 1985). Some significant associations were 
also found among intentions, counselor’s responses, client 
perceptions, and client responses (Fuller & Hill, 1985; Hill 
& 0’Grady , 1985) . 
A multidimensional scaling conducted by Hill and 
O’Grady, revealed the existence of five clusters of 
intentions. The first cluster, assessment, refers to those 
intentions with the objective of exploring and evaluating 
client’s problems. The second cluster, therapeutic work, 
includes those that try to increase the client’s degree of 
emotional and cognitive understanding. The third cluster, 
change, is concerned with intentions to produce behavioral, 
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cognitive, and affective change. The fourth cluster, 
problems, refers to all those intentions that have as an 
objective to overcome obstacles and blocks to the 
therapeutic work. Finally, the fifth cluster, nonspecific 
factors, describes an uncharacteristic group of intentions 
related in several ways with the other four clusters. 
Once the number of intentions for each category was 
very small, given the fact that only one verbal response was 
required per subject, only clusters of intentions were 
considered in the statistical analysis. 
Summarizing, in order to analyze subjects' intentions 
behind their response choices, the Hill and O'Grady list of 
intentions was used. Only clusters of intentions were used 
for the statistical analysis. 
Judges 
Four independent judges were used in the present 
study. Two of the raters were assigned with d viding 
subjects' verbal responses into response units. The other 
two were responsible for rating the response units. As 
suggested by Banaka et al. (1985b), judges for the unitizing 
task were graduate students experts in English grammar. The 
following four steps were used in the training of judges: 
(1) reading and discussing the unitizing rules; (2) 
of examples; (3) administration of practice discussion 
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tests, and (4) discussion of disagreements. Once a minimum 
criteriura of agreement was obtained (i.e., 80%) in the 
judgement of practice tests, they began to unitize actual 
research protocols. The between judge agreement with actual 
protocols was 93%. Disagreements were solved by consensus. 
Two other judges, graduate students in psychology and 
education, classified the response units using the HCVRCS-R 
(Friedlander, 1982a; 1982b). According to the suggestions of 
Hill et al. (1981) the judges followed a training process 
similar to the one described above. After reading and 
discussing the definition and examples, the judges were 
asked to rate examples from Friedlander's (1982b) manual. 
Next, they discussed the discrepencies and repeated the 
process until a minimum agreement criteron of 80%. Once this 
criterion was met, they began the rating of actual research 
protocols. Agreement between judges was computed by the 
kappa statistic (Hill et al., 1981). This statistic is a 
percent of agreement corrected by chance agreement, and is 
given by the following formula: 
Po - Pc 
k = 
1 - Pc 
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Where Po represents the proportion of ratings in which the 
two judges agree; and Pc the proportion of ratings for which 
agreement is expected by chance. The kappa value found on 
the present study was .77. Discrepancies between judges were 
resolved by mutual agreement. 
Summarizing, in this experiment three experimental 
rooms were used, respectively for the tachistoscope 
expositions, vignette presentation, and completion of some 
dependent measures. The tachistoscope stimulus consisted of 
14 positive, and 14 negative emotional concepts, two neutral 
words and one mask. The client simulation vignette was 
selected among Kagan's affect simulation vignettes. Four 
dependent measures were used in order to rate subjects' 
verbal responses, conceptualizations, intentions, and 
stimuli recall. Finally, four raters were used in the 
unitizing and rating of subjects' verbal responses. 
Process 
This section will refer to the experimental procedures 
followed in this study. I will begin with the description of 
the experimental conditions. Then the sequence of the 
experiment will be presented. 
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Experimental Conditions 
All subjects were randomly assigned (counterbalanced 
by sex) to one of the following experimental conditions: (1) 
subliminal presentation of negative emotional concepts; (2) 
subliminal presentation of positive emotional concepts; (3) 
supraliminal presentation of negative emotional concepts; 
and (4) supraliminal presentation of positive emotional 
concepts. In the subliminal condition, stimuli were 
presented for periods of 50 milliseconds on one channel, 
followed immediately by the mask on the second channel. A 
previous exploratory study as well as research on masked 
presentations (e.g., Marcel, 1983), found as very unprobable 
the capacity for graphical identification of stimuli 
presented under these conditions. In the supraliminal 
condition, stimuli were presented for a period 1000 
milliseconds on one channel, followed by the mask on the 
second channel. For the positive emotional concept groups, 
the list of 14 positive words was presented, while the other 
groups were exposed to the list of 14 negative words. 
In conclusion, two variables, with two conditions 
each, were manipulated: (1) condition of presentation 
(subliminal vs. supraliminal); and (2) type of stimulus 
(negative vs. positive). From the interaction between these 
emerged, hereafter referred as (i) 
variables, four groups 
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subliminal/negative, (ii) subliminal/positive; (iii) 
supraliminal/negative ; (iv) supraliminal/positive. 
Experimental Sequence 
Tachistoscope Exposition. After having read and signed the 
permission form (see appendix), subjects went to the 
experimental room 1, where the following instructions were 
given: 
In this experiment, I will present some words 
to you for varying periods of time. Go ahead 
and look inside this box. You will see some 
X's (...) Now focus on those X's. In that same 
space, words will be presented to you. Don't 
worry if the word comes so fast that you are 
not able to read it. Simply be as attentive as 
you can and pick up as much as you possibly 
can. 
After these instructions the two neutral words were 
presented and any questions subjects might have had were 
answered. After these two trials the 14 words were 
presented. The order of the words was randomized for each 
subject. 
Stimuli Recall. Immediately after the tachistoscope the 
subjects were asked to either recall or guess 10 amongst the 
words presented. The instructions for this recall were those 
referred to in the measures section. 
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Ii?!l!t!e Presentation* Following the stimuli recall, 
subjects were taken to the experimental room 2. Here the 
client simulation vignette was presented along with the 
following instructions: 
On this screen you will see a brief film 
strip. A client s statement will be presented. 
Put yourself in the position of the counselor 
who is with this client. Make the situation as 
real as possible. 
After these instructions the research assistant 
answered any question the subjects might have had, 
presenting then the vignette. 
Verbal Response. Still in the experimental room 2, and 
immediately after the vignette presentation, subjects were 
asked to generate a verbal response. These were the 
instructions for this response: 
Write a brief response to that client. What 
would you say directly to him if you were the 
counselor? I only want your verbal response. 
Client Evaluation and Report of Intentions. After writing 
response, subjects were taken into the experimental room 3 
where they were instructed to complet the Client Evaluation 
Form and the List of Intentions. After completing these 
measures the present author responded to any question that 
the subject might have, and they were then dismissed. 
Concluding, this chapter presented the methodological 
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aspects of the research intended to test the effects of 
subliminal presentation of information on counselors’ 
conceptualizations, intentions, and responses. The chapter 
began with an overview of the experimental procedures, 
followed by the sections describing the subjects, apparatus 
and process. Briefly, 36 subjects were assigned to one of 
the following experimental conditions: subliminal/negative; 
subliminal/positive; supraliminal/negative; and 
supraliminal/positive. All the subjects follow an 
experimental sequence consisting of: (1) tachistoscope 
exposition; (2) stimuli recall; (3) vignette presentation; 
(4) verbal response; (5) client evaluation; and (6) report 
of intentions. 
The next chapter will present the data and the 
statistical analysis for all the dependent measures. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
This chapter will present the data, along with the 
statistical treatment, for each one of the dependent 
variables: stimuli recall, verbal responses, client 
evaluation, and report of intentions. The discussion of the 
results, their relationship with the experimental 
hypotheses, and the implication for the multilevel 
intentionality model, will be provided in chapter VI. 
Two kinds of statistical analysis were performed. A 
Two-Way Analysis of Variance was carried out for the stimuli 
recall variable given the objective of testing the 
contribution of each independent variable for the 
experimental treatment. For all the other variables, given 
the objective of testing between group differences, series 
of orthogonal t-test contrasts were performed. As is usual 
in this type of analysis, the t-test contrasts make possible 
dispensing the use of Anova F test (Nie et al., 1975). 
For each dependent variable the results will be 
briefly described and graphically illustrated, and tables 
with descriptive and inferential statistics will be 
provided. 
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Stimuli Recall 
As can be seen by the inspection of Table 1, subjects 
in both subliminal conditions had less than 5% recall, 
whereas subjects in supraliminal groups showed a correct 
recall of above 65%, 
Table 1 
Proportion of stimuli recall 
Stimulus 
Condition Negative Positive 
Subliminal .01 .04 
Supraliminal .69 .67 
A Two-Way Anova (see Table 2) revealed the existence 
of a significant difference between conditions of 
presentation, F ( 1,32) = 507,27 , p <,001. No statiscally 
significant difference was found for the type of stimulus, 
F(l,32)=,10, p> .05. Therefore, subjects from the subliminal 
groups apparently were not able to identify the 
tachistoscope stimuli, whereas the supraliminal group 
214 
revealed a high percentage of recall. 
Table 2 
Anova - Stimuli Recall 
Source SS DF 
Condition 560.11 1 
Stimuli .11 1 
Condition 
X 1.00 1 
Stimuli 
Error 35.33 32 
Total 595.56 35 
MS F p 
560.11 507.27 .001 
.11 .10 .75 
1.00 .91 .35 
1.04 
17.04 
Some authors have been claiming that subjects can be 
semantically influenced even in situations where they are 
not able to show any graphical identification (e.g., Marcel, 
1983). In order to test this hypothesis I proceeded to a 
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computation of all the adjectives with either positive and 
negative connotation, listed by subjects from subliminal 
groups. Table 3 shows the proportion of negative and 
positive adjectives in subjects' lists. 
Table 3 
Proportion of negative and positive adjectives listed 
Stimulus 
Adjectives Negative Positive 
Negative .17 .06 
Positive .06 .21 
Subjects in the subliminal group tended to list more 
negative adjectives, while the sublirainal/positive group 
revealed a greater amount of positive adjectives. However, 
analysis of variance, shown in Tables 4 and 5, carried out 
independently for positive and negative adjectives, did not 
find statistical significant differences, F(1,16)=2.18, 
p> .05, for the positive adjectives; and F(1,16)=1.64, 
p> .05, for the negative adjectives. 
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Table 4 
Oneway - Negative Adjectives 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Between 1 5.56 5.56 1.64 .22 
Within 16 54.22 3.39 
Total 17 59.78 
Table 5 
Oneway - Positive Adjectives 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Between 1 9.39 9.39 
2.18 .16 
Within 16 68.89 4.31 
Total 17 78.28 
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Concluding, subjects from subliminal conditions 
clearly differed from the supraliminal conditions in respect 
to the amount of stimuli recalled. No significant difference 
was found on the semantic characteristics of the stimuli 
recalled by subliminal group subjects. 
Verbal Responses 
In order to test between group differences, regarding 
the use of verbal response categories, series of t-test 
contrasts were performed. Table 6 shows the means and 
standard deviations for all the categories with a frequency 
above 1%. Tables 7 through 11 exibited the T-test contrasts 
for all the categories with frequencies above 1%. 
Only the values for the information seeking skills 
attained statistical significance. Contrasts among all the 
groups revealed significant differences between the 
subliminnal/positive group and both, the 
supraliminal/negative, t(32)=2.00, p< .05 and the 
supraliminal/positive, t(32)=2.25, p< .05. 
In sum, the two supraliminal groups used significantly 
more information seeking skills when compared with the 
subliminal/positive group. No other difference obtained 
statistical significance. 
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Table 6 
Verbal Responses - Means and Standard deviations 
Stimulus 
Negative Positive 
EAR RR PI IS DS EAR RR PI IS DS 
Sub. M .44 .89 .44 .89 5.00 .67 .56 .67 .33 6.89 
SD .73 .78 .73 .60 2.87 1.00 .53 1.00 .50 5.00 
Sup. M .78 .44 .67 1 .22 5.00 .44 .56 .56 1.33 6.44 
SD .44 .53 1.00 1 .20 2.28 1.00 .73 1.00 1.22 4.3 
Note. EAR= encouragement/approval/reassurance; RR= 
restatement/reflection; PI= providing information; IS = 
information seeking; DS= Degree of structure. Only 
categories with frequencies over 1% are shown. 
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Table 7 
T-Test Contrasts - Encouragement/Approval/Reassurance 
Contrast Value SE T DF p 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. -.22 .39 -.57 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. -.33 .39 -.85 32 >.05 
Sup/Neg 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. 0 
Sup/Pos 
.39 0 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. -.11 
Sup/Neg 
.39 -.28 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs *22 
Sup/Pos 
.39 .57 32 >.05 
SU?/sNeg .33 -39 -85 32 >.05 
Sup/Pos 
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Table 8 
T-Test Contrasts - Restaternent/Reflection 
Contrast Value SE T DF p 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. .33 .31 1.09 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. .44 .31 1.45 32 >.05 
Sup/Neg 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. .33 
Sup/Pos 
.31 1.09 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. .11 
Sup/Neg 
.31 .36 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. 0 
Sup/Pos 
.31 0 32 >.05 
SuP/Neg _Al .31 -.36 32 >.05 
Sup/ Pos 
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Table 9 
T-Test Contrasts - Provide Information 
Contrast Value SE T DF p 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. -.22 .44 -.50 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. -.22 
Sup/Neg 
.44 -.50 32 >.05 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. -.11 
Sup/Pos 
.44 -.25 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. 0 
Sup/Neg. 
.44 0 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. .11 
Sup/Pos 
.44 .25 32 >.05 
Sup/Neg 
Vs. 
Sup/Pos 
11 .44 .25 
32 >.05 
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Table 10 
T-Test Contrasts - Information Seeking 
Contrast Value SE T DF p 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. 
Sub/Pos 
.56 .44 1.25 32 >.05 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. 
Sup/Neg 
-.33 .44 -.75 32 >.05 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. 
Sup/Pos 
-.44 .44 -1.00 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs 
Sup/Neg 
_.89 .44 -2.00 32 <.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs 
Sup/Pos 
-1.00 .44 -2.25 32 <.05 
Sup/Neg 
Vs. 
Sup/Pos 
-. 11 .44 -.25 32 >.05 
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Table 11 
T-Test Contrasts - Degree of Structure 
Contrast Value SE T DF p 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. 0 
Sub/Pos 
1.87 0 32 >.05 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. -1.89 
Sup/Neg 
1.87 -1.01 32 >.05 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. -1.44 
Sup/Pos 
1.87 -.77 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. -1.89 
Sup/Neg 
1.87 -1.01 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. -1.44 
Sup/Pos 
1.87 -.77 32 >.05 
Sup/Neg 
Vs. .44 
Sup/Pos 
1.87 .23 32 >.05 
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Client Evaluation 
Means and standard deviations for the client 
evaluation measure are presented in Table 12. 
Table 12 
Client Evaluation Measure 
Condition 
Stimulus 
Negative Positive 
Subliminal M 11.00 14.22 
SD 12.00 10.80 
Supraliminal M 2.56 18.67 
SD 10.49 14.54 
Contrasts among all possible comparisons, shown in 
table 13, revealed the existence of significant differences 
between subliminal/positive and supraliminal/negative 
groups, t(32)=2.05, p< .05, and between the supraliminal 
groups, t(32)=2.38, p< .01. Thus, both the 
subliminal/positive and the supraliminal/positive groups 
revealed significantly more positive client evaluations than 
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the supraliminal/negative group. 
Table 13 
T-Test Contrasts - Client Evaluation 
Contrast Value SE T DF p 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. -3.22 5.69 -.57 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. 8.44 5.69 
Sup/Neg 
1.48 32 >.05 
Sub/Neg 
Vs -7.66 
Sup/Pos 
5.69 -1.35 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. 11.67 
Sup/Neg 
5.69 2.05 32 <.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. -4.44 
Sup/Pos 
5.69 -.78 32 >.05 
Sup/Neg 
Vs. -16.11 
Sup/Pos 
5.69 -2.83 32 <.01 
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Report of Intentions 
In order to facilitate the statistical analysis only 
clusters of intentions were considered. The computation of 
the cluster score was done by dividing the number of 
intentions in the cluster by the amount of categories per 
cluster. Thus the final score was corrected by cluster size. 
The means and standard deviations for clusters of 
intentions are presented in table 14. 
Table 14 
Cluster of Intentions - Means and Standard deviations 
Stimulus 
Condition Negative Positive 
ASS PROB CHA NSP TWOR ASS PROB CHA NSP TWORK 
Sub. M .67 .07 .33 .49 .33 .40 .14 .22 .49 .22 
SD .33 .15 .35 .25 .17 .37 .22 .26 .10 .21 
Sup. M .59 .11 .33 .51 .53 .56 .11 .28 .38 .51 
SD .33 .18 .43 .27 .39 .29 .18 .44 .21 .28 
Note. ASS = assessment; PR0B= problems; CHA- change; NSP 
nonspecific factors; TWOR = therapeutic work. 
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Tables 15 through 19, show the contrast among all 
possible comparisons for each cluster of intentions. These 
contrasts revealed, once again, the existence of a 
significant difference between the subliminal/positive group 
and the supraliminal/negative/positive, t(32)=2.22, p< .05 
and supraliminal/negative groups, t(32)=2.39, p< .05. 
However, these significant differences were only found for 
the cluster of therapeutic work intentions. 
Summarizing, concerning the use of intentions, the 
subliminal/positive group reported a significantly less use 
of therapeutic work intentions when compared with both the 
supraliminal groups. 
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Table 15 
T-Test Contrasts - Assessment Intentions 
Contrast Value SE T DF p 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. 
Sub/Pos 
.26 .16 1.67 32 >.05 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. 
Sup/Neg 
.07 .16 .48 32 >.05 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. 
Sup/Pos 
.11 .16 .72 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. 
Sup/Neg 
-.19 .16 -1.19 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. 
Sup/Pos 
-.15 .16 -.96 32 >.05 
Sup/Neg 
Vs. 
Sup/Pos 
.04 .16 -24 32 >.05 
229 
Table 16 
T-Test Contrasts - Problems Intentions 
Contrast Value SE T DF p 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. -.67 
Sub/Pos 
.09 -.77 32 >.05 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. -.04 
Sup/Neg 
.09 -.45 32 >.05 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. -.04 
Sup/Pos 
.09 -.45 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. .03 
Sup/Neg 
.09 .32 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. .03 
Sup/Pos 
.09 .32 32 >.05 
Sup/Neg 
Vs. 0 
Sup/Pos 
# 09 0 32 >.05 
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Table 17 
T-Test Contrasts - Change Intentions 
Contrast Value SE T DF 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. .11 .18 .62 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. 0 .18 0 32 >.05 
Sup/Neg 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. .06 
Sup/Pos 
.18 .31 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos . 
Vs. -.11 
Sup/Neg 
.18 -.62 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. -.06 
Sup/Pos 
.18 -.31 32 >.05 
Sup/Neg 
Vs 
Sup/Pos 
.06 18 .31 32 
>.05 
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Table 18 
T-Test Contrasts - Nonspecific Intentions 
Contrast Value SE T DF 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. 0 .10 0 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. -.02 .10 -.22 32 >.05 
Sup/Neg 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. .11 
Sup/Pos 
.10 1.09 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. -.02 
Sup/Neg 
.10 -.22 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. 
Sup/Pos 
.11 .10 1.08 32 >.05 
Sup/Neg 
Vs. 
Sup/Pos 
.13 10 1.31 
32 >.05 
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Table 19 
T-Test Contrasts - - Therapeutic Work Intentions 
Contrast Value SE T DF p 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. .11 
Sub/Pos 
.13 .85 32 >.05 
Sub/Neg 
Vs -.20 
Sup/Neg 
.13 -1.54 32 >.05 
Sub/Neg 
Vs. -.18 
Sup/Pos 
.13 -1.36 32 >.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. -.31 
Sup/Neg 
.13 -2.39 32 <.05 
Sub/Pos 
Vs. -.29 
Sup/Pos 
.13 -2.22 32 <.05 
Sup/Neg 
Vs. .02 
Sup/Pos 
.13 .17 32 >.05 
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Conclusion 
Concluding, five main results were found in the 
present study: 
(1) Concerning stimuli recall, a significant 
difference was found between subliminal and supraliminal 
conditions. Supraliminal groups were much more accurate in 
their recall, whereas the subliminal groups revealed an 
almost non-existent capacity to recall the actual stimuli. 
Additionally, no significant differences were found between 
subliminal groups or between supraliminal groups. 
(2) Although no statistically significant difference 
was found, the subjects from sublirainal/negative group 
showed a tendency to list more negative adjectives, while 
subjects in the sublirainal/positive group tended to list 
more negative adjectives. 
(3) In respect to the verbal responses, the 
subliminal/positive group showed a significantly inferior 
use of information seeking skills than both supraliminal 
groups. No other difference was found to be significant. 
(4) Concerning client evaluation, the 
subliminal/positive group demonstrated a significantly more 
positive evaluation than the supraliminal/negative group. 
Additionally, the supraliminal/positive group also presented 
a significantly more positive client evaluation than the 
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supraliminal/negative group. 
(5) Finally, significant differences among groups were 
also found for the report of intentions. Once again, the 
sublimininal/positive group was found to differentiate 
significantly from both of the supraliminal groups. This 
time, the difference was in terras of therapeutic work 
intentions. Subjects from the subliminal/positive group made 
a significantly less use of therapeutic work intentions. 
In sura, this chapter presented the descriptive and 
inferential statistics for the results with each dependent 
variable. The existence of five central findings was also 
stressed. The discussion of these results, as well as their 
relationship with the experimental hypotheses, and the 
implications for the multilevel intentionality model, will 
be addressed in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
The objective of the present research was to conduct 
an exploratory study on the adequacy of a multilevel 
conception of intentionality to describe the mechanisms of 
the counseling process. More specifically, two hypotheses 
underline the present research. First, it was hypothesized 
that the presentation of subliminal information would affect 
the direction of counselor’s conceptualizations, intentions, 
and responses to the client. Second, the direction of this 
influence was hypothesized to be dependent on the 
interaction between type of stimuli and counselor’s covert 
processes. 
The first hypothesis was clearly supported by the 
present data. In fact, the presentation of subliminal 
information was found to interfere with subjects’ 
conceptualizations, intentions, and responses to the 
simulated client. Subjects exposed to the subliminal 
presentation of positive emotional concepts evaluated the 
client in a more positive way, report less therapeutic work 
intentions, and used small numbers of information seeking 
skills. 
The second hypothesis is partly supported by the 
finding of the absence of any significant results due to the 
subliminal presentation of negative emotional concepts. That 
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is, the influence on counselor's cognitive and behavioral 
processes seem to be dependent on the interaction between 
type of stimuli and counselor's both conscious and 
unconscious processes. 
This chapter will begin with a discussion of the main 
results. Following, the limitations of the research will be 
presented. Finally, several theoretical and practical 
implications will be drawn. 
Stimuli Recall 
Briefly, concerning stimuli recall, supraliminal 
groups were very accurate in their recall, while in the 
subliminal groups the recall was almost non-existent. 
Besides, no significant differences were found within the 
subliminal or supraliminal conditions. These results confirm 
the efficacy of the experimental manipulation. That is, 
subjects in both subliminal conditions were not able to 
consciously identify the stimuli presented. 
More surprising are, however, the data concerning the 
semantic characteristics of the stimuli recalled. A slight 
tendency was detected with subjects from the 
subliminal/negative group to list more negative adjectives 
on the recall task, whereas subjects from the 
subliminal/positive group list more positive adjectives. 
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However, these differences were not found to be statistical 
significant. 
As pointed out early on, several authors found 
evidence for the capacity to have access to the semantic 
meaning of information even when no graphical identification 
is possible (e.g., Marcel, 1983b). It was in an attempt to 
test this hypothesis, that a computation of negative and 
positive adjectives on the lists from subliminal group 
subjects was carried out. That is, it was being tested if 
subliminal group subjects, although not able to identify the 
stimuli, were being influenced by their semantic 
characteristics. 
It would be expected that subjects from the 
subliminal/negative condition would report more negative 
adjectives, while subjects from the subliminal/positive 
group would present a greater amount of positive adjectives. 
This was found to be partly true, however the absence of 
statistical significant differences points out the existence 
of semantic influences but of limited scope. 
Several hypotheses could be raised on the absence of 
statistical significant results. First, it could be 
explained by the small number of adjectives on subjects 
lists. Mostly, the words reported were words such as father, 
mother, house, rose, etc. These words, given their semantic 
subjectivity, prevent any possibility for independent 
judgement. This was the main reason for restricting the 
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classification to adjectives agreed as not ambiguous. The 
results could have been different if the opportunity was 
offered for subjects to report the semantic connotations of 
each of the words listed. 
Second, the absence of significant differences could 
also be due to the non-existence of control over the angle 
of vision. According to Silverman and Geisler (1985) in 
order to assure that the stimuli is registered in the foveo 
region, the horizontal angle of vision should be 5.5. The 
absence of this control could have limited the full impact 
of subliminal presentations. 
Future research should take into more careful 
consideration the control over these variables by asking 
subjects to note the semantic meaning of the words reported, 
and by defining with maximum precision the angles of vision. 
Client Evaluation 
The results showed a significantly more positive 
evaluation of the subliminal/positive and 
supraliminal/positive groups when compared with the 
supraliminal/negative group. 
The effects of supraliminal presentations, both 
negative and positive, on subjects’ evaluations is congruent 
with data from studies on social perception. For example, 
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Srull and Wyer (1979) activated, by means of a sentence 
completion task, concepts of hostility and kindness. Then, 
the subjects were asked to evaluate a person ambiguously 
described. They found that subjects' evaluations were 
influenced in the same direction of the categories 
previously activated. Other authors, however, found similar 
results using subliminal stimuli. For instances, Bargh and 
Pietromonaco (1982) found that the evaluation of a person in 
a hostility trait was dependent on the amount of hostile 
words subliminally presented to observers. 
The results of the present study, finding the effect 
of subliminal presentation of positive stimuli, confirm in 
part Bargh and Pietromonaco data. However, the absence of 
effects with the subliminal/negative group raises some 
interesting questions. The first question concerns the 
nature of the task in both studies. While subjects on Bargh 
and Pietromonaco study were in a non-specified social 
judgement context, in the present research subjects were in 
a counseling analogue situation, where the client was 
presented much more closely to reality (i.e., film strip). 
Therefore, one can hypothesize that the nature of the task 
(i.e., social evaluation versus client evaluation) is being 
responsible for the discrepant findings. 
It could be also hypothesized that the subliminal 
presentation of negative stimuli interferes with the 
attitudes of warmth and positive regard toward clients. This 
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would be even more understandable if we take into 
consideration the fact these subjects were selected from a 
counseling course where those attitudes were being taught* 
However, one question still remains - why has that 
happened for the subliminal/negative presentations and not 
for the supra1imina1/negative ones? Although still somewhat 
speculative by now, these results seem to be consistent with 
the second hypothesis in the study. That is, there seems to 
exist a priviliged relationship between presentation of 
unconscious information and counselor's inner processes. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the results found for other 
dependent measures. Both, for intentions and verbal 
responses, no significant effects were found due to 
supraliminal presentations, suggesting that supraliminal 
effects are much less consistent when compared with 
subliminal effects. Subliminal presentations, interacting 
with subjects covert processes, present a much more 
consistent effect on cognitive and behavioral 
intentionality. 
These conclusions, even though needing further 
research, are consistent with the underlying assumptions of 
the multilevel intentionality model, and confirm partly 
Silverman’s (1983) claim that the impact of certain messages 
is much more dramatic when presented in a subliminal way. 
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Report of Intentions 
Here, the subliminal/positive group was found to 
differentiate from both supraliminal groups. Subjects from 
the subliminal/positive group made significantly less use of 
therapeutic work intentions. 
According to Hill and O’Grady (1985) the cluster of 
therapeutic work intentions reflects therapist attempt to 
help the ”client to reach a deeper or new cognitive or 
emotional understanding and to internalize responsibility” 
(p.18). Apparently, the subliminal presentation of positive 
stimuli, producing an activation of positive categories, 
result in a decrease of therapeutic work intentions. 
Interestingly, research carried out by Hill and 
O’Grady (1985) found that the use of therapeutic work 
intentions was particularly frequent among psychodynaraic 
therapists, precisely the same group commonly referred to as 
that with greater tendency for a pessimistic 
conceptualization of clients. 
Verbal Responses 
Once again it was the subliminal/positive group which 
differed significantly from the supraliminal groups. This 
time the difference was in terms of information seeking 
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skills. Subjects from the subliminal/positive group used 
significantly less information seeking skills then subjects 
from any of the supraliminal groups. 
It is opportune to recall that subjects were 
instructed to give only one verbal response. This explains 
the small frequencies for all verbal skills categories. As 
it would be expected, given the fact that it was a first 
interaction with the client, all groups exibited a greater 
amount of information seeking skills. This should explain 
the reason why only for this category, significantly 
differences were found. Possibly, the subliminal/positive 
group, probably due to a more positive client evaluation and 
less therapeutic work intentions, felt less need for probing 
the client. 
Together, the results from the present research 
suggest that, in a counseling analogue situation, the 
subliminal presentation of positive emotional concepts tends 
to produce a more positive client evaluation which is 
cognitively translated in less therapeutic work intentions. 
This decrease is behaviorally expressed in less use of 
information seeking skills. Interesting enough, the 
subliminal presentation of emotional negative concepts did 
not produce any significant effect. Apparently, the 
subliminal presentation of emotional negative stimuli 
produced a conflict with counselor’s covert processes 
(conscious and unconscious), namely attitudes of warmth and 
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positive regard, preventing the change in the direction of 
the subliminal activation. 
Limitations 
Despite the interesting results found, the data from 
the present research should be analyzed in light of four 
major limitations. First, we are in presence of a counseling 
analogue situation. Even though similar findings are 
hypothesized to take place in real counseling situations, 
the generalization of these results should be limited and 
await further studies. 
Second, the angles of vision, stressed by Silverman 
and Geisler (1985) as affecting subliminal processing, were 
not controled. The absence of this control could have 
transformed, for some subjects, subliminal presentations 
into infralirainal ones. If this is true, one should expect 
much more dramatic differences after controling angles of 
vision. 
Third, and as suggested by Marcel (1983b) the 
awareness threshold varies from one subject to another. This 
fact raises limitations for the use of standard time 
exposures. Although it is doubtful that any subject was able 
to detect the presence of the stimuli in the subliminal 
conditions, the definition of an individual threshold would 
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be a more accurate way for establishing the subliminal and 
supraliminal conditions. 
Finally, it shoud be noted that the large amount of 
statistical comparisons increased the likelihood of type I 
error. However this was both necessary and understandable, 
given the small sample size and the exploratory nature of 
the study. 
^^^ing these limitations in mind, let us now turn to 
the theoretical and practical implications of this study. 
Implications 
Four basic assumptions underline the multilevel 
intentionality model presented in this thesis. The first 
assumption states that three levels of intentionality are 
present in the counseling relationship: behavioral, 
cognitive, and unconscious. The present research showing the 
effects of unconscious presentation of information on 
counselor's cognitive and behavioral processes, found 
initial support for the co-existence of the three levels of 
intentionality. That is, the intentionality of the counselor 
results from an interaction among behavioral, cognitive, and 
unconscious dimensions. 
Second, as shown in figure 5, the model assumes that 
client's behavioral intentionality affects counselor s 
unconscious and cognitive intentionality, and it is from the 
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interaction between unconscious and cognitive intentionality 
that counselor's behavioral intentionality results. In other 
words, every input in the counseling interaction is 
cognitively and unconsciously mediated. This assumption 
seems also to have initial support in the present data. That 
is, unconscious presentation of information was found to 
affect counselor's cognitions (i.e., conceptualizations and 
intentions) and behaviors. 
A third assumption states that unconscious 
presentation of information represents the ideal way for the 
activation of counselor's unconscious intentionality. This 
assumption was again supported by the present data showing 
that the effect of subliminal presentations was much more 
dramatic than the effects of supraliminal presentations. 
Finally, a fourth assumption concerning the existence 
of a privileged interaction between type of subliminal 
information and counselor's covert processes (i.e., 
cognitive and unconscious) is also partly supported by the 
differential effects of negative versus positive 
presentations of subliminal information. 
Concluding, the present research showing the effects 
of subliminal presentation of positive emotional concepts on 
counselors cognitions and behaviors, represents initial 
evidence for the multilevel intentionality model presented 
in this thesis. 
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That is, three levels of intentional!ty are present in the 
counseling relationship: behavioral, cognitive, and 
unconscious. In light of this model the analysis of the 
counseling process should take into account these three 
dimensions of the relationship. 
Although still tentative, several implications can 
already be drawn to counseling practice, training and 
research. It is to these implications that I will be 
referring next. 
Implications for Practice 
As referred previously several authors have been 
trying to integrate in their interventions different 
theoretical approaches. Particularly interesting is the 
movement in cognitive therapists to refer in their 
interventions to emotional and unconscious processes. 
Authors like Mahoney (1985), Guidano and Liotti (1985) and 
joyce_Moniz (1985) have been focused in an epistemological 
reanalysis of therapy in general and cognitive therapy in 
particular. From this analysis three central ideas can be 
identified. First, that counseling and therapy are seen as a 
process of epistemological construction and transformation. 
Second, that in the process of epistemological 
transformation, the client is not a passive recipient of 
information, rather he/she creates the information to be 
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processed — the mind appears to be an active, constructive 
system, capable of producing not only the output but also, 
to a large extent, the input it receives" (Guidano and 
Liotti, 1985, p. 103). Third, in the process of conceptual 
transformation, behaviors, cognitions, unconscious and 
affective processes play an important role. This thesis 
shares the basic assumption of this cognitive-constructivist 
movement to counseling and therapy in stating that the 
process of knowledge construction in counseling is processed 
at behavioral, cognitive, and unconscious levels. 
Additionally, in this thesis the participants are seen as 
epistemic subjects where their pre-existing knowledge (i.e., 
intentionality) determines the input that will be processed. 
Having these assuptions in mind, it should be evident 
that, in their practice, counselors should pay systematic 
attention to their clients’ as well as to their own 
behaviors, cognitions, and unconscious processes. It is 
important to take into account, on a moment-to-moraent basis, 
the way both parts are phenomenologically experiencing 
therapy. As referred to in Chapter II, Rennie (1984, 1985) 
has carried out a series of interesting studies showing that 
clients process the therapeutic interaction within several 
streams of consciousness. Obviously, some of these streams 
are unconscious - "the client can experience inner processes 
that cannot be adequately verbally simbolized" (1985, pp. 
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9-10). 
The movement to integrate these ideas into workable 
techniques is already on its way. Recently a great amount of 
literature on behavioral and cognitive approaches has been 
growing tryng to seek tools to deal with the affect and 
emotions in the counseling process (Greenberg & Safran, 
1984a; 1984b; Rachman, 1980, 1981, 1984). Particularly 
interesting is Rachman’s (a radical behaviorist) attempt to 
draw some implications from Zajonc’s (1980) position to 
therapeutic interventions. 
Similarly, some authors like Meichenbaum and Gilmore 
(1984) and Bowers (1984) have been developing some useful 
ideas to deal and explore the unconscious processes. 
According to Bowers (1984) the objective of therapy, like 
the objective of science, is to make the unconscious 
information conscious, that is, turn perceived information 
into noticed information, and make noticed information 
comprehended. 
In sum, the construction of knowledge in therapy is 
seen as a process occuring at different levels. All these 
levels should be the object of attention of the counselor. 
The finding of effective tools in the uncovering of 
cognitive, affective, and unconscious dimensions (as central 
mediators of epistemological transformation) should be one 
of the next major trends of the therapeutic movement. 
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Implications for Training 
One of the first implications of the multilevel 
intentiona1ity model here presented for training programs, 
is that counseling training programs should move beyond the 
strict frontiers of the counseling skills developement. The 
limitations of the behavioral approach to counselor’s 
training was underlined by Gerald Stone (1982): 
An overemphasis on skills acquisition can lead 
to training that is experienced by the trainee 
as stilted, mechanical, and unrelated to their 
personal development (...) To reduce human 
relations training programs to skills only is 
to neglect professional development, including 
the development of personal beliefs and 
attitudes (p.450). 
The dialectic approach to praxis recently defended by 
Ivey and Goncalves (in press) emphasizes the need to 
conceptualize behaviors, cognitions, and unconscious 
processes, as important dimensions of the whole training 
process. Rather than being concentrated exclusively on the 
behavioral dimension (e.g, Ivey, 1971), the cognitive 
dimension (e.g., Mahoney, in press a), or the unconscious 
dimension (e.g, Freud, 1910/1958), the present thesis 
defends that any training program should focus on all these 
three dimensions of counselor’s intentionality. Following 
will be referring to some suggestions to integrate some 
implications of this model to the training on cognitive, 
behavioral dimensions of counselor s 
unconscious, and 
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intentionality. 
As stated above, trainer attention should also be 
directed to counselor’s cognitive processes. Three aspects 
are particularly important in the cognitive training of 
counselors. The first consists of helping counselors to 
think systematically about their clients (Hirsch & Stone, 
1983). That is, the strategies for client conceptualization 
and hypotheses generation should be central to training 
programs. The effects of different methods for teaching 
conceptualization strategies are currently being tested. For 
example, Kurpius, Benjamin, and Morram (1985) tested the 
effectiveness of three strategies (i.e., self- instruction, 
clinical hypothesis knowledge, and self-instruction plus 
clinical hypothese knowledge) on trainees internal dialogue 
and quality of clinical hypotheses. They found that the self 
instruction strategy was effective in the improvement of 
trainees’ conceptualization ability. 
Blocher et al., (1985) are in a process of developing 
a questionnaire (i.e., Counselor Perception Questionnaire) 
intended to measure trainee cognitive development by the 
level of integration and diferentiation of his/her 
hypotheses. Although still in an exploratory stage this 
instrument could represent an important tool for counselors 
cognitive training, with the additional advantage of linking 
cognitive and developmental approaches. 
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A second emphasis of the cognitive training should be 
on the translation of conceptualizations into intentions for 
immediate actions and long terra objectives. At this level it 
would be useful to have the use of Hill and O’Grady (1985) 
and Martin et al. (in press) list of intentions. 
Still within the cognitive framework a third dimension 
of the training should be focused on the identification and 
confrontation of trainer irrational beliefs, as suggested by 
Stone (1980) and Schmidt (1979). 
Another goal of any training program, according to the 
present model, should be to help trainees focus their 
attention on unconscious processes. This aspect describes 
what Freud (1910/1958) refers to countertransference 
mechanisms and is illustrated in the didactic analysis 
required for being psychoanalist. Making counselors more 
aware of these unconscious processes could be achieved, as 
suggested by Schlesinger (1984), training counselors in 
carrying out self-analysis. The affect simulation vignettes 
developed by Kagan (1975) could represent an important tool 
in this self-analytical training. As pointed out early on, 
Kagan’s vignettes tend to arouse four basic feelings: (1) 
fear of being hurt; (2) fear of hurting others; (3) fear of 
being engulfed; and (4) fear of engulfing others. It is 
interesting to notice the correspondance betweewn these 
emotions and those associated with the feelings related with 
early experiences of attachment and separation as described 
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by Bowlby (1985). Therefore these vignettes could be used as 
important tools for the activations of unconscious processes 
often present in the counseling relationship. 
In order to help trainees deal with their feelings and 
unconscious mechanisms several processes can be used. For 
example, Martin (1985b) has recently developed a graphing 
technique to analyze the associative network memory 
structure. Basically, Martin asks their subjects to free 
associate on certain key words. Each of these associations 
is then written on a separate gummed label. Once finished 
with the associations, subjects are instructed to organize 
the labels in a broad, mirroring the way they relate in 
their minds. Although still exploratory, I have been finding 
this strategy as very useful to explore and analyze trainees 
reactions to Kagan's vignettes. Interesting enough these 
networks could be analyzed in light of some emotional 
theories, such as those of Bower (1981) and Leventhal 
(1982). 
Obviously the emphasis on the cognitive and 
unconscious intentionality training should not bring to a 
second plan the importance of developing specific counseling 
skills. It is central to enable counselors in training to 
translate their cognitions into specific counseling skills 
and strategies. One of the mistakes of behavioral approaches 
to counselors training is to operate out of any conceptual 
framework. The research has shown, that in order to 
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effectively learn counseling skills a conceptual framework 
is necessary (Goncalves & Campos, 1985; Stone & Kelly,1983). 
The training on unconscious and cognitive intentionality 
could be a useful way to give a conceptual framework for the 
learning and use of counseling skills. In this way, the 
skills will appear with a strict and clear relationship with 
conceptualization and cognitive intentions. 
It is in the behavioral dimension where the technology 
is already well developed. Several decades of research have 
shown the efficacy of a social-learning approach combining 
instructions, modeling, practice and feedback (c.f., Ford, 
1979). 
In sura, three dimensions should be present in 
counselor's training programs: 
(1) unconscious intentionality - in order to 
make trainees aware of the personal, 
unconscious, emotional, and 
countertransference processes in the 
counseling relationship; 
(2) cognitive intentionality - awareness and 
development of cognitions about clients (i.e., 
conceptualizations, hypotheses generation, 
establishment of intentions) and disputation 
of irrational beliefs; 
(3) behavior intentionality - acquisition of 
counseling skills and specific therapeutic 
techniques. 
Implications for Research 
According to the multilevel intentionality model, 
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research on counseling and therapy process should take into 
careful consideration the interaction between all three 
dimensions of intentionality. 
The present research points to the promising 
possibilities of the subliminal methodology to explore the 
relationship among behaviors, cognitions, and unconscious 
mechanisms in the counseling process. Future studies, should 
try to expand this methodology, correcting some deficiencies 
of the present study and testing the effects of different 
types of messages in different types of situations. Another 
promising way for future research should, by means of 
therapy recall (see Martin et al., in press) explore the 
emotions, cognitions, and behaviors of both client and 
counselor. 
The basic idea that the present thesis tries to convey 
is that relying exclusively on one or two dimensions will 
lead necessarely to inconclusive and conflicting results, as 
it was evident in the literature review presented in chapter 
XI. It is well demonstrated throughout the history of 
science that researchers tend to find what they are looking 
for. That is, the answers obtained will depend on the 
questions that were raised. As it was pointed out by Skinner 
(1974) quoting Bertrand Russel, "experimental animals 
studied by American behaviorists behaved like Americans, 
running about in an almost random fashion, while those of 
Germans behaved like Germans, sitting and thinking (p.20). 
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The integrative view presented in the multilevel 
intentionality model tries to address different kinds of 
questions in order to obtain a wider variety of answers, 
hopefully representing a better description of the 
complexity of the counseling process. 
Conclusion 
The central philosophical assumption that inspired 
this thesis is that counseling and therapy process are 
complex phenomenon where the relationship between counselor 
and client are processed at different levels. 
Within the cognitive-contructivist approach that is 
present in this thesis, counseling and therapy are seen as a 
process of knowledge construction, where the two episteraic 
subjects, client and counselor, are actively and 
continuously producing and transforming knowledge. The 
concept of intentionality was used to conceptualize this 
process of knowledge construction at the behavioral, 
cognitive, and unconscious levels. That is, we relate (i.e., 
we construct knowledge) with the world at all these three 
different levels. Thus, any approach to the research and 
conceptualization of the counseling process should take 
these dimensions into consideration. 
The introductory chapter had referred to the 
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epistemological search that counseling and psychotherapy are 
actually facing. The concept of intentionality was then 
introduced as an useful construct to conceptualize the 
complexity of the counseling process. The concept was 
briefly reviewed in the meanings assumed throughout the 
history of philosophy and psychology. Then, its meaning on 
the context of the present thesis was introduced. 
The second chapter extensively reviewed the literature 
of the behavioral, cognitive, and unconscious dimensions of 
the counseling and therapeutic process. Generally, the 
research literature shows that all these different dimension 
are important contributors to the counseling process and 
that the research exclusively on each of these dimension 
tends to be inconclusive. 
The third chapter, summarizes the conclusions of the 
literature review, intruduces the multilevel conception of 
intentionality along with its major underlying assumption. 
Then an exploratory study testing the effects of unconscious 
presentation of information on counselor s 
conceptualization, intentions, and responses was introduced. 
The basic idea of the research was to explore some of the 
assumptions of the multilevel intentionality model, testing 
additionally the usefulness of the subliminal methodology as 
a way to understand the interaction between different 
dimensions of the client-counselor relationship. 
Chapters four and five, describe the methodology and 
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results of the empirical study. Finally this chapter (i.e. 
VI), discussed the results of the empirical study and their 
relationship with the multilevel intentionality model. 
Generally speaking, the results showed an initial and 
promising support for the major assumptions of the model, 
namely that counselor’s intentionality results from the 
interaction between unconscious, cognitive and behavioral 
dimensions. In other words, counselors are influenced, in 
their cognitions and responses, by information of which they 
are not consciously aware. Finally, this chapter ended with 
some implications for counseling, practice training, and 
research. 
As stated above, Gelso and Carter (1985) had referred 
to the necessity of taking into consideration the real and 
unreal aspects of the counseling relationship. Real, refers 
to the concrete aspects of the counseling interactions, 
while unreal refers to the more psychodynamic dimensions, 
such as transference and countertransference processes. The 
present thesis carried out this distinction a step further 
by introducing three dimensions of the counseling 
relationship: the real (i.e., behavioral), the ideal (i.e., 
cognitive) and the surreal (i.e., unconscious), attempting 
to philosophically integrate realism, idealism, and 
surrealism. 
In a constructivist approach to reality the "truth 
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appears as the limit (...) toward which we tend, without 
ever reaching it" (Guidano & Liotti, 1985, p.103). Thus, the 
present thesis should be seen within this movement striving 
for more complexity, well captured by Michael Mahoney's 
(1980) words, with which I would like to finish: 
The operant researcher seldom "saw" any 
cognitive influence partly because he or she 
seldom looked for it. I would like to think 
that cognitive researchers will not repeat 
this scenario in the appraisal of unconscious 
processes (p.164). 
CHAPTER VII 
PUBLISHABLE ARTICLE 
I believe that three main parts constituted the core 
of this thesis, each one of them could be written in terms 
of a publishable article. 
The first part, mainly represented in Chapter II, 
presented a detailed review of the research on behavioral, 
cognitive, and unconscious dimensions of the counseling 
process. 
The second part, illustrated in Chapter III, presents 
a multilevel model of intentionality in counseling and 
psychotherapy. 
While the first two parts are more theoretical in 
nature, the third part is represented by the empirical study 
about the effetcs of unconscious presentations on counselors 
cognitive and behavioral responses. 
As is usual in thesis submited to the Counseling, 
Consulting and School Psychology Doctoral Program, I chose 
to end this thesis with the proposal of a publishable 
article summarizing the empirical study. 
Thus, the present chapter is constituted exclusively 
by the article as it will be submitted, with the exception 
of the references list. The article was written according to 
guidelines of the American Psychological Association (1984). 
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Abstract 
This article presents a study of the effects of 
tachistoscope presentations of affective words on subjects' 
conceptualizations, intentions, and responses to a simulated 
client. The participants, 36 counseling students, were 
randomly assigned to one of the following treatments: (1) 
subliminal presentation of negative emotional concepts; (2) 
subliminal presentation of positive emotional concepts; (3) 
supraliminal presentation of negative emotional concepts; 
and (4) supraliminal presentation of positive emotional 
concepts. After the tachistoscopic presentations, all 
subjects were exposed to a simulated client, which they were 
asked to evaluate, respond to, and report the cognitive 
intentions that guided their responses. Significant effects 
were found in the subliminal presentation of positive 
emotional concepts on subjects' conceptualizations, 
intentions, and responses. Some significant effects were 
also found for the supraliminal presentation, but only for 
the client evaluation measure. 
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The Effects of Unconscious Information 
on Counselors' Conceptualizations, Intentions, 
and Responses 
What relation is there among behaviors, cognitions, 
and unconscious processes in the practice of counseling and 
psychotherapy? This research presents a new methodology 
useful in the systematic analysis of the multiple processes 
underlying overt unselor and therapist behavior. 
Influenced by the microcounseling (e.g., Ivey, 1971; 
1983) and the human resource models (e.g., Carkhuff, 1969), 
counseling process research, for the past 20 years, has been 
focused on the understanding of behavioral processes, such 
as the effects of verbal and nonverbal skills (e.g., Hill & 
Gorraally, 1977), skills across the counseling process (e.g., 
Hill, Carter & O’Farrell, 1983) and across theoretical 
orientations (e.g., Lee & Uhleraann, 1984). 
However, following the cognitive revolution (e.g., 
Hilgard, 1980; Mahoney, 1977) several researchers nave 
attempted to clarify the covert mechanisms of the counseling 
process. This cognitive movement is illustrated by the 
research on counselor’s conceptual strategies (e.g., Hirsch 
& Stone, 1983; Kurpius Benjamin, & Morram, 1985; Strohmer & 
Chiodo, 1984), attitudes and beliefs (e.g., Hirsch & Stone, 
1982; Stone & Kelly, 1983), perceptions (e.g., Elliott, 
1979; Elliott, Barker, Caskey, & Pistrang, 1982) and 
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intentions (e.g., Fuller & Hill, 1985; Hill & O’Grady, 
1985). Martin (1984), provides a good conceptual 
integration, supported by recent research (Martin, Martin, 
Meyer, & Sleraon, in press), of the cognitive and behavioral 
mechanisms of the counseling process. 
While this cognitive movement is still growing, other 
areas of psychology are already experiencing what some 
authors have chosen to call the cognitive unconscious 
revolution (Van Den Bergh & Eelen, 1984). More and more, the 
advocates of the cognitive movement are giving attention to 
the role of the unconscious processes (e.g., Mahoney, 1982; 
1985; Meichenbaum & Gilmore, 1984). In the counseling 
process research, the influence of this movement is 
virtually non-existent. An exception is the small group of 
studies on countertransference processes (c.f., Peabody & 
Gel so, 1982; Singer & Luborsky, 1977). 
Recently, however, some authors have been stating the 
need to take into account the unconscious dimension of the 
counselor-client relationship (e.g., Gelso & Carter, 1985). 
However, the unconscious, even though recognized as an 
important dimension of the counseling interaction, presents 
some obstacles for the researcher. The present study will 
explore the possibilities of subliminal methodology to 
analyze the interaction between counselor’s unconscious, 
cognitive, and behavioral dimensions. 
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Despite the initial controversy (e.g., Eriksen, 1960) 
several recent reviews of the research are finding support 
for the important role of the unconscious processes and for 
the subliminal methodology as an important tool for studying 
those processes (e.g., Bowers, 1984; Dixon, 1981; Schevrin & 
Dickman, 1980). We will briefly illustrate the state of the 
art on subliminal research with examples from studies 
carried out in cognitive, social, and clinical psychology. 
The first group is represented by the research on 
masking effects. In these experiments, the perception of a 
given stimulus is impaired by the temporal and spatial 
proximity of a second stimulus, referred to as mask. Marcel 
(1983) found that by progressively reducing the temporal 
distance between the stimulus and the mask, the subjects 
would first lose the capacity to detect the stimulus, then 
the capacity for making judgements on the graphical 
similarity, and only finally the capacity for semantic 
analysis. That is, subjects were found to have access to 
semantic information even when they were not able to detect 
the presence of a given stimulus. 
A second group of studies is concerned with the effect 
of subliminal presentations on social perceptions and 
judgements. Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982) presented 
subliminally lists containing 0%, 20%, or 80% of 
hostile-related words. Subjects were then confronted with an 
ambiguous description of a person which they were asked to 
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evaluate. The data showed that the subjects' evaluations 
were significantly effected by the amount of hostile words 
presented subliminally. 
Finally, the third group of studies is illustrated by 
the research program carried out by Silverman and associates 
(e.g., Silverman, 1983; Silverman & Weinberger, 1985). The 
methodology introduced by Silverman - psychodynaraic 
activation method - consists of the subliminal presentation 
of stimuli with psychodynamic content (e.g., MOMMY AND I ARE 
ONE). A considerable amount of research completed during the 
past 20 years, has found support for the effect of these 
messages on the intensification and reduction of 
psychopathology and as adjuncts to therapeutic and 
educational interventions. 
In sum, the research on subliminal perception tends to 
find support for the idea that our evaluations and responses 
are influenced by information presented outside of conscious 
awareness. Therefore, it would be legitimate to hypothesize 
that in the counseling situation, counselors are influenced 
in their cognitions and behavioral responses, by information 
presented outside of consciousness. This statement, even 
though presented by Freud (1910/1958) a long ago, still 
awaits experimental confirmation. 
The present study will explore the possibilities of 
subliminal methodology for analyzing the unconscious 
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presentation of information on counselors' cognitions and 
behaviors. The general hypothesis is that counselors are 
influenced in their judgements, intentions, and responses, 
by information of which they are unaware. 
Method 
Overview 
The subjects, 36 counseling students, were randomly 
assigned to one of the following experimental treatments: 
(1) subliminal presentation of negative emotional concepts; 
(2) subliminal presentation of positive emotional concepts; 
(3) supraliminal presentation of negative emotional 
concepts; and (4) supraliminal presentation of positive 
emotional concepts. Therefore, four groups were compared. 
These groups emerged from the interaction of two independent 
variables (i.e., condition of presentation, and type of 
stimuli) with two conditions each (i.e., subliminal vs. 
supraliminal, and positive vs. negative). All subjects went 
through the following experimental sequence: 
(1) Tachistoscopic presentations ( either 
subliminally or supraliminally) of 14 
emotional concepts (either positive or 
negative) . 
(2) After the tachistoscopic presentation, the 
subjects went through 
where they were asked 
the stimuli recall task 
to recall or guess ten 
stimuli presented. 
words amongst the 
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(3) Subjects were then shown a client 
simulation vignette. 
(4) Following the vignette, they were asked to 
write a verbal response to the simulated 
client, provide an evaluation of the client's 
functioning, and report those intentions that 
guided their responses. 
Subjects 
Participants in this study were 40 students enrolled 
in a graduate course in counseling skills at a large 
Northeastern American University. All participants were 
required to have English as their native language and normal 
or corrected to normal vision. From the original sample, two 
subjects revealed inappropriate vision and two others did 
not complete all the dependent measures, and were 
subsequently withdrawn from the experiment. The final sample 
consisted of 36 subjects, four males and 32 females, with 
ages ranging from 20 to 42, with a mean of 25.4. Academic 
credit was offered for participation. The subjects were 
randomly assigned, counterbalanced by sex, to each of the 
four experimental treatments. 
Instrumentation 
Tachistoscopic stimuli. Coming into the experimental 
room, the subjects were exposed to the tachistoscopic 
(Harvard T-1C-3 two channel) presentation of stimuli words. 
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All subjects were presented either the negative or the 
positive emotional concepts, in one of the following 
conditions: subliminal or supraliminal. (The conditions of 
stimuli presentation will be described in the process 
section). 
The tachistoscope stimuli consisted of 14 positive 
emotional words, 14 emotional negative words, 2 neutral 
words, and one mask stimulus. The 14 positive emotional 
words were: loving, affectionate, compassionate, pleasant, 
relaxed, warmhearted, peaceful, serene, trusting, 
harmonious, tranquil, contented, thoughtful, and kindly. The 
negative emotional words were: morbid, cruel, tortured, 
repulsive, hellish, violent, tragic, persecuted, shattered, 
suicidal, bloodthirsty, plagued, evil, and hateful. Two 
neutral words - window and garden - were used as examples. 
Finally, the mask stimulus consisted of 12 capital X’s in a 
straight line (i.e., XXXXXXXXXXXX). All the stimuli were 
printed in black capital letters, in the middle of white 
cards (15cm x 10 cm). 
Both the negative and the positive words were selected 
from the Semantic Atlas of Emotional Concepts developed by 
Averill (1975). A factor analysis of the 558 emotional 
concepts of this Atlas revealed the existence of four 
dimensions: activation, evaluation, depth of experience, and 
lack of control. All the words selected came from 
high-familiarity concepts with highest and lowest scores on 
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the evaluation factor. 
Client simulation vignette. After the tachistoscopic 
presentation, and immediately following the stimuli recall 
task (described on the measures section), all subjects went 
into another experimental room where they were exposed to a 
client simulation vignette. In this vignette, selected from 
Kagan (1975), an old man communicates the following message 
to the observer: 
Can you give me a minute? Something has been 
driving me frantic. For the last few years 
I've found myself ... thinking about... littie 
children. Wanting to touch them...Where I 
shouldn't. I know it's wrong, I know it's 
evil, I know it's unnatural. I can't help 
myself. Please help me. You've got to help me. 
Measures 
Stimuli recall. This measure was introduced after the 
tachistoscopic presentation and was intended to test the 
efficacy of the experimental treatment. Subjects from the 
subliminal groups were expected not to recall the stimuli, 
while supraliminal groups were expected to recall most of 
the stimuli. In order to measure the degree of stimuli 
recall, participants were instructed to write ten words they 
remembered from the presentation. In case they did not 
remember any words, they were asked to guess. Only words 
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that corresponded exactly to the original stimuli were 
considered correct. 
Subjects verbal responses. Immediately after the 
presentation of the client simulation vignette, the subjects 
were instructed to generate a brief written response to the 
simulated client. The response was then divided into units 
and classified according the Hill Counselor Verbal Response 
Category System - Revised (Friedlander, 1982a; 1982b). The 
system consists of the following categories: 
encouragement/approval/reassurance; restatement/reflection; 
self-disclosure; interpretation; confrontation; providing 
information; information seeking; direct guidance/advice; 
and unclassifiable. Additionally, the scale provides a 
measure of the degree of structure. 
Client evaluation. Following the verbal response, the 
subjects were asked to provide, on a rating scale, an 
evaluation of the client's functioning. This rating scale 
consisted of 10 emotional traits, five positive and five 
negative. Subjects were asked to rate the client they have 
seen by circling a number from 0 (not at all) to 10 
(extremely) on each one of the 10 traits. 
Report of intentions. After the verbal responses and 
the client evaluations, the subjects were instructed to 
report the intentions behind their response choices. In 
order to do that the used. The subjects were asked to select 
those that best apply among the following 19 intentions: set 
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limits, get information, support, focus, clarify, hope, 
change, cathart, cognitions, behaviors, self-control, 
feeling, insight, change, reinforce change, resistance, 
challenge, relationship, and therapist needs. A 
multidimensional scaling conducted by Hill and O’Grady 
revealed the existence of five clusters of intentions: 
assessment, therapeutic work, change, problems, and 
nonspecific factors. 
Judges 
Four independent judges were used in this study. Two 
of the judges divided subjects' verbal responses into units, 
following the rules and the training procedures specified by 
Fried lander (1982a) and Banaka, Birgh-Wilson, and Thompson 
(1985). The between judgement agreement for the construction 
of response units was 93%. Disagreements were solved by 
consensus. 
Two other judges classified the response units using 
the Hill Counselor Verbal Response Category System - Revised 
(Friedlander, 1982a; 1982b). After the training procedures, 
an acceptable level of agreement was found in the 
classification of experimental protocols (k= .77). 
Process 
Experimental conditions. All subjects were randomly 
assigned~~(counterbalanced by sex) to one of the following 
experimental conditions: (1) subliminal presentation 
emotional concepts; (2) subliminal presentation of 
negative 
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positive emotional concepts; (3) supraliminal presentation 
of negative emotional concepts; and (4) supraliminal 
presentation of positive emotional concepts. 
In the subliminal condition, stimuli were presented 
for periods of 50 milliseconds on one channel, followed 
immediately by the mask on the second channel. In the 
supraliminal condition, stimuli were presented for a period 
of 1000 milliseconds on one channel, followed by the mask on 
the second channel. For the positive emotional concept 
groups, the list of 14 positive words was presented, while 
the other groups were exposed to the list of 14 negative 
words. 
In sura, two variables with two conditions each were 
manipulated; (1) condition of presentation (subliminal vs. 
supraliminal); and (2) type of stimulus (negative vs. 
positive). From the interaction between these variables, 
four groups emerged, hereafter referred as (i) 
sub 1iminal/negative, (ii) sublirainal/positive, (iii) 
supraliminal/negative, and (iv) supraliminal/positive. 
Results 
Two statistical analyses were performed. A Two-Way 
Analysis of Varience was employed to test the contribution 
of each independent variable for the stimuli recall. For all 
the other variables, given the objective of testing between 
group differences, series of orthogonal t-testj:ontrasts 
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were performed. As is usual in these types of analyses, the 
t-test contrasts make possible dispensing the use of the 
Anova F test (Nie et al., 1975). 
Stimuli recall. Subjects in both subliminal conditions 
had less than 5% of correct recall, while subjects in 
supraliminal groups showed a correct recall above 65%. A 
Two-Way Anova (Table 20) revealed a significant effect due 
to condition of presentation (i.e., subliminal vs. 
supraliminal), F(1,32) = 507.27, p <.001. No significant 
effect was found for the manipulation of the type of 
stimulus variable (i.e., negative vs. positive), F(l,32)= 
.10, p >.05. 
INSERT TABLE 20 ABOUT HERE 
Verbal responses. Table 21 shows the means and 
standard deviations for the only response category for which 
significant results were found — information seeking. 
Contrasts among all the groups revealed significant 
differences between the sublirainal/positive group and both 
the supraliminal/negative, t(32)=2.00, p <.05, and the 
supraliminal/positive, t(32)-2.25, p <.05. That is, the two 
supraliminal groups used significantly more information 
seeking skills when compared with the subliminal/positive 
group. 
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INSERT TABLE 21 ABOUT HERE 
Client evaluation. Table 21 also shows the means and 
standard deviations for the client evaluation measure. 
T-test contrasts revealed the existence of significant 
differences between sublirainal/positive and 
supraliminal/negative groups, t(32)=2.05, p <.05; and 
between supraliminal groups, t(32)=2.83, p <.01. Thus, both 
the subliminal/positive and the supraliminal/positive groups 
revealed significantly more positive client evaluations than 
the supraliminal/negative group. 
List of intentions. Given the small number of ratings 
per category, only clusters of intentions were considered. 
Table 21 presents the only cluster for which significant 
differences were found -therapeutic work intentions . The 
scores presented were corrected for cluster size by dividing 
the number of intentions in the cluster by the amount of 
categories per cluster. Contrasts among all possible group 
comparisons revealed, once again, the existence of 
significant differences between the subliminal/positive 
group and both the supraliminal/positive, t(32)—2.21, 
p <.05, and supralirainal/negative, t(32) = 1.32 , p <.05. That 
is, the subliminal/positive group reported significantly 
less use of therapeutic work intentions when compared with 
both the supraliminal groups. 
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Discussion 
Together, this study provides some initial evidence 
that the overt behavior of the counselor is influenced both 
by internal cognitions and unconscious processing. 
More specifically the present research revealed three 
main findings. First, in respect to the counselors’ verbal 
responses, the positive/subliminal group showed a 
significantly smaller use of information seeking skills than 
both supraliminal groups. Second, concerning the client 
evaluation, the subliminal/positive group demonstrated a 
significantly more positive evaluation than the 
supraliminal/negative group. Additionally, the 
supraliminal/positive group also presented a significantly 
more positive client evaluation than the 
supraliminal/negative group. Finally, the 
subliminal/positive group was found to make significantly 
less use of therapeutic work intentions when compared with 
both the supraliminal groups. 
In sura, even though significant effects were found for 
the supraliminal presentations on the client evaluation 
measure, only the subliminal presentation of positive 
emotional concepts revealed consistent effects across all 
the dependent variables. That is, the subliminal/positive 
group was the only group significantly different from the 
supraliminal ones in terms of client evaluation, intentions 
and responses. These results suggest that in a counseling 
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analogue situation, the subliminal presentation of positive 
emotional concepts tends to produce a more positive client 
evaluation which is cognitively translated in a decrease of 
therapeutic work intentions and behaviorally expressed in 
less use of information seeking skills. 
The validity of these results is supported by the 
finding that supraliminal groups were very accurate in their 
recall while in the subliminal groups the recall was almost 
non-existent. As was expected, subjects in both subliminal 
conditions were not able to consciously identify the stimuli 
presented. 
The effects of supraliminal presentations (both 
negative and positive) on the client evaluation are 
congruent with data from studies on social perception. For 
example, Srull & Wyer (1979) activated, by means of a 
sentence completion task, the concepts of hostility and 
kindness. Then, subjects were asked to evaluate a person who 
was ambiguously described. They found that subjects 
evaluations were influenced in the same direction of the 
categories previously activated. Other authors found similar 
results using subliminal stimuli. For example, Bargh and 
Pietroraonaco (1982), in the experiment already referred to, 
found that the evaluation of a person was dependent on the 
number of the hostile words subliminally presented to 
observers. The results from the present study, finding the 
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effect of subliminal presentation of positive stimuli, 
confirm in part Bargh and Pietroraonaco data. However, the 
absence of effects with the subliminal/negative group raises 
some interesting hypotheses. The first one concerns the 
nature of the task in both studies. While the subjects on 
Bargh and Pietromonaco's study were in a non-specified 
social-judgement context in the present research, subjects 
were in a counseling analogue situation, where the simulated 
client presentation was much closer to reality. It could 
also be hypothesized that the subliminal presentation of 
negative stimuli had interfered with counselors' covert 
processes, namely attitudes of warmth and positive regard 
towards the client. 
However, one question still remains : Why has that 
happened for the subliminal/negative presentations and not 
for the supraliminal/negative ones? Although not conclusive, 
these results seem to bring support for the hypothesis of a 
priviliged relationship between the presentation of 
unconscious information and counselors' inner processes. 
This hypothesis is reinforced by the results for the other 
dependent measures, where for both intentions and verbal 
responses, no significant effects of the supraliminal 
presentations were found. This hypothesis also seems to be 
consistent with the two central findings of Silverman s 
(e.g., 1983) research. First, the impact of certain messages 
dramatic when presented in a subliminal way. is much more 
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Second, there is an ideal matching between content of the 
messages and subjects' psychological processes. For example, 
the presentation of the message MOMMY AND I ARE ONE had no 
effect when presented supraliminally, and women were more 
impacted by the subliminal message DADDY AND I ARE ONE. 
Future research should try to explore in greater detail the 
relationship between characteristics of the message and 
individual variables of the counselor. 
According to Hill and O'Grady (1985), the cluster of 
therapeutic work intentions reflects the therapist attempt 
to help the "client to reach a deeper or new cognitive or 
emotional understanding and to internalize responsibility" 
(p.18). Apparently, the presentation of subliminal stimuli, 
possibly due to an activation of positive categories, 
resulted in a decrease of therapeutic work intentions. 
As was expected, given the fact that it was an initial 
interaction with the client, all groups exhibited a greater 
amount of information seeking skills. This could partially 
explain the reason why significant differences were found 
only in this category. Once again, the sublirainal/positive 
group, possibly due to a more stable positive client 
evaluation and less therapeutic work intentions, felt less 
need to probe the client. 
In spite of the interesting results found, the data 
research should be analyzed in light of from the present 
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four major limitations. First, we are in the presence of a 
counseling analogue situation. Therefore, any attempt to 
generalize these results should be cautious and await 
further studies. 
Second, the angles of vision were not controled. This 
could have transformed, for some subjects, the subliminal 
presentations into infraliminal ones. If this is true, one 
should expect much more dramatic differences after 
controlling angles of vision. 
Third, and as suggested by Marcel (1983), the 
awareness threshold varies from one subject to another. As 
such, the definition of an individual threshold would be a 
more accurate way for establishing the subliminal and 
supralimnal conditions. 
Finally, it should be noted that the large amount of 
statistical comparisons increased the likelihood of Type I 
error. However, this was both necessary and understandable 
given the small sample size and the exploratory nature of 
the study. 
Despite these limitations, the data from this study 
points to promising possibilities of using the subliminal 
methodology to understand the contribution of the 
unconscious mechanisms in the counseling process. 
Additionally, this study found support for the idea that 
counselors are influenced, in their conceptualizations, 
intentions, and responses, by information of which they are 
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not aware. 
Needless to say, further studies need to be conducted 
to overcome certain methodological deficiencies. Also it is 
imperative to carry out these studies in more naturalistic 
contexts. We hope at least to have contributed to the 
exploration of methodological tools that will enable 
counseling process researchers to open their inquires into 
unconscious processes - "the operant researcher seldom 'saw' 
any cognitive influence because he or she seldom looked for 
it. I would like to think that cognitive researchers will 
not repeat this scenario in the appraisal of unconscious 
processes" (Mahoney, 1980, p.164). 
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Table 20 
Anova - Stimuli Recall 
Source SS DF MS F P 
Condition 560.11 1 560.11 507.27 .001 
Stimuli 
.11 1 
.11 .10 .75 
Condition 
X 1.00 1 1.00 .91 .35 
Stimuli 
Error 35.33 32 1.04 
Total 596.56 35 17.04 
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Table 21 
Means and Standard Deviations for Verbal Responses, Client 
Evaluations, and Intentions 
Sub/neg Sub/pos Sup/neg Sup/pos 
Verbal Resp. 
Information M .89 .33 1.22 1.33 
seeking SD .60 .50 1.20 1.22 
Client M 11.00 14.22 2.56 18.67 
Evaluation 
SD 12.00 10.80 10.49 14.54 
Intentions: 
Therap. M .33 .22 .53 
.51 
Work SD .17 .21 .39 
.28 
Note. Sub/neg=subliminal/negative; 
Sub/pos=subliminal/positive; Sup/neg= 
Sup/pos=supraliminal/positive. 
supraliminal/negative; 
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Appendix A 
Oscar F Gongalves 
Counseling Psychology 
A62 Mills South 
Rhone # 545-3628 
University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, MA Ch 003 
ASKING FOR VOLUNTEERS 
I am an assistant professor at the University of Oporto - Portugal, 
presently a Fulbright visitor and Doctoral student in the counseling 
program at the University of Massachusetts. As part of my dissertation 
I am beginning a research on the relationship between perceptual 
mechanisms and counseling process. 
At this time, I am looking for volunteers who are willing to become 
engaged in a non-threatening experiment. The experiment will take 
approximately thirty minutes of your time. 
In order to participate in this experiment, it is essential: 
(1) That ENGLISH is your NATIVE LANGUAGE; 
(2) That you have NORMAL OR CORRECTED TO NORMAL VISION. 
If you choose to participate, you will be awarded FIVE BONUS 
POINTS IN THE FINAL GRADE of this course. 
If you are interested and meet the qualifying criteria, please 
print the following information and I call you. 
NAME. 
ADORES.. 
PHONE » 
THANKS FOR YOUR COLLABORATION 
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Appendix B 
Oscar F. Gongalves 
Counseling Psychology 
A62 Mills South 
Phone Pt 5A5-3628 
University of Massachusetts Amherst. MA 
□ 1003 
1st May. 1985 
Dear 
I want to thank you for your willingness to participate on my research 
experiment. As you know you will be awarded 5 bonus points on your final grade 
of Theories and Practice of Counseling for your time and efforts. UJhen the results 
have been tabulated, I will send you an abstract of the findings. 
I want to remind you that you are scheduled for the. 
at.in.room.It is very important that you be there 
on time. The experiment will take about 30 minutes. 
• Feel free to contact me at any time about questions you may have concerning 
this experiment. 
Thanks again for your collaboration. 
Cordially, 
Oscar F. Goncalves 
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Appendix C 
Oscar F-. Gongalves 
Counseling Paychology 
University Of Massachusetts 
Amherst, 01 00 3 
A62 Mills South 
Phone & 545-3628 
Permission Form 
As the reseacher who is responsible for this study, I would like to 
familiarize you further with the nature of this experiment. During this experiment, 
we will measure your reactions to images presented on a Tachistoscope. We 
will also measure your verbal reactions and evaluations of films which simulate 
client statements. 
The results will be part of my dissertation at the University of Massachusetts 
and may be used in further publications. 
My agreement with you is that: 
(1) Your name will not be disclosed in any recording of my data. 
(2) Participation will not pose a physical risk, emotional hindrance 
or financial cost to you. 
(3) You will be awarded 5 bonus points for your participation, in the 
final grade of "Theories and Practice of Counseling". 
(4) You are free to withdraw at any point without any penalty or inconvenience. 
(5) You will receive an abstract with the main results of the experiment. 
(6) If you choose, we will meet with you personally to discuss the outcomes 
of this study. 
In return, it is essential that you agree not to disclose any information 
regarding the content or nature of this experiment to anyone, before re jing 
the abstract of the results. 
Please feel free to contact me at any time regarding any questions 
and concerns you may have. 
I have read and understood this permission form and agree to participate 
in this study and to abide by its agreements. 
Subject Signed. 
Reseacher Signed 
Date 
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Appendix D 
Recall of UJords 
II 
Now. I would like you to write TEN WORDS that you remenber from the past presentation. 
If you don't remenber any words, try to guess" guess the ten words that first come 
to your mind. The order of the words does not make any difference. 
I 
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Appendix E 
Generation o-P a Response 
IV 
Write a brief response to that client. What would you say directly to him if you 
were the counselor? 1 only want your verbal response. 
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Appendix F 
Cl±ent Evaluation Form 
NAME CODE 
PLease, rate the client you have just seen, by circling a number 
from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely) on each of the following 
traits: 
KINDLY 
not at all 
0 1 2 
extremely 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
REPULSIVE 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
COMPASSIONATE 
HELLISH 
WARMHEARTED 
CRUEL 
LOVING 
VIOLENT 
AFFECTIONATE 
SUICIDAL 
0 1 2 3 4.5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 8 9 10 
6 7 8 9 10 
6 7 8 9 10 
6 7 8 9 10 
6 7 8 9 10 
6 7 8 9 10 
6 7 8 9 10 
6 7 8 9 10 
Appendix G 
Intentions 
VI 
Intentions are here defined as the counselor's rationale fnr ooinrtinn a soocifie 
response. Try to remenber what was in your mind at the time you were writing vour 
response to the client. I am only interested in your intentions for the response 
with” M client;0* V0Ur 009 term ob)ectluBS if vou going to work further 
h rirrH™“t0hW=inn3’ i°U find 3 Ust °f ” intencion’' Choose those that best anolv by circling the number before each intention. Please, choose all the intentions 
that apply to your situation, even if all phrasing is not directly applicable. 
L 
r 
s. 
4. 
5. 
«. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
1L 
11 
11 
14. 
11 
11 
17. 
11 
11 
Lotantioaa 
Senate To atnwnns mah* miunmMWe feKli^. r~l. wk|—^--. -nliia —ihnTh 
to attain pak cvnct expectaoone about MaaMnanl or aalihliih miaa or parameters of lektiooehip i• I 
tuna, faas cancel 1* boo polidaa. homework). 
Gat taliraatMc To find out specific facta about history, dlant hincbocing. future plana, and to aa. 
Giro uiaraatMa: To aducata. pi facta, correct misperceptions or mkiaformatioa, |i«i reasons far 
tharapwt’s bahaviar or procedures 
SupperC To provide a warn, rupporbes ampathic environment; Inaema trust and rapport aad build 
rekunnahipc help chant faai accepted. understood. comfortable, rearnurvd. and laaa annwa; bdp liMat 
a pcreorilo-pmon relationship. 
Poeoae To balp client get back oa tba track, change subject. channel or structure tbr discussion if ba or 
■be ia unahk to bagm or baa baas or rambling. 
Clarify: To provide or solicit more elaboration, or specification abac client or theraplal ha 
been vacuo, incomplete, confining, contradictory, or inaudible. 
Hepae To convey tba expectation that change ia poaaible and likely to occur, convey that tba tbarepal 
•til ba able to help tba diaat. raetore monk, build up the divot'a confidence to make changes 
Catharb To promote relief from teoaion or unhappy feeling*, allow Ole dienl a chance to kt gear talk 
through fedop and problem*. 
Cognitions To identify maladaptive, iTryrel or irrational thoughU or atutudaa («-f- “I auat be par* 
fact"). 
Bebavierec To identify aad give feedback about the diant'* inappiopnat* or maladaptive bahanore 
and/or tbair iruaaq ijam.es do a behavioral analysis paint out gamas 
Sdf-coatrefc Tb among* dient to own or gam a aanaa of matary or control ovw ba or bar owe thorohts 
fsahags behaviors <* impulses balp cheat h—»— mare appropriately infernal rather than inapprapnaiaty 
aztaraai ia taking reaponaibility for ha or bar role. 
fee Lings To idanbfy, mtaaoity, and/or enable acceptance of feelings ancourago or provoke the diaat 
to become aware at at deepen underlying or hidden fading* or affvet or vxpenence fading* at a dupe 
Laaaghe To anjuurage undantanding of tba underlying reaanns dynam* 
mouvatmaa for oogniboaa. behavior*, attitudes, or fading* May indud* aa undaratanding of chant's 
reortinna to other* behaviors 
Cbaagee To bndd and develop new and more adaptive skills behaviors or cognitions ia dealing «nth 
aaif and otbars May ba to 11 new, more adaptive aaeumpUve models (Vaiea arki axplaoataoos or 
aooesptuahmcimm. May be to give an aeaaaanant or op two about dwnl functwrung that will bdp dwat 
me oslf in new wey. 
Baiafaree ehnagec To give punitive leudarcemest ar feed berk shout bahavinrmL ccgnitivs or ifletrv 
iBnpe at change to tba probability ilm the change will ht oontoiusd or mainiamad nauw* 
nag taking aad aew np of behaving. 
gaanaaa Ta owcoaaa obatadna to diaag* a program. May daman faOine to adhere «a tbarapmmr 
pruoedurm. mthm m pam or to preverS poeability at ouch failure is futurs 
fballaaga To jolt tba dkot out of a praaant rtata: ibaks up currant baor fvdingr mm veidity. 
adequacy, mil) or qptpal— of ballads thoughts fadings or hvhavewe. balp daoat qumuoa tba 
aomarnty <W mamtanung old pottarns 
Bakffeaohim To rmoiva protons ra they ana* in tbt rakbmdup ui <edr» to kdd or aaaoa s Merab 
_.iu^» h—i naanw m tba alliancs deal with dependency arrenprm fe stag* ia treat 
mmti uacotw and rmrdve dotortxms in chant'* thinking about lb* rakomdup that ar* baawi aa pad 
tba current renhty. 
To protKt. refievs « dafand the «barep»*t. alWmate anriacy. May try imduly fe 
[*——argon. <a fad good or aupfesce d tba expanse d tba HW.__ 
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